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Abstract 
At a perceptual level, faces and voices consist of very different sensory inputs and therefore, 
information processing from one modality can be independent of information processing from another 
modality (Adolphs & Tranel, 1999). However, there may also be a shared neural emotion network 
that processes stimuli independent of modality (Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010) or emotions 
may be processed on a more abstract cognitive level, based on meaning rather than on perceptual 
signals. This thesis therefore aimed to examine emotion recognition across two separate modalities in 
a within-subject design, including a cognitive Chapter 1 with 45 British adults, a developmental 
Chapter 2 with 54 British children as well as a cross-cultural Chapter 3 with 98 German and British 
children, and 78 German and British adults. Intensity ratings as well as choice reaction times and 
correlations of confusion analyses of emotions across modalities were analysed throughout. Further, 
an ERP Chapter investigated the time-course of emotion recognition across two modalities. Highly 
correlated rating profiles of emotions in faces and voices were found which suggests a similarity in 
emotion recognition across modalities. Emotion recognition in primary-school children improved with 
age for both modalities although young children relied mainly on faces. British as well as German 
participants showed comparable patterns for rating basic emotions, but subtle differences were also 
noted and Germans perceived emotions as less intense than British.  
Overall, behavioural results reported in the present thesis are consistent with the idea of a 
general, more abstract level of emotion processing which may act independently of modality. This 
could be based, for example, on a shared emotion brain network or some more general, higher-level 
cognitive processes which are activated across a range of modalities. Although emotion recognition 
abilities are already evident during childhood, this thesis argued for a contribution of ‘nurture’ to 
emotion mechanisms as recognition was influenced by external factors such as development and 
culture.   
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1  
Introduction  
There’s no art to find the mind’s construction in the face. He was a gentleman on whom 
I built an absolute trust. 
Shakespeare, Macbeth (1.4.14-5, 2010/1699) 
 
In Shakespeare’s famous play Macbeth (2010/1699), King Duncan got betrayed by Thane of 
Cawdor and subsequently concluded that one cannot read another person’s mind or trustfulness from 
the face alone. This quote may still apply today to some every-day situations such as communicative 
misunderstandings. On the other hand, it is also evident that we are actually very well adapted to read 
other’s emotions in the face – and even in the voice. To what extend voices and faces indeed signal 
specific emotions that can be reliably recognised and whether both modes of communication are 
equally useful to read another person’s emotional state will be the focus of this particular work. In 
everyday life, information from voice and face are usually combined simultaneously in order to 
deliver a more detailed picture of social situations. However, the present thesis aims to investigate 
vocal as well as facial information separately in order to examine how we recognise emotions when 
we only have one modality available such as in darkness or very noisy situations. The aim of this 
thesis is to demonstrate to the reader that –contrary to Shakespeare’s well-known words – humans are 
to some degree able to see the mind’s construction in the face and even in the voice. Further, the goal 
of this thesis is to investigate whether this emotion recognition ability is already evident in primary-
school aged children and what role cultural influences play during emotion recognition across 
modalities.  
 
1.1 The Six Basic Emotions 
According to Hess and Thibault (2009), ‘emotions are considered to be relatively short-
duration intentional states that entrain changes in motor behavior, physiological changes, and 
cognitions’ (p. 120). The ability to produce as well as recognise emotions has often been contributed 
to the concept of social and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Salovey, & Mayer, 1990) and is 
thought to be a separate construct to general IQ or personality traits (Mayer, 2000). Emotional 
competence (Scherer, 2007) can be used as an umbrella term for emotion production, regulation and 
perception.  
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Whilst all three mechanisms are related and needed for high levels of emotional intelligence, the 
present thesis focuses on the ability to perceive and categorise emotions. The six basic emotions 
covered in this piece of research are the emotions of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and 
disgust as described by Ekman and Friesen (1975).  
Although the focus of the present thesis is not emotion expression but rather emotion 
recognition, it is important to understand how the basic emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) can be 
produced in order to be recognised by others. In past literature on emotion production, competing 
hypotheses have either claimed emotion expressions that are based on categorical emotion-specific 
responses (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1976) or emotion expressions that are based on the subjective 
appraisal of events which are not necessarily specific to one particular emotion (e.g. Frijda, Kuipers, 
& ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1984). In more detail, accounts of emotion expressions based on discrete 
categories have been supported by innate and universal recognition of prototypical emotion displays 
(Izard, 1994). It is believed that specific events trigger corresponding bodily responses as reflected in 
specific emotion expressions that are universal. For example, the thought of an imminent maths test 
may cause tensioning of face muscles and wide-opened eyes, and this combination may display the 
emotion ‘fear’. On the other hand, appraisal theories – such as the Component Process Model by 
Scherer (1984) – suggest a combination of cognitive, physiological and motor behaviours that follow 
the subjective evaluation of an event. This evaluation of the situation controls for novelty, 
pleasantness or coping resources needed following the onset of an event. And so, the thought of the 
imminent maths test may be less distressing to the reader than it is to the writer due to different coping 
resources. Emotion processes can also be driven by social norms which seem appropriate during the 
experience of an emotional event (e.g. Frijda, 1986). 
Happiness is the only positive emotion included in the six basic emotions and some 
researchers have begun to include several other positive emotions such as pleasure or relief in emotion 
research (e.g. Sauter & Scott, 2007). Expressing happiness is part of a very basic and instinct human 
behaviour and even infants can distinguish between emotions of positive and negative valence 
(Grossman, Striano, & Friederici, 2007). Happiness can be caused by several factors such as pleasure, 
excitement, relief or following social approval. In terms of appraisal theories, positive emotions such 
as happiness are the result of initial stimulus evaluation such as pleasantness which is, for example, 
followed by the face muscle contraction of pulling lip corners upwards resulting in a smile (Scherer, 
2009). Sadness, anger, fear and disgust on the other hand are prevailing negative emotions. Sadness 
usually is a longer-lasting feeling that expresses suffering as a consequence of a loss. Sadness can be 
the result of failing to cope with helplessness and grief and can therefore blend with feelings of anger 
or fear (Ekman & Friesen, 1975/2003).  
According to appraisal theories, negative events, which may obstruct reaching a personal goal, 
are accompanied by bodily changes such as increased heart rate or tensioning of muscles in order to 
prepare the organism for a possible attack.  
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This physiological response is associated with an increase in voice frequency and tightening of eye 
lids, resulting in motor expressions of the felt emotion following the appraisal of the current situation 
(Scherer, 2009).Very generally, fear – but also anger - processing is thought to be associated with 
amygdala activation within the human brain (e.g. Adolphs, 2002).  
Disgust can be a reaction towards physical stimuli such as smells and sounds as well as 
towards socio-moral types of behaviour that elicit disgust or even anger. In evolutionary terms, 
disgusted reactions could save lives by protecting the organism from poisonous substances or 
infections by spitting out spoiled food (Chapman & Anderson, 2012). Disgust perception is 
commonly associated with activation in the insula (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 2001). The last of the six basic emotions is the emotion of surprise which is of neutral 
nature and usually rapidly followed by either positive or negative emotions. According to discrete 
accounts of emotion production, surprise is an emotion of short duration, felt after “unexpected or 
misexpected events” (Ekman & Friesen, 1975/2003, p. 25). According to appraisal theories, motor 
expressions of positive or negative surprise follow the appraisal of unexpected events with subsequent 
appraisal of coping resources available to deal with a surprising situation (Scherer & Ellgrin, 2007).  
All emotions can vary in intensity and the expression may be influenced by previous 
experiences, stereotypes as well as personality types (Ekman & Friesen, 1975/2003). Especially 
appraisal theories suggest individual differences in emotion expression due to underlying differences 
in appraisal checks and coping resources following an event (Scherer, 2009). More details about 
specific emotion expressions in either faces or voices and their neural mechanisms are described 
below.  
 
1.2 Faces 
In everyday life, basic and universal emotion cues are most obviously communicated via the 
visual domain. Faces are very important social stimuli which can communicate information regarding 
gender (Sung, Gao, & Han, 2010), mental states (Adolphs, 2002), perceived attractiveness (Perrett, 
Burt, Penton-Voak, Lee, Rowland, & Edwards, 1999) and even dominance levels (Neave et al., 2003) 
of the expresser.  
1.2.1 Vision and Face Perception  
As summarised by Goldstein (2001), visual perception starts with objects (or in the present 
case with faces) that cause light to be reflected from the surface onto the retina inside the human eye. 
After light has been turned into electrical signals due to chemical reactions in receptive cells in the 
eye, the signals then travel along the optical nerve to the bilateral lateral geniculate nucleus in the 
thalamus before being sent to the visual striate cortex in the occipital lobe.  
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Whilst neurons in the striate cortex are specialised to respond to specific features of the object such as 
orientation (e.g. Bosking, Zhang, Schofield, & Fitzpatrick, 1997), extrastriate areas then allow further 
in-depth processing of the stimulus such as face expressions (e.g. Kanwisher, 1997). Visual 
information gets then passed on via the ventral or ‘what stream’, from the visual to the inferior-
temporal cortex, which serves object identification. On the other hand, visual information related to 
location of objects and associated motor response preparation will be sent to the posterior parietal 
regions via the dorsal or ‘where stream’ (Goodale & Milner, 1992). Whilst this is a very basic 
summary of visual perception, the reader is referred to Goldstein (2001) for a more detailed 
description of visual processing in the human brain. 
However, not all visual objects are the same and for humans, faces can play a crucial role 
during social perception or communication. Even new-born infants pay special attention to human 
faces as shown by increased eye-tracking behaviour of moving face patterns compared to non-face 
patterns which suggests inborn abilities for recognising the structure of human faces (Morton & 
Johnson, 1991). Typical timings of brain responses for processing faces are often observed in ERP
1
 
studies at around 170ms after stimulus onset which is thought to reflect a face-specific negative 
component of the event-related potential (e.g. Eimer, 2011; Luck, 2005). 
Past research from patients with the neurological disorder prosopagnosia, or so-called ‘face 
blindness’, has demonstrated separate pathways for object versus face identity recognition within the 
human brain (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005). For these individuals, vision and object recognition is 
intact whilst the recognition of faces is impaired (Bodamer, 1947).The brain has shown a specialised 
face processing area which consists of three main structures, namely the lateral fusiform gyrus - 
which is also famously known as the fusiform face area FFA (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) 
- as well as the lateral inferior occipital gyrus (occipital face area OFA) and the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (STS, Benton et al., 1980). Faces are usually recognised as a whole rather than as a 
sum of its individual features (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998). Trying to categorise faces that 
are displayed up-side-down seems to disturb this holistic way of processing faces, resulting in longer 
processing times based on individual features alone (Rossion, 2009). However, the face-specificity 
has also been criticised and instead attributed to general expertise recognition (Diamond & Carey, 
1986). 
1.2.2 Emotional Face Recognition 
Humans are generally pretty good at recognising emotions expressed in the face. Kohler and 
colleagues (2004) for example reported high accuracy rates for categorising four basic emotions in 
static photos of faces with happy faces being recognised with 91.2% accuracy and sad faces with 84% 
accuracy.  
                                                     
1
 Event related potential. Average of electrophysiological brain responses following events such as watching 
emotional faces. Recorded by electroencephalography EEG (Luck, 2005). 
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ERP studies suggest that emotionality in faces can be recognised as early as100ms after stimulus 
onset whilst differentiation between specific emotion categories occurred as early as 140 ms after 
stimulus onset (Batty & Taylor, 2003). Especially the mechanisms for recognising fear is believed to 
elicit early brain responses: Ashley, Vuilleumier and Swick (2003) reported enhanced negativity for 
fearful versus happy or neutral facial stimuli at around 200ms after stimulus onset (see also Kiss & 
Eimer, 2008).  
How is the richness of information from faces being processed? In 1986, Bruce and Young 
first proposed a face perception model that introduced separate functional pathways for speech 
analysis, identity analysis or expression analysis for extracting specific information from the face. 
According to this model, we structurally encode the face to extract its features. This information gets 
stored as face recognition units for future face recognition or it can be used for categorization of 
emotion expressions and both processes can happen in parallel and functionally separate from each 
other.  
This functional dissociation has been confirmed by data from prosopagnosic patients which 
suggested that whilst emotion recognition is intact, some individuals had difficulties recognising 
familiar faces, indicating deficits for identity recognition rather than general face perception deficits 
(Tranel, Damasio, & Damasion, 1988). In contrast, prosopo-affective agnosia describes impaired face 
emotion recognition in patients whilst face identity recognition remains intact (Kurucz & Feldmar, 
1979). In 2002, Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini reported separate neural pathways for processing either 
identity or emotion expression from faces. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, they found that cells in the 
lateral fusiform gyrus seemed to be specialised for identity recognition whilst cells in the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) responded mainly to changes in face expressions and eye gaze. 
However, more recent evidence suggests that the route of completely separate pathways for 
face recognition and face expression may not be as clear-cut. For example, Calder and Young (2005) 
propose that principal component analysis reveals overlapping visual pixels of images displaying 
faces that can be used to either decode face identity or face expressions. In addition, Baseler, Harris, 
Young and Andrews (2014) reported functional connectivity for face identity and face expressions 
mechanisms between the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and other face areas such as the 
fusiform face area (FFA). Of particular interest for the present thesis is also the finding that the STS 
responds to emotion information not only from faces – but also from other modalities such as voices 
(Charest et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 1998). Hence, the aim of the current thesis is to investigate 
whether emotional face recognition – irrespective of the debate whether it is completely separated 
from face identity recognition or not – is modality specific or whether a general emotion mechanism 
(possibly within the STS) drives emotion recognition for faces and voices equally. 
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Figure 1.1. Face recognition model. Face identity and face expression recognition seem to be (a) functionally (Bruce & 
Young, 1986) as well as (b) anatomically segregated (Haxby et al., 2002). In Calder, & Young (2005).  
 
1.2.2.1 Ekman Face Stimuli 
How are emotions expressed and recognised in faces? Commonly, facial emotion perception 
is investigated by manipulating overt changes in facial musculature during face expressions. The 
Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman & Friesen, 1976) was developed in order to assess facial 
emotion expression based on the combination of specific muscle activity within the face.  
Just like acoustical features within the voice, a combination of action units (physical features based on 
muscle movement of the face) are believed to give a reliable and universal impression of the 
underlying emotions displayed (Sauter, Eisner, Calder, & Scott, 2010). 
Common action units are summarised in Table 1.1. For example, happiness in faces is 
expressed by action units of tensing of the lower eyelids, pulling up the lip corners and raising the 
cheeks (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Further, wrinkles from the nose down to the outer corner of the 
mouth as well as wrinkles at the outer corners of the eyes may be visible (Ekman & Friesen, 
1975/2003). Sadness is portrayed by raising the inner eye brows and pulling down the lip corners.  
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Anger is expressed by drawing the eyebrows together and lowering them as well as tensing the lower 
eyelids and either pressing the lips together or with open mouth. The degree of muscle tension in the 
face can reflect the intensity of the emotion experienced (Ekman & Friesen, 1975/2003). Fear is 
demonstrated by raising the eyebrows, eyes are wide open and tense lower eyelids. The lips are 
usually stretched and tense and the mouth may be open or closed. Interestingly, surprise in the face 
shares several features with the expression of fear such as the raised eyebrows and wide open eyes. 
However, surprise shows a lesser degree of tension in the face compared to fear and whilst the lips are 
stretched with tension in fear, surprise often is expressed with a dropped and relaxed jaw (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1975/2003). Lastly, disgust is usually expressed by raising the upper lip with the lower lip 
either raised as well or lowered which results in an open mouth. Further, the nose is wrinkled and the 
eyebrows are lowered.  
Hence, due to its widespread use, the present thesis includes the static black and white Ekman 
faces from the Pictures of Facial Affect database (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), posed by white Caucasian 
actors based on the FACS system. Although more recent emotion research has begun to include 
dynamic (Vieillard & Guidetti, 2009) or spontaneous (Jack, Garrod, & Schyns,  2014) face expression 
stimuli in order to simulate real-life situations, the Ekman faces are believed to be of a comparable 
difficulty level to non-verbal affect vocalisations (Hawk et al., 2009) which makes for an ideal basis 
for comparison.  
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Table 1.1 
List of Action Units (AU) from the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1976, p.65) 
 
Note. AUs can be used in specific combinations to display specific emotions in faces, based on muscular 
activity. In Rosenberg, 2005. 
 
1.3. Voices  
Whilst recognising expressions in faces requires seeing the other person in front of oneself at a 
not too far distance, voices can be heard from further away and also from all angles without having to 
turn the head (Scherer, 1995). Hence, communicating emotions via the vocal modality may be 
especially useful for situations where immediate action is required.  
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1.3.1. Voice Perception 
In basic terms, sound perception is based on the inner ear receiving sound pressure waves from 
the environment. Those sound waves are then transformed into electrical potentials when vibrations 
bend hair-cell receptors inside the cochlear which in turn causes those receptors to release 
neurotransmitters. Next, the electrical signal travels along the auditory nerve to the medial geniculate 
nucleus in the thalamus before being sent to the primary auditory area in the temporal cortex and 
further subcortical structures such as the amygdala (Goldstein, 2001). In terms of specialised 
pathways for auditory perception, comparing two sounds (in the ‘what’-stream) activated the auditory 
cortex and inferior frontal gyrus whilst locating the origin of two sounds relative to each other (in the 
‘where’-stream) activated the posterior temporal cortex, parietal cortex and superior frontal sulcus, 
suggesting independent processing pathways of auditory information depending on the information 
extracted from sounds (Alain, Arnott, Hevenor, Graham, & Grady, 2001).  
Just like faces are thought to be special kind of visual objects (e.g. Duchaine & Nakayama, 
2005), voices are thought to be special kind of sounds. The vocal signals we receive and decode are 
based on acoustical features of the encoder’s voice such as pitch and amplitude and are created by air 
pressure waves from the lung that moves through the vocal cord and vocal tract. A natural variation in 
membrane length of vocal folds within the individual’s larynx and its vibrations creates a person’s 
characteristic pitch whilst the vocal tract above the larynx filters out specific frequencies of the pitch 
that determines sound production (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Ghazanfar & Rendall, 2008). Variance in 
size of vocal folds is also the reason for perceived gender differences in pitch with females naturally 
having smaller vocal folds which in turn produce a higher mean pitch (Juslin & Laukka, 2001). 
Amplitude in human sounds describes the loudness of the sound (Goldstein, 2001). 
Similarly to faces (Kanwisher et al., 1997), voice selective areas, which respond more to 
voices than to other sounds, have been found and these are believed to be in the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS) within the auditory cortex (Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & Pike, 2000; von Kriegstein 
& Giraud, 2004). However, the role of the STS during voice processing does not seem to be exclusive 
because voice-sensitive areas have also been found in pre-frontal brain areas (Fecteau, Armony, 
Joanette, & Belin, 2005). Further, it has also been proposed that face or voice-specific neural areas 
rather reflect general expertise-processing, independent of the object processed (Gauthier et al., 2000). 
In the same way that prosopagnosic patients show a dissociation between face and general visual 
object recognition (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005), phonagnosic patients show dissociations between 
voice identity recognition and general voice discrimination. Whilst the first is linked to damage in the 
right parietal lobe, the latter is associated with damage in the bilateral temporal lobe (Van Lancker, 
Cummings, Kreiman, & Dobkin, 1988). Further, there also seems to be time-locked events in the 
brain in direct correspondence to human voice processing. Similarly to the N170 component found 
during face processing (e.g. Eimer, 2011), ERP studies have confirmed specific electrical responses 
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between 160 and 200ms after stimulus onset for human voices as compared to non-vocal sounds, 
called the ‘fronto-temporal positivity to voices’ (FTPV, Charest et al., 2009).  
1.3.2. Emotional Voice Recognition  
Past research has demonstrated that emotions can be recognised above chance not only from 
faces – but also from voices. Just like physical features in the face, a combination of auditory features 
within the voice such as pitch and intensity can give insight into underlying emotional processes of 
the individual (e.g. Sauter, 2010). Across several studies, emotional prosody recognition accuracy 
seems to be around the 50% mark as observed by Banse and Scherer (1996). They suggested highest 
recognition accuracy for spoken sentences expressing hot anger (78%) with disgust only being 
correctly recognised in 15% of cases; this, however, was still higher than making judgements by 
chance alone. Juslin and Laukka (2001) reported highest decoding accuracy for prosody 
communicating sadness and fear, followed by anger, happiness and disgust; emotions with higher 
intensity were recognised with increased accuracy.  
Affective information from voices is mainly processed within the right hemisphere such as 
the right temporal lobe, right inferior prefrontal cortex or right amygdala (Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard. 
2004; Morris, Scott, & Dolan, 1999). However, emotional prosody has also been found to be 
processed bilaterally in the so-called emotional voice areas (EVA) which are located in the superior 
temporal gyrus close to the primary auditory cortex (Ethofer, Bretscher, Gschwind, Kreifelts, 
Wildgruber, & Vuilleumier, 2011).  
As discussed above, emotional information from faces seems to be processed independently 
to identity information from faces – although the degree of independence may vary (Calder & Young, 
2005). In direct comparison, emotional information from voices also seems to be processed 
independently from identity information from voices (Belin et al., 2004; see also Belin, Bestelmeyer, 
Latinus, & Watson, 2011). According to Belin et al.’s voice perception model (2004), after initial 
low-level analysis of auditory signals, structural encoding of auditory features follows which then 
leads to either voice identity or voice affect recognition. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Separate 
functional pathways for identity and affect recognition in voices have been demonstrated by 
phonagnosic patients: A single-case study of developmental phonagnosia has reported impaired 
recognition mechanisms for famous and new voices which were independent of emotional voice 
recognition mechanisms (Garrido, Eisner, McGettigan, Steward, Sauter, & Hanley, 2009).  
For the present thesis, the pathway of affective processing for both modalities is of special interest. 
During emotion recognition of prosody, the right posterior STS as well as frontal areas showed 
increased BOLD
2
 responses (Wildgruber et al., 2005) 
 
                                                     
2
 BOLD: Blood oxygenation level-dependent. Hemodynamic response to increase blood oxygen levels in active 
brain regions following neural activity (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito (1998). 
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Figure 1.2. Comparable structure between voice (pink) versus face (green) perception. Emotion recognition 
seems to be independent of identity and speech recognition for both modalities. From Belin et al., 2004 
 
 
Generally, good verbal knowledge is needed to understand emotion categories and semantic 
meaning of emotion words can influence general emotion processing (Lindquist, Feldman Barrett, 
Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). However, voice perception is still possible in non-verbal individuals 
such as infants. For example, Grossman, Oberecker, Koch and Friederiki (2010) used near-infrared 
spectroscopy (NIRS)
3
 in order to observe brain development in infants and found adult-like increased 
oxygenated haemoglobin levels in right temporal regions when listening to words with emotional 
tone. Those findings suggest that perception of emotional voices has its origin in early infant brain 
development. Further, emotionality in voices does not always have to be communicated via prosody. 
As summarised next, non-verbal affect bursts such as laughter have recently begun to be included in 
emotion research. 
 
1.3.3. Non-Verbal Affect Bursts 
An alternative method to observing emotions in speech prosody is to investigate the 
recognition of non-verbal affect vocalisations which are ‘brief, non-word utterances’ (Simon-Thomas, 
Keltner, Sauter, Sinicropi-Yao, & Abramson, 2009, p. 838) and contain laughter, crying or an angry 
                                                     
3
 NIRS is a child-friendly functional neuroimaging method which observes changes in hemodynamic responses 
by investigating optical changes in structures due to different degrees of light absorption following the absence 
of oxygen in the blood (Zabel & Chute, 2002). 
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roar. Affect bursts are the shortest possible form of vocal emotion expression which lends itself to the 
comparison of static face expressions. Vocalisations can be used for cross-cultural research without 
the limitation of language skills and are thought to represent more natural emotion expressions than 
prosody (Sauter et al., 2009). 
Recognition scores are often higher for emotional affect bursts compared to prosody as 
expressions are of a more prototypical nature, hence, facilitating emotion recognition (Hawk, van 
Kleef, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2009; Simon-Thomas et al., 2009). For example, overall recognition 
rate for emotion categories was 81.1% with disgust yielding accuracy rates of 93% (Schroeder, 2003) 
slightly lower recognition rates of 72% for sadness (Simon-Thomas et al, 2009). Whilst anger, 
disgust, sadness and surprise were especially well recognised, Simon-Thomas and colleagues (2009) 
concluded that overall, up to 14 out of 22 different emotion categories could be reliably identified 
from non-verbal affect clues alone. Accuracy levels were above chance with a recognition advantage 
for emotions expressed by female as compared to male speakers.  
By including additional positive emotions expressed non-verbally such as relief or 
achievement, Sauter and Scott (2007) reported high recognition rates above chance which ranged 
from 52.7% for contentment to 90.4% for amusement. Even children as young as 5 years old could 
recognise non-verbal affect vocalisations with overall accuracy of 78.1% which increased to 83.9% in 
children up to the age of 10 (Sauter et al., 2013). Which features within the voice – other than 
linguistic content – determine emotion transmission?  
Sauter et al. (2012) investigated the relationship of recognition abilities and acoustical features of their 
own developed dataset of affect bursts created by actors. They concluded that specific combinations 
of amplitude, pitch and variation of the frequency spectrum could lead to reliable recognition of 
emotion categories. For example, multiple linear regression analysis revealed that a combination of 
short stimulus duration, a lower mean pitch and less pitch variation predicted the emotion as 
belonging to the ‘surprise’ category.  
The nature of non-linguistic affect bursts can be reflexive and – just like for face expressions 
– they are usually caused by biological processes (so-called ‘push effect’) or can sometimes be 
influenced by socio-cultural expectations which are learned and result in intentional exclamations of 
emotions (so-called ‘pull effect’), often containing additional phonetic properties (Scherer, 1994). In 
terms of neural structures, emotion processing of non-verbal vocalisations is believed to occur in 
bilateral regions of anterior insula, frontal and temporal regions (Morris, Scott, & Dolan, 1999). 
Fecteau et al. (2007) additionally reported increased amygdala activation during the processing of 
positive and negative non-verbal affect bursts. 
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1.3.3.1. Montreal Affective Voices 
When comparing recognition of emotion from affect bursts with the widely used Ekman face 
set (Ekman & Friesen, 1987), it is crucial to choose vocal stimuli that are of comparable standard in 
their recordings, speaker ethnicity and emotion categories included. Hence, the present thesis includes 
the Montreal Affective Voices (MAV) which have been produced by white Caucasian actors (Belin, 
Fillion-Bilodeau, & Gosselin, 2008). The MAV are solely based on non-verbal variations on the 
vowel /a/.Recognition rates for the MAV database are generally high with overall recognition 
accuracy being 68.2%. Sadness received highest rates of 86%, followed by disgust (81%) and anger 
(87%). Overall, female vocalisations were recognised with higher accuracy than emotions expressed 
by male actors. As illustrated in Table 1.2, the median pitch across all vocalisations and actors was 
highest for fear, followed by surprise, sadness, anger and happiness with lowest median pitch for 
disgusted stimuli. The mean length from stimuli across all 10 actors reached from 385ms for surprised 
stimuli to 2229s for sad vocalisations (Belin et al., 2008).  
 
Table 1.2 
Acoustical features of non-verbal affect vocalisations for all 9 emotions included (Belin et al., 2008). 
 
 
Overall, previous literature suggests that acoustical features in affect vocalisations reveal 
sufficient information about the emotion category in question, making the inclusion of non-verbal 
affect bursts a useful addition to the investigation of emotion recognition across several modalities as 
well as across cultures and in children.   
Neither the MAV nor the Ekman faces rely on linguistic or verbal information which makes them 
ideal stimuli for the present investigation of emotion recognition in children and across countries as 
implied by Koeda, Belin, Hama, Masuda, Matsuura and Okubo (2013).  
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1.4. Role of Modality and Emotion Mechanisms 
For person identity recognition, Yovel and Belin (2013) stated recently that – despite very 
different sensory inputs - there might be unified coding principles across the visual and auditory 
modalities as based on previous neurological, cognitive and developmental data. Interestingly, during 
speaker recognition, voice specific areas such as the STS and face-specific areas such as the fusiform 
face area (FFA) show direct functional connectivity which facilitated identification of familiar 
persons (Von Kriegstein, Kleinschmidt, Sterzer, & Giraud, 2005). There is little knowledge, however, 
about whether emotions from faces and emotions from voices are also represented using similar 
mechanisms; although there is indeed some behavioural evidence for correlations between rating 
abilities of emotions in faces and voices (e.g. Borod et al., 2000). Both voices and faces have been 
shown to be processed in the STS (Haxby et al., 2002; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004), but is there 
evidence for emotion-specific brain regions that process information independent of the modality? 
Although emotion processing may be somewhat subjective and context-dependent (e.g. 
Scherer, 1984), past research has indeed demonstrated biological evidence for recognising the basic 
emotions in the human brain (e.g. Adolphs, 2002; Wicker et al., 2003). There seems to be a general 
right hemispheric advantage for emotion processing (Blonder, Bowers, & Heilman, 1999; Kesler-
West et al., 2001) and emotion recognition in faces as well as in voices is usually associated with 
specific emotion structures in the brain.  
With fear being an emotion representing danger or threat, taking on a locationist
4
 perspective 
of emotion processing (Lindquist, Wagner, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Feldman Barrett, 2012), the main 
subcortical structure commonly associated with fear processing is the amygdala. Lesion studies have 
consistently shown that although bilateral amygdala damage results in a more general reduced 
emotion recognition ability of mainly negative emotions (Adolphs, 1999; Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, 
& Dolan, 1999), the recognition of fearful faces was impaired the most (e.g. Adolphs, 2002) and can 
be extended to fearful emotion processing in prosody (Phillips et al., 1998) and even to fearful and 
angry non-verbal affect-bursts (Scott, Young, Calder, Hellawell, Aggleton, & Johnson, 1997).  
Fecteau, Belin, Joanette, and Armony (2007) also reported a link between the recognition of non-
verbal affect and amygdala function – although this extended to positive and negative emotions 
equally.  
Apart from fear, disgust is another basic emotion that can be mapped to a specific brain 
location. Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young (2000) demonstrated that a patient with lesions to 
the insula and putamen in the left hemisphere was impaired in recognising disgust from several 
modalities, including face expressions and verbal as well as non-verbal voices. Further, the 
connection between somatosensory brain areas and the insula (Stephani, Fernandez-Baca Vaca, 
                                                     
4
 Locationist perspective: discrete emotion categories (such as fear) are associated with a discrete brain location 
(such as amygdala). This is the opposite to a psychological constructionist perspective (see footnote 6) 
(Lindquist et al., 2012). 
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Maciunas, Koubeissi, & Lüders, 2010) suggests a link between recognising disgust, feeling sick and 
activation of the insula.   
Orbito-frontal parts of the brain have previously been associated with general emotion 
recognition abilities across voices and faces (Homak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996) and more specifically 
with the recognition of angry faces (Blair et al., 1999) and angry voices (Sander et al., 2005). Angry 
faces also activated the anterior cingulated cortex (Blair et al., 1999) and some studies also reported 
activation in the right fusiform gyrus in response to angry voices (Johnstone, van Reekum, Oakes, & 
Davidson, 2006). This indicates that the link between angry stimuli, modality and assigned brain areas 
is not straight forward. It is possible that frontal parts of the brain are mainly involved in general 
higher cognition such as the conscious evaluation of emotional stimuli classification rather than 
specific emotion processing (Nakamura et al., 1999). This may be especially true when stimuli such 
as affective prosody are ambiguous and need further evaluation (Leitman et al., 2010). The right 
somatosensory cortex has been associated with a variety of emotion processing within faces (Adolphs, 
Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2008) as well as 
in voices (Banissy et al., 2010). Lesion studies suggested that impairment of right somatosensory 
cortices was associated with a deficit in forming neural representations of the observed emotion which 
in turn disabled simulation and recognition of the emotion expressed by others (Adolphs et al., 2000).  
Whilst the current review suggests neural emotion structures that process emotions 
independently of modality, it also has to be noted that there is some evidence for emotion processing 
that was dissociated for faces and voices. For example, Bach, Hurlemann and Dolan (2013) reported 
that for two individuals with bilateral amygdala lesions, fear recognition from prosody was spared 
although commonly, the amygdala is associated with recognition of fear in faces (Adolphs et al., 
1994). Hence, Bach and colleagues (2013) concluded that fear processing in the amygala is modality-
dependent. However, it needs to be noted at that point that the locationist approach of emotion brain 
networks has also been challenged and instead, it has been proposed that more general cognitive 
networks drive emotion processes. This psychological constructionist approach
5
 has been supported 
by findings from a meta-review by Lindquist et al. (2012); for example, from a density analysis, they 
reported that voxels within the amygdala did not respond exclusively to the emotion of fear.  
Specific brain activations were not only associated with emotions per se but rather with general 
cognitive processes. 
Overall, there is conflicting evidence from neuroimaging studies regarding the role of 
modality during emotion processing. Hence, the present thesis aims to investigate – mainly 
behaviourally – how emotions are being processed from two separate modalities in direct comparison 
by collecting data from adults and children from different North-Western European countries. Since 
                                                     
5
 The psychological constructionist approach assumes that emotions are based on general psychological 
constructs rather than emotion-specific networks. This is in contrast to locationist approaches (Lindquist et al., 
2012). 
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the present thesis does not include functional neuroimaging methods, a more detailed debate about 
locationist or psychological constructionist approaches to emotion processing is beyond the focus of 
this work. 
 
1.5. General Emotion Concepts 
Across all modalities, emotions are a highly complex construct that attempts to define a very 
subjective experience of the human body. Why do we recognise emotions and how can we talk about 
it in an objective way? After introducing how and where emotions might be processed in the human 
brain, the following section will describe two common theories regarding the origin of emotion 
recognition with evidence for innate as well as socially learned emotion recognition processes before 
familiarising the reader with simulation and perspective taking of others’ emotional states. 
1.5.1. Innate Versus Learned Effects  
Whilst humans have to encode emotions in faces or voices to make their current emotional 
states apparent to others, decoding the information then allows the observer to recognise emotions 
expressed by others. In terms of emotion expression, this mechanism is thought to be present from 
birth onwards in order to promote communication and survival (Darwin, 1872/1965). Hess and 
Thibault (2009) summarised Darwin’s work ‘The expression of the emotions in man and animals’ 
(1872/1965) by saying that emotion expressions evolved as expressive habits over time as a way to 
symbolize underlying feelings and to promote survival. For example, opening eyes during specific 
emotion expressions may enhance eye-sight. This habit would be passed on through generations, 
turning it into an evolved and universal mechanism. Indeed, more recently, Matsumoto and 
Willingham (2009) suggested that congenitally and non-congenitally blind athletes produced the same 
emotion expressions in faces as healthy individuals which supports the view of universal and inherited 
components of emotion expression. 
Focusing on emotion recognition rather than expression, years of research have come to the 
conclusion that the ability to perceive and judge emotions may be included in our genetic make-up 
(Izard, 1994) but also develops and increases with age throughout childhood (Herba & Phillips, 2004; 
Gagnon, Gosselin, Hudon-ven der Buhs, Larocque, & Milliard, 2010).  
Indeed, several empirical studies have found that infants can already discriminate between different 
types of emotions expressed in faces. For example, Bornstein and Arterberry (2003) demonstrated that 
five month-old infants showed preferential looking for new fearful compared to habituated static face 
expressions of happiness. Those findings suggested that from a very early age onwards, we can 
distinguish between different facial emotion categories which may be an innate feature aiding 
survival. 
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Although even 2-year old children have demonstrated a degree of understanding of the 
concept ‘emotion’ as evident from ‘pretend-play’, more complex emotion matching and categorizing 
abilities become evident from the age of 5 onwards (Widen & Russell, 2008).  
This goes in hand with findings by Gagnon et al. (2010) who stated that fear and disgust showed 
higher recognition accuracy in 9 to 10-year old children as compared to 5 to 6-year old children, 
suggesting a gradual improvement of facial emotion recognition ability with age.  
In addition, two earlier studies by McCluskey and Albas (1981) and McCluskey, Albas, Niemi, 
Cuevas and Ferrer (1975) have shown that just like for face processing, vocal emotion processing in 
children also improved with age right into adulthood.  
Interestingly, on the opposite end of the age-dimension, emotion recognition abilities such as 
accuracy of labelling facial expressions seems to decrease in older subjects (Isaacowitz et al., 2007) 
and older adults often demonstrate a positivity-effect with enhanced processing of positive face 
expressions (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). Whilst the exact interpretation of this 
finding is beyond the scope of the present work, results demonstrate that emotion recognition abilities 
change during the course of life and may to some degree depend upon social factors or past 
experiences and subsequent positive or negative reinforcements (Dollard & Miller, 1941). Especially 
theories of social learning propose a social account of emotion understanding. Bandura’s Theory of 
Social Learning (1971) suggested that by observing others, physical as well as emotional behaviour 
can be copied and learned. In Bandura’s famous Bobo doll experiment (1965), children who observed 
adults exhibiting aggressive behaviour towards a doll were significantly more likely to also behave 
aggressively towards the doll compared to children that saw adults acting in a neutral way towards the 
doll.  
Further, the argument of cultural and social rules influencing emotion recognition also 
contributes to the discussion about universal or learnt emotion processes. Often times, emotions are 
regarded as universal and inherited mechanisms (Darwin, 1872/1965). For example, it has been 
proposed that the six basic emotions in faces, which are expressed in prototypically manner, can be 
expressed and recognised universally across cultures (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1980). The 
universal recognition of emotions has also been found for emotions displayed within the voice (e.g. 
Bryant & Barrett, 2008). However, more recently, it has also been accepted that social and cultural 
norms can influence emotion recognition to a degree, similarly to a dialect in an otherwise universal 
language.  
This dialect-theory of emotion recognition (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002) hints at a learnt contribution 
of emotion recognition. Overall, there seem to be some innate as well as learned emotion recognition 
mechanism as evident from developmental and cultural research. By including a developmental as 
well as cross-cultural perspective on emotion recognition, the present thesis aims to shed light on 
external factors that may potentially contribute to our emotion recognition abilities.  
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1.5.2. Mind-Reading and Simulation Approaches 
In a philosophical account, our understanding of other’s underlying emotions comes from so-
called ‘mind reading’ processes (Goldman & Sripada, 2005). Emotions can be recognised by inferring 
mental states from others based on one’s own knowledge. In terms of facial expressions, one would 
link the observed emotion to a repertoire of previously known emotion categories in order to classify 
the observed emotion. One example of mind reading is the Theory of Mind (ToM). According to 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985), ToM is a “mechanism which underlies a crucial aspect of 
social skills, namely being able to conceive of mental states: that is, knowing that other people know, 
want, feel, or believe things; in short, having what Premack and Woodruff (1978) termed a ‘theory of 
mind’ ” (p. 38).  Hence, a degree of ToM and perspective taking is necessary in order to understand 
others’ emotional states and several studies have demonstrated a relationship between impaired 
emotion recognition and Theory of Mind deficits in autistic children (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985; Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003) or schizophrenic patients (e.g. Bruene, 2005). 
Commonly, ToM abilities are associated with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (Gallagher, 
Happe, Brunswick, Fletcher, Frith, & Frith, 2000) although most ToM and emotion recognition 
studies are based on facial emotion recognition rather than on vocal emotion recognition. 
On the other hand, simulation theories describe emotion recognition as a process of 
simulating and replicating others. According to Goldman and Sripada’s review (2005), individuals 
observing others can reproduce the target emotion in corresponding brain areas. This activation can 
then be related back to how the target individual must feel at a certain moment of time. Consequently, 
a deficit in emotion production is often paired with a deficit in emotion recognition.  
For example, dysfunction of the right somatosensory cortex
6
 interrupts simulation of what an actor 
might feel when expressing emotions in faces (Adolphs et al, 2000; Pitcher et al., 2008) or voices 
(Banissy et al., 2010) which in turns reduces emotion recognition abilities across modalities. Further, 
the role of facial feedback also seems to be important during emotion recognition: dampening face 
expressions following Botulinum Toxin injections in turn reduced subjective experience of emotions 
as the muscle feedback from faces was limited (Neal & Chartrand, 2011). 
Advances in recent neuropsychological research have allowed the investigation of neural 
mechanisms of simulation based approaches to emotion recognition such as the Mirror Neuron 
System (MNS). Mirror neurons are individual neurons within the brain, mainly within motor areas 
and are for example active during observation of other’s performances of actions. This in turn gives 
the individual a deeper understanding of the actions and intentions observed (Fabbri-Destro & 
Rizzolatti, 2008; Rizzolatti, 2005). More specifically, parts of the premotor cortex and the inferior 
parietal lobe form a circuit of mirror neurons which fire when observing as well as hearing others 
                                                     
6
 Somatosensory representations help to understand how another person is feeling by internal simulation of 
facial expressions in brain regions of the right somatosensory cortex (Adolphs et al., 2000). 
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performing certain motor behaviours by using the hand, foot or mouth (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 
2008). However, when observing others performing a behaviour, actual execution of the same action 
is usually inhibited and the activation is only used to get a better insight into what the observed person 
must feel at that moment of time (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
The MNS is important for social functioning such as imitation, learning and interpersonal 
relations and could help to explain why and how humans are able to detect emotions in others in 
accordance with simulation theories. In 2003, Wicker et al. conducted a study where participants 
either experienced a feeling of disgust or observed disgusted others’ facial expressions. As a result, 
mirror neurons dealing with experiencing as well as observing the emotion disgust fired in areas of 
the insula and the anterior cingulated cortex (see also Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 2007). Interestingly, 
electrically stimulating the anterior insula resulted in feeling sensations in the throat and mouth which 
is associated with experiencing the feeling ‘disgust’ (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003). Another study by 
Calder et al. (2000) demonstrated that brain damage involving the insula resulted in decreased feeling 
of disgust across several modalities. 
Overall, the present thesis assumes that normally developed people are able to take 
perspectives of others and simulate emotions expressed in faces and voices to some degree. By 
investigating behavioural ToM abilities during childhood in the present Chapter 3, for the first time, 
the current thesis could provide a link of children’s’ mind reading abilities and emotion recognition 
not only from faces, but also from voices. However, the present thesis does not investigate the 
localisation of brain activity to support the involvement of specific brain areas or simulation networks 
during emotion recognition. 
1.6.  Research Rationale and Outline of Thesis 
As demonstrated above, emotion recognition from faces and voices has received a large 
amount of attention – especially in the past two to three decades. However, the existence of several 
sets of databases which were especially developed for specific experiments (e.g. Morris et al., 1999; 
Schroeder, 2003; Simon-Thomas et al., 2009) makes comparisons of results between studies difficult. 
The emotion categories included in databases varies enormously from study to study and expressions 
can be either posed or spontaneous.  
Further, depending on the nationality of presenters, rating scores may be biased by in-group 
advantages and emotions displayed by people from the own culture may be recognised with higher 
accuracy than members from another culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Also, recording facilities 
for stimuli will vary depending on resources and laboratories. Consequently, it is important to choose 
sets of stimuli that have been widely validated and to implement them in a within-subject design to 
reduce external variance. Hence, the main aim of the present thesis is to investigate human’s emotion 
recognition abilities within the face and voice as two separate, yet interdependent domains, but in a 
within-subject design. The researcher plans to investigate whether emotion recognition in one 
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modality is superior over another modality – independent of the variable of task difficulty. Or whether 
there is one general, modality-independent emotion recognition mechanism which may possibly be 
grounded in shared neural networks.  
More specifically, Chapter 2 of the present thesis behaviourally tests emotion recognition in 
adults and aims to find out just how similar the recognition of the six basic emotions is when 
presented either in faces or in voices. Investigating both modalities in parallel addresses the question 
of whether we recognise emotions based on modality-independent constructs such as general 
appraisal mechanisms (Scherer, 1984) or on distinct perceptual features such as a smile in happiness 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1975/2003).  
Chapter 3 of the present thesis aims to find out how the emotion recognition abilities across 
two separate modalities develop across middle years of childhood. For this, children at primary school 
age completed the same emotion task in order to demonstrate whether both modalities develop in 
parallel or whether recognition from one modality may be acquired earlier in life. It will also 
investigate whether emotion recognition from two modalities depend on specific emotions and 
whether young children find it easier to recognise specific emotions in one modality compared to the 
other modality, which may change as a function of age. Chapter 2 includes a cross-sectional as well as 
a smaller longitudinal study by re-testing a subset of children after 1.5 years. Additionally, it 
examines the effect of including child – rather than adult - face stimuli to be rated by children by 
validating a new child face database (Dalrymple, Gomex, & Duchaine, 2013) for use in children. 
 Can the results from Chapter 2 and 3 including British adults and children be generalised to 
another North-Western European country such as Germany.  
Chapter 4 includes the cross-cultural comparison of an adult sample in order to investigate cultural 
differences in emotion recognition in voices and faces in two similar European countries. Further, it 
includes the cross-cultural comparison of a child samples in order to examine early socialisation 
effects in emotion recognition.  
Lastly, in order to add more depth to the collection of behavioural experiments in the present 
Chapter 2-4, Chapter 5 provides data from a neurophysiological ERP experiment – which are of 
preliminary nature at this stage.  
The aim here is to investigate whether different modalities such as faces and voices have comparable 
temporal stages of emotion processing such as a broad but early discrimination between emotional 
and neutral stimuli and a later but narrow discrimination between individual emotion categories.  
 Overall, the present thesis aims to examine the role of cognition, child development, culture 
and display rules as well as temporal brain dynamics in order to answer the question whether emotion 
recognition is comparable across two separate modalities within one and the same person. 
 
 
 33 
 
2  
 
Emotion Recognition: Just how similar are voices 
and faces? 
Non-verbal perception of emotions has high evolutionary implications for survival as well as 
for communication (Darwin, 1965/1872; Hampson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006). We need to rapidly 
classify emotions in order to recognise threat, assess social situations, and behave accordingly by, for 
example, protecting our offspring from enemies. Previous studies have shown that – although 
emotions are off highly complex nature, - we can perceive and reliably classify the six basic emotions 
from different modalities, such as faces (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Herba & Phillips, 2004) and 
voices (Belin, 2011; Sauter, et al., 2010). However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no 
previous study has specifically investigated via within-subject designs how similar the emotion 
coding mechanisms for two independent modalities are in direct comparison - unless contrasted to 
multimodal emotion integration (see Lambrecht, Kreifelts, & Wildgruber (2014) for a summary). In 
the present Chapter 2, the aim was to examine whether emotions are recognised in comparable 
manner from faces and voices in British adult participants.   
2.1.1. Shared Emotion Coding Mechanisms Across Modalities? 
It is possible that perception of emotions presented in different modalities may share the same 
neural (Calder & Young, 2005) or behavioural mechanisms (Borod et al. 2000). For example, it has 
been proposed via fMRI multivoxel pattern analysis that activity for five basic emotions such as 
anger, fear, sadness, happiness and disgust is correlated highly across the face, voice and body in the 
medial prefrontal cortex and the left superior temporal sulcus (Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 
2010). As outlined in the introductory Chapter 1, subcortical emotion structures like the amygdala are 
commonly associated with facial (e.g. Adolphs, 2002) as well as for auditory (Fecteau, Belin, 
Joanette, & Armony; 2007; Phillips et al., 1998) and even during emotional music recognition (Aube, 
Angulo-Perkins, Peretz, Concha, & Armony, 2014). Further, ERP studies have suggested that 
temporal discrimination of emotional versus non-emotional voices occurs as early as 150ms after 
stimulus onset (Iredale, Rushby, McDonald, Dimoska-Di Marco, & Swift, 2013; Sauter & Eimer, 
2009) which is comparable to ERP data from emotion processing in visual domain (Batty & Taylor, 
2003; Eimer & Holmes, 2007).  
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From brain lesion studies it becomes evident that damage to the temporal lobe (Bonora et al., 2011; 
Dellacherie, Hasboun, Baulac, Belin, & Samson, 2011) or amygdala (Scott, Young, Calder, Hellawell, 
Aggleton, & Johnson, 1997) is typically associated with impaired facial emotion recognition as well 
as reduced vocal emotion recognition. In addition, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of right 
somatosensory cortex temporarily interrupts representations and correct classifications of facial 
emotions (Pitcher et al.,  2008) as well as non-verbal affect vocalisations (Banissy, Sauter, Ward, 
Warren, Walsh, & Scott, 2010).  
Support for modality-independent emotion processing mechanisms also comes from 
behavioural data: Studies of individual differences have found significant (though not high) 
correlations between adults’ visual and vocal emotion recognition abilities (Borod et al., 2000; 
Palermo et al., 2013). Further, emotion recognition across modalities often seemed to be impaired 
conjunctionally in Autism (Philip et al., 2010), Schizophrenia (Simpson, Pinkham, Kelsven, & 
Sasson, 2013) and in recently detoxified alcoholics (Kornreich et al., 2013), affecting a core emotion 
network rather than single modalities. Similarly, boys aged 8 to 16 with callous-unemotional traits
7
, 
have been found to be impaired in recognising fear in others across a range of modalities such as faces 
and body posture (Munoz, 2009).  It is possible then that cognitive appraisal of events such as novely 
and degree of pleasantness is a substantial component of emotion processing (Ellsworth & Scherer, 
2003; Scherer, 1984) - independent of perceptual differences due to mode of presentation.  
Overall, it seems plausible that our brain exhibits an emotion processing mechanism 
involving a general emotion circuit, combining input from several modalities in order to aid 
evolutionary mechanisms (Calder & Young, 2005). However, referring to the studies mentioned 
above, heterogeneity of methods and lack of within-subject designs across modalities makes 
generalizability of outcomes difficult. 
 
2.1.2.  Separate Mechanisms 
In contrast to the view that the same brain regions support emotion processing across 
modalities, emotion recognition in the visual and auditory domain have also been independently 
affected. For example, patients with right hemisphere damage have shown isolated deficits in 
recognising fear in the face but not in vocal stimuli (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2001). In addition, 
prosody discrimination performance was found to be independent of impaired visual emotion after 
anterior temporal lobectomy (Milesi et al., 2014) or amygdala damage (Anderson & Phelps, 1998; 
Bach et al., 2013).  
 
                                                     
7
 Callous-Unemotional Trait: Psychopathy that describes antisocial patterns in behaviour and emotional 
impairments due to lack of empathy (Munoz, 2009). 
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For clinical and pre-clinical patients with the neurogenerative disorder of Huntington’s 
disease, which typically affects the insula and basal ganglia, recognition of disgust seemed to be 
impaired for face expressions (Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998) but intact in the 
vocal domain (Sprengelmeyer, Schroeder, Young, & Epplen, 2006), suggesting separate processors 
for emotion recognition based on modality.  
However, on the other hand, a meta-analysis suggested that neurological patients with another 
form of basal ganglia pathology –Parkinson Disease – have difficulties recognising emotions mainly 
from voices, but also from faces (Gray & Tickle-Degnen, 2010). This would suggest a common 
underlying neural network that can affect emotion recognition – independently of modality. Hence, 
the degree to which underlying mechanisms are shared or dissociable may depend on the specific 
neural structures involved as well as the specific emotion affected. However, it is important to note 
that, especially for Parkinson Disease, deficits in emotion recognition across several modalities may 
be secondary to other executive function deficits such as impaired working memory (Gray & Tickle-
Degnen, 2010). 
Those findings are not surprising, because at the perceptual level, signals from the voice and 
from the face are indeed quite different. Within the auditory domain, each of the basic emotions is 
believed to have a corresponding acoustic profile, containing an emotion- specific combination of 
pitch, amplitude and spectrum which is produced by movements of the larynx (Sauter et al., 2010). 
Summarising past neuroimaging studies, Schirmer and Kotz (2006) proposed a hierarchical multi-step 
working model and suggested that initial acoustic analysis of vocal stimuli is processed within the 
first 100ms in the auditory cortex. Consequently, information is sent to the right superior temporal 
sulcus for emotional evaluation and transmitted to frontal parts of the brain as well as the right inferior 
frontal gyrus for further cognitive appraisal of emotional significance at around 400ms after stimulus 
onset. 
On the other hand, in the visual domain, emotion recognition is based on configural changes 
within the face initiated by movements of muscles (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Different combinations 
of contracted face muscles over time such as the early wrinkled nose followed by raised upper lip 
during production of dynamic disgusted face expressions allows for an emotion-specific profile. This 
emotion profile can be reliably discriminated whilst access to incomplete emotion profiles can cause 
confusions between similar emotion expressions that share common features (Jack, Garrod, & Schyns, 
2014; Schyns, Petro, & Smith, 2009). Hence, emotions like happiness produce large scale features in 
the face such as an open mouth showing teeth which aid rapid recognition. Encoding probably starts 
with processing of the eyes before ‘zooming out’ to a whole face analysis before zooming back in to 
encode more specific perceptual features (Schyns et al., 2009).  
Given the differences in basic perception between faces and voices, it is possible that emotion 
recognition mechanisms depend on their presentation domain and are based on bottom-up perceptual 
features rather than modality independent top-down cognitive evaluation. This is, however, in direct 
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contrast with studies which suggest that the same brain regions may be responsible for emotion 
processing in faces and voices alike. In the present study, this current issue is investigated by directly 
comparing the behavioural emotion recognition profiles across modalities in a within-subject design. 
In order to compare two perceptually different modalities, data on valence superiority, gender effects 
and confusion rates within each modality were collected.  
 
2.1.3. Valence Superiority 
Assuming similar neural and cognitive mechanisms across different modalities, rating 
preferences of emotions may be comparable across modalities. For example, if a negative emotion 
such as anger is easily recognised in faces, one expects to see the same pattern in voices. Indeed, 
similarity between modalities at the level of individual emotions has previously been demonstrated. 
For example, multiple ERP studies have reported fast and subliminal detection of fearful auditory 
(Sauter & Eimer, 2009) and visual stimuli (e.g. Kiss & Eimer, 2008) at around 150 to 200ms post 
stimulus onset. It is possible then that general evolution-motivated mechanisms guide attention 
towards specific emotions – independent of source. Such mechanisms could be based on i) biological 
preparedness and threat avoidance  (Seligman, 1971), or  ii) social bonding (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995) and altruism theories (Hauser, Preston, & Stansfield, 2014), which support the importance of 
attending to people that radiate positive rather than negative attitudes. 
Supporting threat-avoidance theories, often, previous studies have reported that threatening, 
angry faces popped out during visual search tasks of emotional faces (Hansen & Hanson, 1988). This 
may be guided by experience and has been used to explain police officers’ enhanced abilities in 
detecting angry faces within a riot crowd (Damjanovic, Pinkham, Clarke, & Phillips, 2014). However, 
it does not take professionals to detect threatening faces within a crowd. The working memory of the 
average British undergraduate student also seems to be enhanced for detecting angry as compared to 
happy faces (Thomas, Jackson, & Raymond, 2014). Most recently, studies have begun to investigate 
this ‘anger-superiority effect’ in more detail, though to the best of the researchers’ knowledge, 
exclusively within the visual domain. Electrophysiological studies for example have described N2pc
8
 
amplitudes which occurred earlier and with larger amplitude for detecting angry versus happy faces 
(Weymar; Loew, Oehman, & Hamm, 2011) indicating increased attention capturing for evolutionary 
threatening faces. 
However, studies demonstrating anger superiority – possibly motivated by threat avoidance 
mechanisms - cannot account for studies reporting the opposite with early and unconscious brain 
activation during ratings of faces expressing positive emotions. This has often been reflected in 
                                                     
8
 N2pc is a ERP component and though to reflect spatial selective attention during visual search of angry faces 
and correlated with differences in behavioural reaction times of about 50ms (Weymar et al., 2010). 
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increased N170 components (Batty & Taylor, 2003) or increased accuracy and fast reaction times 
below one second for happy faces in behavioural experiments (Smith, 2012). Questioning the lack of 
attention directed at happy stimuli, which may promote attachment and caretaking of offspring 
(Babchuck, Hames, & Hampson, 1985), Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld and Neel (2011) 
conducted a series of experiments, demonstrating consistent evidence that happy faces were detected 
efficiently during visual search tasks.  
This ‘happiness superiority effect’, – which has also been found by Juth, Lundquist, Karlsson 
and Oehman (2005) - reflected behaviourally in enhanced accuracy as well as speed. Similarly, 
Leppänen, Tenhunen and Hietanen (2003) suggested faster response selection times for happy faces 
as compared to angry and disgusted faces and refuted the automatic anger detection within a crowd. 
This has refuelled the discussion of threat avoidance versus attachment mechanisms which can be 
reflected in the duality of valence (positive or negative) of emotions. Problematically, data from 
auditory sources is almost non-existing which makes identification of supramodal emotion perception 
mechanisms difficult. Hence, investigating valence superiority effects across modalities could firstly 
provide data on anger or happiness superiority effects within the vocal domain and secondly 
demonstrate the degree of emotion recognition similarities across two separate modalities. 
2.1.4. Gender Effects 
It has been proposed that facial emotion classification in women may –to some degree - be 
happening automatically. For example, subliminally presented emotions elicited correct accuracy 
ratings above chance in women but not in men (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004). Emotion recognition may 
be influenced by gender with females appearing to use different visual features in the face such as the 
mouth area than men do (Blais, Fiset, & Gosselin, 2013). Further, Schulte-Ruether, Markowitsch, 
Fink and Piefke (2007) linked higher levels of empathy in women with greater activation of the mirror 
neuron system during an fMRI study involving facial emotion judgements. Generally, women seemed 
to be better at recognising emotions from faces, voices or audio-visual presentations (Collignon, 
Girard, Gosselin, Saint-Amour, Lepore, & Lassonde, 2010). However, gender differences cannot 
always be reliably established: for example, women were found to show enhanced emotion 
recognition in the auditory but not in the visual domain (Lambrecht, Kreifelts, &Wildgruber, 2014). 
Further, Hawk, van Kleef, Fischer and van der Schalk (2009) did not find any gender differences at all 
in accuracy rates for rating emotional non-verbal vocalizations.  
Summarising past research, the relationship between gender differences and emotion 
recognition in faces and voices remains somewhat unclear. Summarising past research, the extent to 
which there are gender differences for emotion recognition in faces and voices remains somewhat 
unclear. In a meta-analysis, Thompson and Voyer (2014) recently suggested that there may be a 
female advantage in recognising non-verbally displayed emotions, but the size of the effect depended 
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on interactions between the specific emotions and modality presented. For example, the effect sizes 
for gender differences in anger were significantly larger than for any other basic emotion. Similarly, 
the gender difference was largest in combined audio-visual conditions rather than in visual or auditory 
conditions alone.   
One reason to expect gender differences in emotion recognition can be related back to the 
‘primary care-taker hypothesis’ (Babchuck et al., 1985), which describes that females ‘will display 
evolved adaptations that enhance the probability of survival of their offspring’ (Hampson et al., 2006, 
p. 402). This could be reflected in female’s enhanced emotion recognition to ensure the offspring’s 
wellbeing. Significant gender effects could demonstrate adaptive child-rearing mechanisms in female 
participants by correctly classifying other’s emotions displayed in faces and voices. Again, assuming 
neuronal and cognitive similarities in emotion processing across modalities which are possibly linked 
to evolutionary concepts of survival and attachment promotion, the present chapter aims to investigate 
whether gender differences in emotion recognition occur not only in one but within both domains.  
2.1.5 Confusion Rates 
Apart from valence of stimuli and gender of judges, the degree of confusion amongst the six 
basic emotions lends itself as third comparisons across different modalities.  It is understood that 
specific emotion pairs such as fear and surprise within facial expressions often are confused due to 
many shared perceptual features such as raised upper eye lids and raised eye brows (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1978). The lesser amount of action units that fearful and surprised faces share, the higher is 
the recognition accuracy (Gosselin & Simard, 1999). Moreover, angry and disgusted faces also share 
many perceptual features during early stages of emotion transmission (Jack et al., 2014). 
However, perceptual features cannot explain possible confusions amongst emotions in the 
auditory domain. Interestingly, Belin, Fillion-Bilodeau and Gosselin (2008) also found common 
confusions between fearful and surprised affective vocalisations. They suggested that very short 
length and highest average pitch (f0) in both types of emotional stimuli could lead to confusions. In 
addition, Sauter et al. (2010) found that for emotional vocalisations, anger and disgust as well as 
disgust and anger often got confused. All three emotions share “low spectral variations and higher 
spectral centre of gravity” (p. 2262).  
 
2.1.6. The Present Study 
Up to this day, no study has specifically investigated how similar emotion recognition profiles 
are across two separate modalities. To compare across the visual and auditory modalities, the 
similarity of emotion rating patterns across voices and faces was investigated via valence superiority 
and gender effects, as well as the confusability rates across different emotions. To the researcher’s 
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best knowledge, the present study is the first to investigate correlations amongst confusion rates for 
faces as well as for voices in a within-subject design in order to investigate similarities in processing 
emotions across modalities. High correlations of rating profiles across modalities would indicate 
processing similarities that are independent of perceptual features of each individual modality. 
Assuming underlying similarities in cognitive and neural mechanisms as well as emotion recognition 
which promotes survival or attachment, signals should not only be communicated by face, but also by 
vocal, non-verbal features within the voice. Finding comparable behavioural profiles across the visual 
and auditory modalities could suggest shared emotion coding systems.  
 
The present study predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The present study predicted to see either anger or happiness valence superiority - 
replicated across both modalities.  
Hypothesis 2: Patterns of gender effects of emotion processing will be comparable across both 
modalities. It is predicted that female participants will rate emotional stimuli more efficiently than 
male participants due to parent-offspring attachment formation and offspring survival.  
Hypothesis 3: Rating profiles across modalities – as investigated by confusion matrixes – are 
correlated and suggest similarities in emotion rating patterns.  
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2.2. Methods 
2.2.1. Participants 
 
Participants were 54 British adults recruited through the participant pool at Brunel University 
and social networks. Data was excluded for nine participants – all undergraduate university students - 
whose non-verbal IQ scores were lower than two SDs below the overall participants’ average IQ 
scores of 48.78, which seemed to be due to lack of motivation rather than genuine IQ deficits. The 
final sample consisted of 45 British adults (15 male, 30 female), aged between 18 and 61, (M = 30.47; 
SD = 16.81), with average non-verbal IQ scores (M = 48.78; SD = 4.41) which falls into GRADE III 
‘intellectually average’ according to British norms from the 1992 standardisation (Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 2000, page 81). Participants presented different educational backgrounds: GSCE level and 
below (N = 9), A levels (N = 6), Undergraduate (N = 24) and Postgraduate level (N = 6). All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing.  
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Department of Psychology 
(01/03/2012) Brunel University and all participants gave informed consent to participate (see 
Appendix). 
2.2.2. Research Material 
Visual & Auditory Stimuli 
Face expressions for happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust were displayed by 
two male (identity JJ and EM) and two female (identity C and SW) actors from the Ekman Pictures of 
Facial Affect series (Ekman, 1975). The Ekman faces were created according to the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) as developed by Ekman and Friesen (1976) where specific facial muscles and 
their position within the human body had been identified which were used for expressing certain 
voluntary facial emotions. Each of the 24 pictures was in grey-scale and was randomly presented in 
the middle of a computer screen. Non-verbal voice samples for the six emotions were selected from 
the Montreal Affective Voices (Belin et al., 2008) and displayed by two male (identity 42 and 55) and 
two female (identity 45 and 53) French-Canadian actors. Vocalisations included laughter or moans 
based on the vowel /ɑ/ expressing the 6 basic of happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger and surprise 
in terms of non-verbal affect bursts such as laughter or moans. 
Each stimulus was rated on each of the six basic emotions (2 x 2 x 6 x 6 auditory stimuli and 
2 x 2 x 6 x 6 visual stimuli) on a 7-point Likert-scale scale ranging from ‘not happy/sad/… at all = 1’, 
to ‘extremely happy/sad/… = 7’. No definition of emotions was provided in order to avoid biasing the 
responses into any direction.  
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Computer Program 
The task has been programmed on the PsychoPy software in Python (Peirce, 2007), 
measuring reaction times (RTs) as well as intensity perception. Stimuli were presented randomly 
within alternating face and voice condition blocks (on Acer ASPIRE 5735). Voices were presented 
via closed-back-on-ear headphones (Sennheiser HD 202) for the duration of the stimulus, ranging 
from 378ms (M surprise) to 2039ms (M disgust) whilst faces were presented until button click. 
Intelligence Assessment & Demographics 
The paper based Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test for adults was included in 
order to assess ‘fluid IQ’ and problem solving abilities, independent of language skills (Raven et al., 
1998, p. CPM29). The adult version consists of 60 items and is presented in black and white. Studies 
across different countries have reported high test-retest reliability around .90 for short term reliability 
and around.60 for long term reliability of up to four years (Raven et al., 2000). In addition, this 
current study collected demographic details such as age, gender, ethnicity, first language, country of 
birth, culture they belong to and educational status of participants (see above). 
2.2.3. Procedure 
Before starting the study, all participants signed an informed consent sheet and provided some 
basic demographic data (Appendix A). Participants received a short introduction and could then work 
through the emotion judgement and IQ task with a maximum time allocation of 25 minutes for each 
task. Finally, all participants received debriefing and psychology undergraduate students received 
credits as part of their course requirement. 
2.2.4. Data Analysis 
For each participant and each stimulus, choice reaction times (RTs) as well as intensity 
ratings were recorded. RT outliers exceeding 50s were removed and replaced with the mean (N trial = 
1).  Higher hit intensity ratings as well as lower mix-up intensity ratings reflect correct 
inclusion/exclusion of the target emotion. 
For the first analysis (Analysis of Target Emotions), only stimulus scores were included 
which matched the corresponding emotion question (target emotions) and two separate mixed 
measures ANCOVAs were conducted, one for RTs and one intensity ratings as the dependent 
variables. Between-subject variables were gender of participants (male or female).The within-subject 
variables were modality (face or voice), emotion category (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise and 
disgust) and gender of the actor (male or female). Age was included as a covariate in order to control 
for a significant age difference between female (M = 26.43, SE = 15.62) and male participants (M = 
38.53, SD = 16.67), as demonstrated by an independent t-test, t(43) = 2.4, p < .05.  
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The age difference between male and female participants was the result of recruiting young 
Psychology undergraduates as participants which commonly consist of more female than male 
students.  
For the second analysis (Analysis of Confusion), the responses using all emotion labels for 
each type of stimulus were used, separated by modality in order to create full rating profiles for each 
emotion. Due to the design of the study, it was possible to collect the mean-intensity ratings for each 
type of emotional label given to each of the six emotions. Correlation matrixes were computed for 
mean intensity ratings of all possible combinations of emotion pairs - resulting in 36 conditions. 
Representational Similarity Analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) was employed in order to compare 
how similar the representation and therefore how high the correlation of emotion responses are within 
as well as across modalities.  
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2.3. Results  
2.3.1. Analysis 1: Target Emotions  
 
Means (M) and Standard Error (SE) for modality and emotions for adults for Intensity and 
Choice Reaction Times are tabulated in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 
Means and Standard Error for modality and emotions for adults for intensity and Choice reaction times 
 Emotion  Mean Intensity (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
 Female 
Adults 
Male 
Adults 
All 
Adults 
 Female 
Adults  
Male 
Adults 
All  
Adults 
 N = 30 
M *= 
26.43 
(16.62) 
N = 15 
M = 
38.53 
(16.67) 
N = 45 
M = 
30.47 
(16.81) 
 N = 30 
M = 
26.43 
(16.62) 
N = 15 
M = 
38.53 
(16.67) 
N = 45 
M = 
30.47 
(16.81) 
Face Happy 6.54 
(.10) 
6.62 
(.14) 
6.58 
(.08) 
 
3.31 
(.13) 
3.63 
(.19) 
3.47 
(.11) 
 Sad 5.35 
(.19) 
5.54 
(.28) 
5.34 
(.16) 
 
4.28 
(.22) 
4.29 
(.32) 
4.28 
(.19) 
 Angry 5.41 
(.17) 
4.79 
(.25) 
5.10 
(.15) 
 
3.76 
(.21) 
4.34 
(.30) 
4.05 
(.18) 
 Fear 5.87 
(.18) 
5.44 
(.26) 
5.66 
(.16) 
 
4.04 
(.25) 
4.47 
(.36) 
4.25 
(.21) 
 Surprise 6.40 
(.12) 
6.31 
(.17) 
6.35 
(.10) 
 
3.33 
(.24) 
4.63 
(.34) 
3.98 
(.20) 
 Disgust 5.82 
(.19) 
5.13 
(.28) 
5.47 
(.16) 
 
3.57 
(.28) 
5.04 
(.41) 
4.31 
(.24) 
 All  5.90 
(.10) 
5.60 
(.150) 
5.75 
(.09) 
 
3.82 
(.09) 
4.40 
(.23) 
4.06 
(.13) 
Voice Happy 6.12 
(.16) 
6.16 
(.23) 
6.14 
(.13) 
 
3.66 
(.15) 
4.39 
(.22) 
4.03 
(.13) 
 Sad 6.23 
(.15) 
5.85 
(.22) 
6.04 
(.13) 
 
4.16 
(.16) 
4.53 
(.23) 
4.35 
(.14) 
 Angry 5.07 
(.20) 
4.52 
(.29) 
4.81 
(.17) 
 
4.02 
(.18) 
4.38 
(.26) 
4.20 
(.15) 
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  Mean Intensity (SE)  Mean Choice RTs 
  Female 
Adults 
Male 
Adults 
All 
Adults 
 Female 
Adults  
Male 
Adults 
All  
Adults 
 Fear 5.22 
(.21) 
5.10 
(.30) 
5.16 
(.18) 
 
3.80 
(.17) 
4.24 
(.25) 
4.02 
(.15) 
 Surprise 5.27 
(.20) 
5.14 
(.29) 
5.21 
(.17) 
 
3.45 
(.11) 
3.49 
(.16) 
3.47 
(.10) 
 Disgust 5.55 
(.17) 
5.58 
(.25) 
5.56 
(.15) 
 
3.82 
(.13) 
4.33 
(.19) 
4.08 
(.11) 
 All  5.58 
(.11) 
5.40 
(.16) 
5.49 
(.10) 
 
3.82 
(.09) 
4.23 
(.13) 
4.02 
(.08) 
Overall  
Happy 6.33 
(.10) 
6.39 
(.14) 
6.36 
(.08) 
 
3.48 
(.11) 
4.01 
(.16) 
3.75 
(.10) 
 
Sad 5.79 
(.13) 
5.59 
(.19) 
5.69 
(.11) 
 
4.22 
(.14) 
4.41 
(.21) 
4.32 
(.12) 
 
Angry 5.24 
(.15) 
4.67 
(.22) 
4.95 
(.13) 
 
3.89 
(.16) 
4.36 
(.23) 
4.12 
(.14) 
 
Fear 5.55 
(.17) 
5.27 
(.25) 
5.41 
(.15) 
 
3.92 
(.16) 
4.36 
(.23) 
4.14 
(.14) 
 
Surprise 5.84 
(.12) 
5.72 
(.18) 
5.78 
(.11) 
 
3.39 
(.13) 
4.06 
(.19) 
3.72 
(.11) 
 
Disgust 5.68 
(.15) 
5.35 
(.21) 
5.52 
(.12) 
 
3.70 
(.15) 
4.68 
(.22) 
4.19 
(.13) 
All Female 
stimuli   
 5.85 
(.09) 
5.71 
(.13) 
5.78 
(.08) 
 
3.74 
(.11) 
4.29 
(.16) 
4.02 
(.10) 
All Male 
Stimuli 
 5.62 
(.11) 
5.29 
(.15) 
5.46 
(.09) 
 
3.79 
(.12) 
4.34 
(.17) 
4.06 
(.10) 
Grand Mean**  
 5.74 
(.09) 
5.5 
(.13) 
5.62 
(.08) 
 
3.77 
(.10) 
4.31 
(.15) 
4.04 
(.09) 
Note. * = Mean age ** = Average scores across all participants and conditions.  
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a) Intensity Ratings  
Results from intensity ratings suggested that whilst intensity ratings across modalities did not 
differ, the category of emotion, gender of the stimulus and age of participants influenced intensity 
perception and intensity ratings also depended on the interaction of emotion and modality as well as 
on emotion and gender of the stimulus. Huynh-Feldt corrections were used for factors that violated 
the assumption of sphericity.  
A repeated measure ANCOVA for intensity ratings with gender of participants (2) as 
between-subject factor and modality (2), emotion (6) and gender stimulus (2) as within-subject factors 
whilst controlling for age of participants as covariate revealed that there was a significant main effect 
of emotion, F(4.77,  200.25) = 10.15, p < .001,  = .2 and gender of the stimulus, F(1, 42) = 12.85, p 
= .001,  = .23.  Female stimuli receiving higher intensity ratings than male stimuli. In addition, there 
was a significant main effect for the covariate age of participants, F(1, 42) = 4.23, p = .05,  = .09 
and as age increased, intensity ratings decreased (r = -.38, p = .01).  
To follow up on the main effect of emotions, Sidak post-hoc for multiple comparisons 
revealed that happy stimuli received highest ratings which were significantly higher than for all other 
emotions, followed by surprise, sadness, disgust which did not differ significantly from each other and 
then followed by fear which was significantly lower than all emotions but sadness and disgust.  Anger 
received lowest ratings which were significantly lower than for all other stimuli displayed, all at p < 
.001. The main effect of modality as well as of gender of participants was not significant (p > .05).  
Further, the interaction effect between (i) emotion and modality, F(4.56, 191.65) = 4.7, p = 
.001, as well as between (ii) emotion and gender of the stimulus, F(5, 210) = 3.54, p = 
.004, was significant (for M and SE see Table 2.1). 
i: Happy stimuli received highest ratings in the face condition and happiness and sadness 
equally received highest ratings in the voice condition. For the face condition, this was followed by 
ratings for surprise which were different to all other emotions, followed by fear and disgust which did 
not differ significantly from each other. For the voice condition, happiness and sadness were followed 
by disgust which was different from all other emotions. Anger received lowest ratings in the face and 
voice conditions, which were significantly lower than all other emotions but sadness (in the face 
condition) or fear (in the voice condition), all at p < .05. Additionally, although no overall significant 
main effect for modality, for emotions of happiness, fear and surprise, faces were being rated with 
higher intensity than voices whilst for sadness, the opposite was true and voices were being rated with 
higher intensity than faces. For disgust and anger, the modalities did not differ in their intensity 
ratings.  
ii: The interaction between emotions and gender stimulus revealed that the main effect for 
gender of the stimulus with higher intensity ratings for female than for male stimuli was true for 
emotions displaying anger, fear and disgust, p < .05. Further, for male stimuli, happiness was rated 
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higher than all other emotions with anger and fear receiving lowest ratings. A similar pattern was 
found for female stimuli with happiness receiving ratings which were higher than for all other 
emotions and with anger receiving lowest intensity ratings (p < .05). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. Means and Standard Error for intensity ratings for emotion and gender stimulus, p < .05. N = 45.  
 
b) Choice Reaction Times (RTs) 
Results from RTs suggest that speed for making decisions depended on the emotion category, 
on age as well as gender of participants and also on the interaction of modality, emotions, gender of 
participants and gender of the stimuli. Huynh-Feldt corrections were used for factors that violated the 
assumption of sphericity. A repeated measure ANCOVA for RTs with gender of participants (2) as 
between-subject factor and modality (2), emotion (6) and gender stimulus (2) as within-subject factors 
whilst controlling for age of participants as covariate revealed that there was a significant main effect 
of emotion, F(4.92, 206.74) = 2.85, p = .02, age of participants, F(1, 42) = 4.91, p = .03, 
.11 and of gender of participants, F(1, 42) = 8.64, p = .005, .17. To follow up on the main 
effect of emotions, Sidak post-hoc for multiple comparisons revealed that surprised and happy stimuli 
had fastest RTs which did not differ significantly from each other, followed by anger, fear, disgust 
and sadness which all did not differ from each other significantly (p > .05). Further, age correlated 
positively with speed and as age increased, speed of decision making also increased, r = .43, p = .003. 
Lastly, female participants made significantly faster decisions (M = 3.77, SE = .1) compared to male 
participants (M = 4.31, SE = .15). However, the main effects for modality and gender of stimuli were 
not significant (p > .05). 
Further, analysis revealed that the three-way interaction between modality, emotions and 
gender of participants was significant, F(5,  210) = 2.95, p = .014, .07. Whilst the present study 
did not find overall significant differences in choice RTs for modality, faces were rated faster than 
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voices for happy stimuli – for male as well as for female participants whilst for surprise, there was an 
opposite modality effect.  Only ratings made by male participants showed faster ratings for surprised 
voices than for surprised faces. This modality effect for surprised stimuli was not visible in female 
participants. Furthermore, the significant main effect for gender of participant with females rating 
stimuli faster than male participants seemed to be true for surprise and disgust in the face condition 
and for happiness and disgust in the voice condition, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
   
Figure 2.2. Means and Standard Error for RTs. Significant three-way interaction effect between modality, 
emotions and gender of participants,  *p < .05. N = 45 
 
Lastly, the three-way interaction between modality, emotion category and gender of 
participants also interacted with a fourth variable gender of stimuli, F(5, 210) = 2.21, p = .05, .05. 
Men showed a face superiority effect for happy and surprised faces over voices only if they were 
displayed by other males. Further, for faces, the faster RTs for women as compared to men for 
surprised faces only seemed to be true when displayed by male actors whilst for disgusted faces, the 
RT effect was true for stimuli displayed by actors of both genders. Additionally, faster RTs for 
women than for men was also true for angry faces when displayed by female actors. Men also  rated 
disgusted faces faster when they were displayed by women as compared to men. 
For voices, faster choice RTs for women over men for happy voices was only true when 
stimuli were displayed by male actors. Men rated angry voices faster when they were displayed by 
other men as compared to women, all at p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Means and Standard Errors for RTs. Significant four-way interaction effect between modality, 
emotions, gender of participants and gender of stimulus, *p < .05. N = 45 
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2.3.2. Analysis 2: Confusion Data 
For each individual participant, the whole spectrum of possible emotion combination (36 
pairs) was analysed. Confusion data which display the mean intensity ratings for each fo the 36 
possible combinations across all participants are displayed in Figure 2.4. For voices and faces, the 
confusion matrices illustrate some similarities in rating profiles of individual emotions across two 
separate modalities. As can be seen, for example surprise and fear are often confused within the visual 
modality – but also within the auditory modality. Happiness on the other hand is very rarely 
misinterpreted as another emotion – in voices as well as in faces.               
 
                             
 
 Faces                                                           Voices 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Confusion matrices for voices and faces with mean intensity ratings from 45 participants. 
 
 
The confusions between emotion pairs across two modalities are also illustrated in Figure 2.5, which 
shows the specific emotion rating profile for each of the six basic emotions.  
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Figure 2.5. Complete emotion rating profiles for each of the six emotions, split by modality. N = 45. Ha = 
happiness, su = surprise, fe = fear, sa = sadness, di = disgust, an = anger. 
 
In order to calculate the similarity of correlations between auditory and visual rating profiles 
per emotion and participant, the face and the voice conditions were each split into two separate 
datasets (yielding four datasets in total). The first two presentation blocks of the experiment (F1 and 
V1) formed the first pair whilst the third and fourth presentation blocks of the experiment (F2 and V2) 
formed the second pair. Hence, each dataset contained the same number of stimuli per emotion label 
and emotion category. Thus, four datasets for each participant were obtained: two datasets with 
average intensity ratings for each label and each emotion for faces (F1 and F2), and two datasets with 
average intensity ratings for each label and each emotion for voices (V1 and V2). To examine 
similarity of emotional response profiles, the correlations between response profiles within same 
modality (F1 versus F2 and V1 versus V2) and across modalities (F1 versus V1) were computed.  
Hence, there were four independent datasets that included mean intensity ratings for the full 
emotion profile for faces (dataset F1 & F2) and the same for voices (dataset V1 & V2). Then, for each 
individual participant, correlation analysis was performed between response profiles within the same 
modality (F1 versus F2 and V1 versus V2) and across modalities (F1 versus V1).  
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The mean correlation across all participants between both face datasets (F1 versus F2) was high,  r = 
.78 (SD = 0.10) and emotion ratings from half of the face stimuli correlated with the rating profiles in 
the other half of the face stimuli and explained about 60% of variance.  
For voices, similar results can be found with mean correlations of  r = .71 (SD = 0.12) across 
participants between both voice sets (V1 versus V2), explaining about 50% of variance in rating 
profiles. This suggests consistency in emotion labels associated with stimuli across two sets of stimuli 
within each modality. Interestingly, not only within but also across modalities, the rating profiles also 
moderately correlated (F1 versus V1), r = .68 (SD = 0.14). About 46% of the variance in the rating 
profiles for faces can be predicted by the rating profiles for voices (and vice-versa).  
In order to investigate whether the mean correlations for rating two subsets of the same 
modalities differ from correlations for rating two separate modalities, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with condition (3 levels) as within-subject variable was conducted. Since correlations are usually not 
normally distributed, correlation scores were z-transformed before entered into the ANOVA. The 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for condition, F(2, 88) = 19.11, p < 
.001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that on average, correlations for rating profiles from F1 
versus F2 were significantly higher than for correlations for rating V1 versus V2 and higher than 
correlations for ratings across modalities F1 versus V1. Interestingly, mean correlations for ratings 
profiles across two separate modalities F1 versus V1 were not significantly different from correlating 
rating profiles within one modality V1 versus V2 (p > .05). This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6. Significant mean correlation scores (N = 45) between the complete rating profiles of emotional 
stimuli either from the same (F1 vs F2 and V1 vs V2) or across different modalities (F1 and V1). With Standard 
Errors. *p < .05. 
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2.4. Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to establish just how similar the independent modalities of 
the voice and face are in facilitating recognition of the six basic emotions within the same participant. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the current study is the first to investigate whether 
happiness or anger superiority effects are predominantly a feature of visual emotion recognition or 
whether the same valence effects are also observable in parallel within the auditory domain. Further, 
the possible existence of shared emotion decoding mechanisms across modalities was investigated by 
examining gender effects (of actors as well as of participants) within the voice and the face condition. 
In addition, the present study investigated whether the full rating profiles of emotions, as evident from 
confusion data – were also correlated between both modalities.   
 In line with Hypothesis 1, the analysis of target emotions in the present study pointed 
towards a positive valence superiority effect that was replicated across both modalities. Previous 
findings regarding the anger superiority - as reported for example by Damjanovic et al. (2013) - could 
not be replicated. Further, there was evidence for the influence of gender of participants on speed of 
making emotion decisions – independent of modality which supports Hypothesis 2. Gender of 
actor/stimuli additionally influenced the perceived intensity of emotions – again, independent of 
modality.  In line with Hypothesis 3, the analysis of confusion data revealed highly correlated 
confusion matrixes within as well as across modalities. This finding hints towards the possibility of 
common underlying emotion recognition mechanisms which are independent of modality. This 
finding may potentially support neurological studies of shared impaired emotion recognition in faces 
and voices after isolated brain damage (e.g. Fecteau et al., 2007) or shared representations of object 
categories (Shinkareva et al., 2011). 
 
2.4.1 Modality Similarities 
In hand with neuroimaging studies which demonstrated activation in shared brain regions 
during emotion categorisation across a range of modalities (Peelen et al., 2010), data from the present 
behavioural study emphasizes the idea of modality-independent emotion recognition which may be 
due to a common coding mechanism. For example, neither RTs nor intensity ratings differed as a 
function of modality. This has previously also been reported by Hawk and colleagues (2009) who 
reported lowest accuracy scores for prosody recognition whilst recognition rates for emotional face 
expressions and non-verbal vocalisations did not differ from each other.  
Looking closer at the interaction between individual emotions and modality, data revealed 
that faces communicated the emotions of happiness, fear and surprise with higher perceived intensity 
than voices whilst for sadness, the opposite was true and voices communicated sadness with higher 
perceived intensity than faces. For disgust and anger, participants did not differ in their intensity 
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perception across both modalities. It is plausible that for emotions which convey immediate 
information relevant for survival such as anger and disgust, it is beneficial to recognise signals with 
equal intensity across a range of modalities. For emotions that require less immediate action such as 
happiness, fear or surprise, focusing on the face alone may be sufficient whilst sadness seems to be 
communicated especially well within the auditory affect bursts. In order to further demonstrate 
similarities in emotion recognition across voices and faces, the following section will firstly discuss 
data on valence superiority effects, before moving on to gender and age effects as well correlations of 
emotion confusions across both modalities.  
Overall, current behavioural evidence on emotion recognition similarities across modalities 
supports findings from brain imaging studies that suggested that emotions from faces (e.g. Adolphs, 
2002) as well as from voices (e.g. Phillips et al., 1998) may be processed within comparable neural 
circuits. Further, in line with previous behavioural evidence from autism (Phillips et al., 2010) or 
Schizophrenia (Simpson et al., 2013), the ability to recognise emotions in one modality may indeed be 
directly linked to the ability to recognise emotions in other modalities, suggesting one emotion core 
network rather than separate, modality-dependent mechanisms.  
Apart from neural evidence, modality-independent processes may, for example, also be rooted 
in top-down cognitive mechanisms rather than on the bottom-up analysis of modality-specific 
perceptual features. It is possible that the same semantic representation of emotion categories may be 
activated across different types of stimulus presentation formats as has previously been shown for 
objects depicted in pictures or as written words, possibly reflecting a common neural representation 
(Shinkareva et al., 2011). Further, parallels in emotion recognition across modalities may also 
originate from perceptual interdependence of physical features during emotion production. For 
example, Ohala (1980) suggested that the smile in the animal and human face may be a consequence 
of vocal tract movements to increase the pitch of vocalisations in order to resemble an infantile-like, 
submissive sound. This pitch variation may protect the sender from an imminent attack and hence, the 
contraction of the lip corners accompanies changes in the vocal tract resonance. In order to further 
demonstrate to the reader of the similarity across modalities found in the present study, the following 
section will discuss valence and gender effects across two independent modalities. 
 
2.4.2 Happiness Superiority in Faces and Voices 
This present study is one of the first to have obtained data on valence-superiority effects 
across non-verbal auditory as well as visual stimuli from the same participant. Contrary to past 
research on anger superiority effects such as by Damjanovic et al. (2013), the current study did not 
find a general negative valence superiority effect. In fact, for faces, anger was consistently one of the 
worst recognised emotions whilst happiness showed fastest RTs and highest intensity ratings. This 
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seems surprising in the light of evolutionary theories since threatening emotions ought to be 
recognised effectively in order to avoid danger. So what could be a possible explanation for this 
happiness superiority effect? 
In happy faces, a smile takes up a very large proportion of the face. This large perceptual 
feature within the face may enhance rapid recognition of happiness (Smith, 2011). Indeed, Du and 
Martinez (2013) suggested only 10-20ms of exposure time for happy faces are needed for correct 
classification, indicating that happiness in faces is rapidly recognised – even if image resolution was 
reduced. However, from the findings within the visual domain alone, it is not clear whether happiness 
superiority effects are only due to perceptual features within the face or may also be due to more 
modality-independent top-down processes such as attachment promotion or offspring bonding 
(Babchuck et al., 1985). Interestingly, the current study also provides evidence for happiness 
superiority within the voice. Again, anger was the emotion recognised with less intensity and longer 
reaction times throughout. This seemed to be independent of the length of the auditory stimuli since 
the mean length for angry stimuli used in this study was 970.5ms which was significantly shorter than 
the average vocal expression of happiness (1267ms).  
From a cognitive perspective, anger approach-and-avoidance theories (e.g. Marsh, Adams, & 
Kleck, 2005) suggest that angry stimuli often elicit avoidance rather than approach behaviour. This 
has been tested by the tendency to manually increase the spatial distance between the written word 
‘me’ on a computer screen (which represented the participant) in response to a static angry face. It is 
possible that we prefer to avoid uncomfortable situations and instead pay attention to people 
displaying positive attitudes - especially when aggression towards the angry person is not an option 
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2013). This tendency may be modality-independent and may be based on 
evolutionary concepts. For example, efficient recognition of positive emotions may enhance social 
bonding and offspring care-taking (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Further, happiness superiority could 
be explained by studies on biological aspects on altruism, suggesting that humans are more willing to 
help happy people as compared to people in immediate distress which is in accordance with social 
affiliation models
9
 (Hauser, Preston, & Stansfield, 2013). In our everyday life, it may simply be 
beneficial for us to attend to social partners that have a positive attitude towards us and may pose as a 
potential mating partner or be sympathetic to helping out in need.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that the modality-independent happiness superiority 
effects found in the present study could simply be a confounding result of comparing one positive 
emotion (happiness) with one bidirectional (surprise) or four negative (sadness, anger, fear and 
disgust) emotions. Hence, it may be easier to distinguish one single positive emotion from several 
negative emotions which could also account for higher confusion rates amongst several negative 
emotions of the same valence. Further, happy stimuli may be particularly prone to iconic 
                                                     
9
 Social affiliation models suggest the idea to invest in ‘cooperative partnerships that benefit survival and 
success in group-life’ (Hauser et al., 2013, p. 2). 
 55 
 
representations by actors (Scherer, Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 2011). This exact issue of limited 
numbers of positive emotions typically included in emotion research was addressed by Sauter and 
Scott (2007) who compared non-verbal vocalisations of several positive emotions such as relief, 
contentment and amusement. They reported that especially the positive emotion of ‘amusement’ was 
recognised with high accuracy rates that exceeded 90%. When conducting the study with children as 
young as five years old, amusement and relief yielded highest accuracy rates compared to several 
negative non-verbal affect bursts (Sauter, Panattoni, & Happe, 2013). Further, for face recognition, 
Juth and colleagues (2005) compared one single positive (happiness) with one single negative (anger) 
and one neutral emotion, and also found fastest RTs for faces expression happiness. The current issue 
may not be as black and white but previous studies such as by Sauter et al. (2013) - at least partially - 
support the notion that emotions of positive valence may enhance emotion recognition, independent 
of the proportion of positive and negative emotions displayed. The current data suggests that this 
could be extended to auditory as well as visual stimuli. 
 
2.4.3 External Factors 
a) Age and Gender of Participants 
Accordingly to the predictions set aside, the present study found significant differences 
between gender of participants for RTs; this, however, was not true for intensity ratings. Findings may 
possibly reflect a female advantage in emotion recognition which has previously been linked to 
greater mirror neuron system activation in females during emotion judgements (Schulthe-Ruether et 
al., 2008). In the current study, gender differences for speed were true for both modalities. In the face 
as well as in the voice condition, female participants made faster emotion categorisation decisions 
than male participants. It is possible that whilst gender may have an impact on the rating speed, 
intensity perception may be comparable between male and female judges.  
In the light of the ‘primary care-taker hypothesis’ (Babchuck et al., 1985), speed – rather than 
intensity - of recognising emotions in others may play a very important role in protecting offspring. 
The current data suggested an importance of disgust because across both modalities, female 
participants rated disgust faster than male participants. This finding may be related to females’ 
necessity to perceive disgust during offspring rearing. In addition, women rated happiness in voices 
faster than men, which again, might related to attachment theories and females’ evolutionary tasks of 
forming attachment with offspring and mating partners (Babchuck et al., 1985). This female 
superiority was not only limited to positive emotions; findings suggest a female care-taking role that 
includes threat-avoidance as well as attachment formation.  
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However, a significant difference for gender was not found for intensity ratings – although, 
again, this applied to both modalities. Unlike result reported by Lambrecht et al. (2014), gender 
effects did not depend on modality as neither the facial nor the auditory domain showed significant 
gender effects for intensity ratings. However, it is important to note that the ratio of male and female 
participants used in the present study was not equally distributed and further research with larger 
sample sizes needs to be conducted to address this current issue.  
Although not specifically worded as hypothesis, the co-variate of age demonstrated that age 
of participants influenced the way emotions are processed. For intensity ratings, increasing age 
seemed to decrease emotion intensity perception and for RTs, increasing age resulted in longer choice 
RTs across participants. This was true for the face as well as for the voice condition. This is a 
consistent finding in emotion literature with older adults often showing decline in emotion recognition 
tasks in faces (Williams, Mathersul, Palmer, Gur, Gur, & Gordon, 2009) and in voices (Demenescu, 
Mathiak, & Mathiak, 2014). Age-related emotion recognition differences could be the result of 
changes in general cognitive decline, neuronal activity or motivation (Issakowitz & Stanley, 2011). 
Overall, the same pattern of presence - or absence for that matter – of gender and age affects across 
both modalities suggests the existence of general supramodal emotion perception mechanisms.  
b) Gender Stimuli 
Although not specifically predicted, the present study found that emotions expressed by 
females were generally perceived as more intense than men. This was especially true for emotions of 
anger, fear and disgust. For disgusted faces, female stimuli were also rated faster than male stimuli – 
when rated by male participants. Interestingly, as stated above, present findings suggest a connection 
between being female and either recognising or being expected (by males) to express disgust in faces. 
This finding possibly indicates females’ importance of expressing and perceiving disgust during 
offspring rearing as stated by the ‘primary care-taker hypothesis’ (Babchuck et al., 1985). For 
example, it is equally important for children to learn from the primary caretaker when something is 
disgusting in order to avoid rotten food as it is for mothers to react rapidly to offspring that shows 
signs of having consumed poisonous objects. 
In addition – although RTs for gender of stimuli was not a significant main effect– men 
showed faster speed when rating angry voices expressed by other men as compared to women. This 
finding is interesting because it shows a) that men may be conditioned to rapidly recognise anger in 
voices, suggesting a possible threat-avoidance or fight preparedness and b) that men might show own-
gender bias for recognising anger in other men. It has been stated from face research that male faces 
tend to be recognised faster than female faces when they express anger (Aguado, García-Gutierrez, & 
Serrano-Pedraza, 2009; Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell and Smith, 2007). A recent ERP study 
(Valdés-Conroy, Aguado, Fernández-Cahill, Romero-Ferreiro, & Diéguez-Risco, 2014) also 
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suggested a stronger brain response to male as compared to female angry faces as early as 150ms after 
stimulus onset. Recently, anger displayed by male actors also elicited stronger startle reflexes in 
viewers than female faces, demonstrating higher perceived dominance in threatening male faces 
(Paulus, Musial, & Renn, 2014). This could be a result of sensitivity to stereotypes such as men are 
expected to express anger (Aguado et al., 2009) or because of male features, such as the relative 
position of eyebrows within the face, which may naturally appear more angry than female faces 
(Hess, Adams Jr, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009).  Here, the present data suggests that this association 
between rating anger and male actors may go beyond visual features within the face and could 
potentially be extended to the vocal domain.  
However, the current data only supports the above statement if the judges were also male. 
This in turn may hint at possible gender in-group effects for rating speed of emotions. For example, 
past research has shown amygdala lateralization depending on gender of judges with men showing 
right amygdala activation when judging emotional male faces with the opposite to be true for females 
(Armony & Sergerie, 2007). However, again, it is to remember that the present sample size of male 
and female participants was unequal and so results have to be interpreted with caution. Further, 
present trials per condition were relatively small when split for gender of stimulus and would need to 
be replicated with increased trial size before generalizing the current findings.  
 
2.4.4 Confusion Data  
Results from the confusion matrices indicate that the rating profiles from faces correlated 
highly with the rating profiles from voices. Independent of the mode and perceptual features of 
emotions presented, judges associated specific emotions with specific emotion labels which was 
consistent within, as well as across modalities. For example, in faces, confusions occurred between 
pairs of emotions such as fear and surprise and between anger and disgust. Confusions between fear 
and surprise in faces have often been reported due to similar visual features within the face such as 
wide opened eyes and raised eye brows (Castelli, 2005; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 
1973). In a recent study, Jack et al. (2014) demonstrated that fearful and surprised as well as disgusted 
and angry dynamic face expressions share the same basic perceptual features during early processing 
stages and only later do more complex, distinguishable emotion features for six individual emotion 
categories develop. Anger has also been classified as disgust – although not the other way around - in 
a face emotion recognition study by Du and Martinez (2011) and the confusion rate increased the 
lower the picture resolution was.  
For voices in the present study, confusions also occurred between emotion pairs such as fear 
and surprise as well as fear and disgust and anger and disgust, which has partly been supported by 
Belin et al. (2008) and Sauter et al. (2010). It seems surprising that pairs such as fear and surprise 
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often get confused in faces as well as in voices – independent of perceptual features. The current 
finding of highly correlated rating profiles as well as confusion matrices across modalities contributes 
to the current argument of supramodal emotion perception based on shared underlying mechanisms.  
In the present thesis, certain confusions between emotions – as evident from the confusion 
matrices - were more common than others, such as disgust being identified as anger. For facial 
expressions, disgust and anger share early perceptual signals such as the shared nose wrinkle and lip 
movements (Jack, Garrod, & Schyns, 2014) which may account for common confusions. From an 
evolutionary perspective, angry expressions can carry the meaning of aggression and hence, it is 
important to correctly recognise anger in others in order to avoid threat (Damjanovic, Pinkham, 
Clarke, & Phillips, 2014; Seligman, 1971).  
Error management theory has proposed that it might be more costly to underestimate- rather 
than overestimate- anger expressed in others (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Hence, we may be biased 
towards overestimating emotion expressions as angry (even if they are not) as this has important 
implications for survival (Holbrook et al., 2014). Consequently, in the present thesis, faces which 
share certain muscle activation, such as disgust and anger, may both be biased towards ‘looking 
angry‘, in order to avoid costly underestimation of anger and hence risking attacks. Interestingly, 
humans are also biased towards judging moving angry face expressions as approaching faster than 
neutral faces perhaps because overestimating the speed of potentially threatening objects can enhance 
survival (Brendel, DeLucia, Hecht, Stacy, & Larsen, 2012). Hence, emotion judgements and 
associated common errors in emotion judgements may be influenced by an evolved bias towards 
making a less costly error of overestimating rather than underestimating anger in others. Interestingly, 
in the present thesis, this seemed to be common to both modalities, suggesting a modality-
independent bias of emotion judgements.  
2.4.5 Limitations & Future Ideas 
Although the static Ekman faces (Ekman, 1975) of basic expressions are widely used and 
validated, recent studies have started to include newly recorded dynamic visual face stimuli which 
evolve over time in order to create more natural situations within the laboratory.  
It would be interesting to see whether the current happiness superiority effect could also be replicated 
in dynamic faces. It has previously been stated that for dynamic faces, anger – rather than happiness – 
superiority effects may occur due to anger-typical features within the moving face that may appear 
later in time and are not instantly accessible in static faces (Ceccarini & Caudek, 2013). Hence, for 
future studies, it would be interesting to collect dynamic, coloured visual as well as dynamic vocal 
data from the same poser in order to investigate whether emotions expressed across different 
modalities correspond when they are expressed by the same person.  
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Although several studies have identified emotion recognition locations within the human 
brain that may be shared across modalities (e.g. Peelen et al., 2010), less is known about the temporal 
dynamics of emotional face and voice processing within the same individual. Conducting objective 
neurophysiological studies as a within-subject design could determine how similar the temporal 
make-up of emotion transmission across modalities within the brain might be. The idea that visual and 
vocal domains have very similar patterns for individual emotion processing also raises the option to 
create intervention or training programs for individuals with emotion recognition deficits. Most 
previous work focuses on emotion recognition training based on visual input, especially in children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009; Williams, Gray, & Tonge, 
2012).  It could therefore be beneficial to create training programs based on auditory as well as visual 
input since emotion recognition in both modalities may be based on shared mechanisms.  
Lastly, this study included British adults, reportedly belonging to the British culture. 
Although many studies claim the universal existence of basic emotions across cultures (e.g. Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971, Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001), one cannot conclude that the current results may be 
stable across non-Western countries. For example, Jack et al. (2009) repeatedly found that Eastern and 
Western cultures use different perceptual features of the face (such as the eye region in Eastern groups 
and extract information from the whole face in Western groups) to decode specific emotions. Since 
cultural display rules can influence emotional intensity experience which in turn has an effect on 
emotion intensity recognition (Schneider, Hempel, & Lynch, 2013), it would be beneficial to conduct 
the same study from a cultural perspective.  
2.4.6 Conclusion 
Assuming shared cognitive (Borod et al., 2000) as well as neural networks (Peelen et al., 
2010), emotions deemed to be important for survival or reproduction within one modality ought to 
also be recognised with same intensity in a parallel, yet separate modality. Indeed, data from the 
present behavioural study suggested similar emotion communication mechanisms across modalities 
based on valence superiority, gender or age effects and confusion rates. The current results could 
mean emotion recognition is based on general emotion-specific, but modality-independent 
mechanisms. Hence, the current study may extend Yovel and Belin’s hypothesis (2013) of person 
recognition by adding information about similar cognitive mechanisms during emotion recognition 
across two separate modalities. Whilst inferences from the present Chapter 2 about a modality-
independent emotion mechanism are drawn upon adult participants, it remains unanswered whether 
children also demonstrate similarities in emotion processing across modalities or whether children 
rely on one modality more than on another. Consequently, the following Chapter 3 will describe a 
developmental study of emotion recognition across modalities in primary school children.  
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3 
Children’s Emotion Recognition in Human Voice and 
Face.  
 
Chapter 3 aims to examine findings from the adult data in Chapter 2 within a developmental 
context including children aged 5 to10. Whilst the adult study in Chapter 2 demonstrated a) 
similarities in rating emotions displayed in faces and in voices as visible in choice speed and intensity 
perception, b) superior recognition for happy as compared to angry stimuli replicated across two 
independent modalities as well as c) highly correlated confusion patterns across independent 
modalities suggesting supramodal processing, it is of considerable interest how and when these 
patterns develop across childhood. Investigating emotion perception development across separate 
modalities in primary school-aged children could help to assess the component of social learning and 
developmental factors to emotion understanding. This is especially important under conditions where 
only one modality is accessible such as during phone conversations or extremely noisy play-ground 
situations. Finding similar patterns to the adult data could indicate supramodal emotion perception 
mechanisms which are acquired early in childhood. 
Overall, the present chapter focuses on the development of emotion perception across two 
separate modalities in a within-subject design. Individual factors such as children’s gender, Theory of 
Mind (ToM) abilities and non-verbal IQ scores were controlled for in Experiment 3-I. Further, some 
longitudinal data from a smaller number of 7 and 8-year-old children aims to deliver a deeper 
understanding of developmental trajectories for emotion perception in Experiment 3-II. In addition, a 
smaller Experiment 3-III evaluates the appropriateness of using adult face stimuli in a child study by 
comparing children’s emotion recognition abilities for either judging adult or child faces. This 
methodological comparison also aims to investigate whether children demonstrate in-group age 
effects during emotion perception in faces of different age groups as otherwise sometimes shown in 
adult studies (Kuefner, Kassia, Piccozi, & Bricolo, 2008).  
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3.1. Experiment 3-I  
Children’s Emotion Recognition in Human Voice and Face: 
A Developmental Perspective. 
 
Normal development of emotion perception is a crucial prerequisite for social competence 
and communication skills in children. For example, abnormally enhanced perception of angry faces in 
childhood has been linked to later substance abuse in adolescents (Ernst et al., 2010) and caregiver’s 
reports of children’s social behaviour has been associated with children’s recognition accuracy in face 
expressions (Parker, Mathis, & Kupersmidt, 2013). It has now been established that the ability to 
perceive and judge emotions in faces and voices develops and increases with age throughout 
childhood (Herba & Phillips, 2004; Gagnon, Gosselin, Hudon-ven der Buhs, Larocque,  & Milliard, 
2010) and even until adolescence (Aguert, Laval, Lacroix, Gil, & Le Bigot, 2013; Thomas, de Bellis, 
Graham, & LaBar, 2007).  
 
3.1.1.1. Children’s Emotion Recognition in Faces 
Are young children able to identify emotions expressed in faces? By observing children’s 
looking time at faces with different emotion expressions, it has been claimed that 4 to 6 month old 
infants can already discriminate between two negative expressions such as fear and anger (Serrano, 
Iglesias, & Loeches, 1999). According to Pons, Harris and de Rosnay (2004), children undergo three 
different stages of face emotion recognition. By reflecting on emotional stories told by cartoon 
characters, it became evident that most 5-year-olds were able to name basic face expressions. Seven-
year-old children were able to understand emotions communicating beliefs, desire and hidden 
emotions which required understanding of other person’s mental state. Not before the age of 9 did 
children pass the final stage of correctly identifying emotions that are mixed in nature or are 
influenced by morality.  Accordingly, although accuracy did not improve after the age of 7, speed of 
recognition increased between the ages of 7 to 11-year old children (De Sonneville, Verschoor, 
Njiokiktjien, Op het Veld, Toorenaar, & Vranken, 2002), suggesting that – although basic emotion 
recognition has its onset early in childhood – performance continued to stabilize with age. 
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Although most developmental studies of emotion recognition have focused on early years of 
childhood, several studies have demonstrated that emotion recognition develops well into adolescent 
years which may be especially true for the perception of mixed emotions whose successful 
interpretation depends upon appraisal of social context (Izard & Harris, 1995) and emotions displayed 
with varying intensities (Montirosso et al., 2010). Gagnon and colleagues (2010) stated that fear and 
disgust showed higher recognition accuracy in 9 to10-year-olds as compared to 5 to 6 year-old-
children which demonstrated a gradual improvement of emotion recognition. This goes in hand with 
findings by Thomas and colleagues (2007) who investigated emotion recognition in morphed faces 
across older children, adolescents and adults and found that recognition of changes in emotion 
expressions improved well past adolescent years in terms of speed and correct responses. Those 
changes seemed to be linked to specific emotions as shown by increased sensitivity to changes in 
angry faces between adolescence and adulthood which happened later than for fearful stimuli. 
Overall, it seems evident that even basic categorisation of emotions within the face is by no means 
complete before the time children enter primary school and many developmental changes happen just 
before they move into secondary school around the age of 10.  
 
3.1.1.2. Children’s Emotion Recognition in Voices 
Although the majority of emotion recognition studies have focused on facial expressions, 
some studies have attempted to assess developmental trajectories in vocal emotion recognition which 
are mainly based on prosody of spoken sentences. It has been proposed that even new-borns (around 
34 hours after birth) distinguish between different emotions expressed in the mother’s voice. This has 
been shown by a higher tendency in infants to open eyes when listening to happy compared to sad, 
angry or neutral voices (Mastropieri & Turkewitz, 1999). Moving on to middle childhood, two earlier 
studies by McCluskey and Albas (1981) and McCluskey and colleagues (1975) have shown that just 
like for face processing, vocal emotion recognition in children also seems to continuously improve 
with age right into adulthood. They demonstrated that Canadian as well as Mexican participants aged 
5 years onwards showed increased accuracy in content-free vocal emotion identification until the age 
of 25. However, McCluskey et al. (1975) made no connection to any external variables such as 
gender, IQ or Theory of Mind development in relation to emotion processing development which 
limits the generalizability of results. In a more recent study by Rothman and Nowicki (2004), a 
nonverbal measure of children’s paralanguage (DANVA2-CP) was validated and results indicated that 
children’s intensity ratings of child voices performance increased with age with errors decreasing 
significantly between the ages of 4 to 12.  
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Recently, Aguert and colleagues (2013) suggested that emotional prosody recognition of even 
very basic emotions like happiness and sadness is difficult for children at the age of entering primary 
school and only becomes more stable when most children move into secondary schools. Apart from 
linguistic prosody-recognition, one of the first studies to look at children’s understanding of emotions 
presented via non-verbal affect vocalizations such as a cry or moan was conducted by Sauter, 
Panattoni and Happe (2012). Looking at developmental progress children make in recognising 
emotions from vocalizations rather than prosody, they suggested that children between the ages of 5 
to 10 were able to recognise ten different emotions such as relief, fear or amusement. This result is 
interesting since the study extends beyond the six basic emotions and also offers the comparison of 
several emotions of positive valence rather than just focusing on happiness. Sauter et al. (2012) 
concluded that - similarly to face expression or prosody understanding - recognition abilities for 
emotional vocalizations also improve with age.  
Overall, previous studies have attempted to pin down the time course of emotional 
development from either the visual or the auditory domain. Although across both channels, infants 
show early awareness of different emotion categories, advanced emotion classification does not seem 
to be in place before primary school age and does not cease to develop well into adolescent years. 
However, comparisons across studies or even across modalities are extremely difficult due to a large 
variety of stimuli, task instructions and differences in sample selection. Only a limited number of 
studies have explicitly observed children’s emotion recognition across several modalities in a within-
subject design. For example, Nelson and Russell (2011) reported that during early childhood (children 
aged 3 to 5) generally showed high recognition rates for emotion presented in voices, faces, body 
posture or multimodal conditions but recognition improved with age. The auditory condition showed 
lowest recognition rates.  
It has been proposed that –even for basic emotions like sadness and happiness - children only 
start to utilise acoustical information from prosody aged 4 to 5 (Quam and Swingley, 2012).  In 
addition, Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates and Slater, (2007) investigated the ability to recognise 
emotions from faces, vocal prosody and eyes during late childhood (children aged 9 to 15) and 
concluded that, whilst decoding emotions from faces and eyes improved until the age of 11, 
performance on vocal cues remained stable across age. Across early and late childhood, it seems that 
children are more equipped to read emotions from faces rather than from voices. However, to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous studies have examined emotion recognition across several 
modalities during middle childhood. Hence, the questions arises whether the social brain develop 
continuously throughout the years of primary school and whether this depends on modality? Does this 
also include the emotion recognition in non-verbal affect vocalisations?  
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3.1.1.3.  Neurological Evidence for Changes in Emotion Recognition 
Assuming behavioural changes in emotion recognition across childhood, what could account 
for those age-related changes? Several neuroimaging studies have recently begun to investigate how 
emotional-related brain structures such as the amygdala change with age. Wierenga and colleagues 
(2014) conducted a longitudinal fMRI study and concluded that some subcortical structures within the 
developing brain continue to mature right into adolescent years. They found that volume of the 
amygdala and hippocampus increased with age. Especially the amygdala is commonly associated with 
emotion processing such as the recognition of emotions from faces (Morris et al., 1998), non-verbal 
vocalisations (Fecteau, Belin, Joanette, & Armony) and even music (Gosselin, Peretz, Johnsen, & 
Adolphs, 2007). Hence, it seems that structures which are important for emotion processing are not 
fully developed in primary or even secondary school aged children. Similarly, Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, 
Giedd, and Blakemore (2014) indicated that social brain structures – such as the anterior temporal 
cortex, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior superior temporal sulcus - continued to develop 
between the ages of 7 and 30. Data was collected in a longitudinal design with scans conducted 
roughly every 2 years and investigated an underlying cause for the behavioural age-related changes in 
emotion recognition abilities reported in the present study. 
Apart from structural changes, functional changes during emotion processing across 
childhood have also been observed. A decrease of amygdala activation during observation of 
emotional visual scenes has been found to be replaced with an increase of prefrontal activation 
between the ages of 10 and 24 (Vink et al., 2014). Hence, processing of emotional stimuli in children 
may be associated with amygdala activation whilst this function seems to be shifted to frontal brain 
areas in adults. This is supported by developmental studies suggesting that younger children whose 
frontal lobe hasn’t fully matured yet, showed similar performance in matching faces to cartoon 
situations to patients with frontal lobe damage (Kolb, Wilson, & Taylor, 1999). It has been stated that 
the connection between limbic structures such as the amygdala and prefrontal areas may consolidate 
with age as shown in an fMRI study investigating changes in the functional connectivity of the 
amygdala at rest for participants aged 4 to 23 (Gabard- Durnam et al., 2014). However, according to a 
review by Herba and Phillips (2004), ‘the role of the amygdala in emotion processing throughout 
childhood and adolescence remains unclear’ (p. 1191) and not all studies have shown age related 
changes in amygdala activation during emotion processing (e.g. Baird et al., 1999). 
Overall, neuroimaging data from children suggests that brain areas and connections which are 
commonly associated with emotion processing, mature between childhood and adult years. In line 
with this, it is predicted that emotion recognition abilities in the present child sample improves with 
age. However, functional imaging studies linking neuronal responses and emotion processing are 
typically based on visual processing of emotional stimuli.  
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As summarised below, it is possible that neuronal structures may influence emotion recognition not 
only in the visual but also in the auditory domain. 
 
3.1.1.4.  Evidence for Similarities Across Modalities  
Data from the adult data in Chapter 2 suggested the possibility of underlying coding 
mechanisms for emotion recognition which may be shared across modalities. Indeed, visual and 
auditory emotion recognition was simultaneously impaired after temporal lobe (Bonora et al., 2011; 
Dellacherie et al., 2011) or amygdala damage (Scott et al., 1997), suggesting underlying supramodal 
emotion networks. Considerably less is known about children’s neurological activity during emotion 
recognition – especially across separate modalities. Is it possible that modality-independent emotion 
processing is already a feature of the child’s brain? It is not clear whether children at primary-school 
age also show similarities in recognising emotions across modalities as seen from adult data or 
whether children’s judgements rely mainly on external perceptual analyses of stimuli.  
For unimodal emotion recognition in children, previous neuroimaging studies have suggested 
impaired face expression recognition in children aged 6 to 10 presenting with medial temporal lobe 
epilepsy (Cantalupo et al., 2013). This has also been found for prosody – again, in patients aged 6 to 
11 with right temporal lobe epilepsy (Cohen, Prather, Town, & Hynd, 1990). Those findings parallel 
data from adults with temporal lobe epilepsy which also suggests simultaneous impairment of 
emotion recognition from faces and voices (Bonora et al., 2011). Above arguments suggest global 
deficits during right hemisphere or temporal lobe damage which may in turn indicate modality 
independent emotion mechanisms in similar brain areas by the age of 6 as well as in adults. Further, 
studies including children with Autism
10
 also demonstrated that participants aged 7 to 17 showed less 
brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex as compared to healthy children during irony recognition 
in vocal or in visual conditions (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2007). Further, in a behavioural 
experiment, Munoz (2009) investigated emotion recognition abilities in boys aged 8 to 16 with 
callous-unemotional traits and suggested impaired recognition of fear not only in faces but also in 
body posture.  
Overall, evidence from neuroimaging as well as behavioural studies suggested that emotion 
processes may have similar underlying mechanisms across modalities in adults as well as in children. 
Those mechanisms may already be in place by the age of 5 and could potentially be a result of shared 
brain areas for emotion processing which mature with age. However, lack of data fails to provide 
evidence; hence, the present study aims to fill this gap by delivering behavioural data on children’s 
patterns for recognising emotions across modalities. 
                                                     
10
 Autism: Neuropsychiatric disorder which impacts social functioning and empathy understanding, possibly 
with abnormal amygdala function (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore, Wheelwright, Ashwin, & Williams, 2000). 
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3.1.1.5.  Individual Factors  
Several individual factors such as gender, Theory of Mind (ToM) and Intelligence Quotient 
(IQ) may play a role in children’s ability and development of emotion recognition. This present study 
aims to control for all of those three factors in order to investigate the possible contribution of each to 
emotion recognition across two modalities. 
a) Gender  
For neural as well as behavioural adult data, gender seemed to influence emotion recognition 
in previous studies. For example, women showed greater event-related potentials in response to 
passively viewing unpleasant pictures compared to men (Lithari et al., 2010) and females matched 
semantic content and intonation of emotional stimuli more correctly than their male counterparts 
(Szymanowski, Kotz, Schroeder, Rotte, & Dengler, 2007). However, this pattern has not always been 
replicated and several studies could not find significant gender differences for emotion recognition in 
adults (e.g. Hawk et al., 2009). Similarly, results from the adult Chapter 2 did not find any gender 
effects for intensity ratings for either voices or faces. 
For children, the role of gender is equally unclear with some – but by far not all - studies 
reporting gender differences during emotion decoding for a range of modalities. For example, van 
Beek and Dubas (2008) demonstrated that girls aged 9 to 15 rated face expressions as more intense 
than boys. This was especially true for faces displaying anger, suggesting an interaction between 
gender and specific emotions. The male disadvantage in emotion processing abilities has previously 
been linked to gender-related neurological structures with the male brain specializing in ‘systemizing’ 
rather than ‘empathizing’ skills, suggesting males preference of analysing systematic patterns rather 
than specializing in understanding feelings of others (Baron- Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & 
Wheelwright,  2003). However, as mentioned above, gender related effects cause conflicting 
evidence. For example, for non-verbal affect vocalisations ratings, no gender effects in children have 
been found (Sauter et al., 2012), suggesting similar perception of emotions in non-verbal vocalisations 
in children at primary school age. So what role exactly does gender play during emotion recognition 
in children? This current study aims to address this question by including gender of participants as 
additional between-subject variable. 
b) Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) comprises the ability to understand other people’s beliefs and desires 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and a natural consequence of advanced ToM skills is enhanced 
emotion understanding. For example, a longitudinal study by Ketelaars, van Weerdenburg, 
Verhoeven, Cuperus and Jansonius (2010) tested 77 children aged 5 for three consecutive years on 
several ToM aspects such as emotion attribution via story telling.  
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Findings suggested that children undergo a significant developmental change between the age of 5 to 
7, with aspects of ToM such as false belief
11
 and emotion understanding improving significantly with 
age. In addition, Weimer, Sallquist and Bolnick (2012) reported similar findings and demonstrated 
that children aged 4.5 to 6.5 showed significant improvements in their general emotion understanding 
- such as emotion recognition from facial expressions - parallel to age and increased understanding of 
false beliefs.  
Indeed, neurological studies support the relationships between emotion recognition and 
Theory of Mind abilities: adults with traumatic brain injury showed reduced face emotion recognition 
and the ability to understand feelings of others  (Henry et al., 2006) and so did autistic children (for 
example Frith & Happe, 2002; Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2004). However, none of the studies 
mentioned above have explicitly linked emotion recognition across two separate modalities in relation 
to age and ToM abilities. Hence, this current study aims to control for children’s current ToM level 
and, in addition, number of participants’ siblings was reported since family structure also seemed to 
be linked with children’s ToM abilities (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). 
c) Non-verbal IQ 
It seems obvious that children need basic language capacities in order to verbally describe the 
emotion in question. Indeed, young children’s emotion recognition abilities were positively correlated 
with language development (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Since the children included in this study all 
attend a primary school for normally developed children, sufficient basic language knowledge for 
emotion categorisation of participants was assumed. The ability to solve novel problems and 
understand abstract reasoning – as tested by non-verbal IQ tests such as Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) – may be particularly important to emotion categorisation 
tasks. Albanese, de Stasio, Di Chiacchio, Fiorilli, and Pons (2010) tested children aged 3 to 10 and 
concluded that whilst age correlated positively with general emotion understanding, non-verbal 
intelligence was also related to emotion understanding; however, this was only true for higher levels 
of emotion understanding tasks such as rating mixed emotions. It remains unclear whether a link 
between non-verbal intelligence also exists for rating emotions expressed in faces and voices.  
 
 
                                                     
11
 ‘False-belief understanding is defined as the ability to understand that others can have an inaccurate 
understanding (a false belief) of reality.’ (Keteelars et al., 2010, p. 87).  
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3.1.1.6.  The Present Study  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this current study is the first to assess directly how 
similar two different modalities are in communicating emotions within primary school aged children. 
The aim is to investigate the time-course of emotion recognition within voices and faces in British 
children aged 5 to 10 in a within-subject design. It aims to investigate whether emotion develop 
continuously across childhood and across both modalities. Including an adult control group will help 
to put children’s developing recognition abilities into perspective of the fully developed adult brain. 
Assuming similar emotion recognition patterns across modalities in adults (see Chapter 2), the present 
study investigates whether children also show signs of modality-independent emotion processing. 
Results from the present study can help to identify how children during primary and secondary 
schools years understand emotions within others – especially when only one modality is available 
such as during phone conversations. Further, the present study is the first to compare different 
modalities during middle childhood by using non-verbal vocalisations rather than prosody stimuli. 
The present study predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Emotion recognition abilities improve continuously with age. This should 
apply equally to both faces as well as non-verbal vocalisations. 
Hypothesis 2: Children will be able to recognise emotions from faces better than emotions 
from voices although – like for the adult data set - patterns will be similar across modalities.  
Hypothesis 3: Similarities across modalities should be reflected by high correlations for 
confusion matrixes across modalities. Adults may show higher correlations amongst modalities than 
children. 
Hypothesis 4: If individual factors such as gender, IQ and ToM correlate with children’s 
emotion recognition abilities in one modality (more specifically: within the faces), they should 
equally correlate with emotion recognition abilities in the other modality (more specifically: within 
the voice).  
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3.1.2. Methods  
3.1.2.1. Participants 
 
Fifty-seven British children (23 male, 34 female) were recruited; however, three children had 
to be excluded from the study due to English not being the first language and reporting not to belong 
to the British culture. Adult participants were part of a larger adult sample (N = 45) from a separate 
study in Chapter 2; for the purpose of forming a control group for the present study, only data from 
younger adults (adults aged 25 or younger) were selected. 
The final sample consisted of 54 British children (23 male, 31 female) aged 5 to 10 (M = 7.52, 
SD = 1.72) and 27 younger adults in the control group (10 male, 17 female, M age = 18.59). 
Following Sauter, Panattoni and Happe (2013), the children were divided into two age groups: one 
younger group including children aged 5 to 7 and one older age group including children aged 8 to 10. 
This included 26 children in Group I (12 male, 14 female, M age = 5.96) and 28 children in Group II 
(11 male, 17 female, M age = 8.96). Participants were recruited from a local primary school and 
Brunel University in West London and were from mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Children had 
age-appropriate non-verbal IQ skills (Raven et al., 1998, p. CPM55) within both age groups (M = 
23.19, SE = 5.69 and M = 31.46, SE = 3.42 respectively). All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal hearing and vision and English was the first language. 
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
Committee (17/10/2012) and informed consent as well as a child-friendly version of the consent form 
was filled in both by participants and parents prior to the study. All participants were debriefed after 
the study. Forms are detached in Appendix B. 
3.1.2.2. Research Material 
Visual & Auditory Stimuli 
As for Chapter 2, facial expressions for happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust 
were individually displayed from the Ekman Pictures of Facial Affect series (Ekman, 1975). 
However, in contrast to four actors in Chapter 2, for the present Chapter 3 only stimuli from two 
actors were included: one male (identity JJ) and one female actor (identity C). Again, the Montreal 
Affective Voice (MAV) samples (Belin et al., 2008) were used as the auditory stimuli and included 
two actors only: one male (identity 42) and one female (identity 53). Non-verbal stimuli can be used 
in young children as well as cross culturally to investigate the problem of auditory emotion perception 
(Hawk et al., 2009).  
Like for the adult Chapter 2, each stimulus was presented 6 times at random in order to be 
questioned on each of the 6 basic emotions resulting in 2 x 6 x 6 visual and 2 x 6 x 6 auditory stimuli 
for the child condition. 
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Computer Program 
PsychoPy software in Python for psychological experiments by the University of Nottingham 
(Peirce, 2007) was used to run the experiment. After a short introduction and practice session, the 
stimuli were presented in a block design with two voice trials and two face trials presented each in 
two alternate runs. Within each category, the stimuli were presented at random for counterbalancing. 
After listening to the sound or seeing the face, each stimulus was rated on a 7-point Likert-scale scale 
ranging from ‘not happy/sad/… at all = 1’, to ‘extremely happy/sad/… = 7’ on each. 
For more details on emotional stimuli see Chapter 2. 
Nonverbal IQ assessment. 
The child-friendly paper based Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) test as well as the adult 
Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), which had been validated across different nations, was used as 
a non-verbal IQ test in order to assess non-verbal learning and problem solving abilities such as 
‘abstract reasoning by analogy and pattern completion’ (Raven et al., 1998,  p. CPM29). The child 
version (CPM) consisted of 36 coloured items and had been chosen since it had been tested and 
validated for the use in children aged 6 years onwards as well as across different cultures such as 
Germany (Raven et al., 1998). Li et al. (1988) reported test-retest reliability of.95 in Chinese children 
after 10 days (in Raven et al., 1998). In the CPM, participants had to complete patterns by picking one 
of four possible choices which ought to match a logical continuous sequence of patterns and/or 
colours. The difficulty increased over time and finding the correct pattern built on the ability to solve 
previous problems. For more details about the adult version, see Chapter 2.  
Theory of Mind Task and Demographics. 
For the child sample, a combination of four Theory of Mind (ToM) stories assessing first, 
second and third order of ToM as well as False Belief understanding was used.  The stories were 
taken from a study by Liddle and Nettle (2006), see Appendix B. There were two questions for each 
ToM level and only if children answered both questions correctly, they were classified as having 
acquired the ToM level in question. In addition, there was a basic Perspective Taking task for 5 and 6-
year old children. This included the understanding that a cuddly toy - which was hiding under the 
table – was not aware of the true content of a box holding chocolate coins (adapted from O’Brien et 
al., 2011). Tasks ensured that all children had at least a ToM level one as basic requirement for taking 
part in the present study. Lastly, demographic details of all participants such as age, gender, ethnicity, 
first language, country of birth, cultural background, number of siblings and educational status (of 
parents) were collected. See Appendix B. 
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3.1.2.3. Procedure 
Prior to the study, all participants as well as parents of child participants signed an informed 
consent sheet and provided some basic demographic data described above. This study tested up to two 
participants at the same time – except from young children aged 5 and 6 where a one-to-one session 
was always necessary. Participants did not receive a clear definition for each emotion in order to 
represent an unbiased emotion judgement and participants were not told how often each emotion was 
displayed. However, it was ensured that all children could verbally explain what the six basic 
emotions are in order to check their general emotion understanding of the emotions used in the study. 
In addition, children completed a training session in order to get used to the handling of the computer 
mouse as well as to grasp an understanding of the Likert scale concept. Participants worked through 
the stimuli in their own time with an average of 10 minutes to complete each task. No feedback about 
accuracy or speed of responses was provided. After finishing the two main tasks, children answered 
four short Theory of Mind questions and 5 and 6-year-olds took part in a playful Theory of Mind task. 
All children received a small present such as stationary and the school received book vouchers as a 
‘Thank You’ for taking part whilst undergraduate Psychology students received credit points as a 
course requirement.  
 
3.1.2.4. Statistical Analysis  
For the present study, intensity ratings, accuracy rates as well as choice RTs for emotion 
ratings were collected in three separate mixed measures ANOVAS. Stimuli could either match the 
corresponding question (‘target analysis’) or could not match the corresponding question (‘confusion 
analysis’). Between-subject variables were age-group of participants (5 to 7 year-olds, 8 to 10 year-
olds and young adults) and gender of participants (male or female). The within-subject variables were 
modality (face or voice), emotion category (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise and disgust) and gender 
of the actor (male or female).  
Accuracy Scoring 
In order to demonstrate that higher intensity ratings partially reflect better recognition 
accuracy, accuracy ratings were included in the current analysis. Across all possible emotion 
combinations that resulted from multiple emotion scales, it was of interest which emotion-pair 
received the highest intensity ratings. If the congruent target-emotion received highest intensity 
ratings i.e. happy stimuli received highest intensity ratings on the happiness scale), participant 
received a score of 1 for correct recognition. If the highest intensity rating occurred for an emotion 
that was not the target emotion (i.e. happy stimuli received highest intensity ratings on the angry 
scale), participant received a score of 0 for incorrect recognition.  
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Similarly, if the highest intensity rating was shared between several emotions and not classified as one 
specific emotion, participants also received a score of 0. For each emotion, accuracy scores where 
then averaged across trials and participants (for more information on accuracy scoring see Kornreich 
et al., 2012).  
RTs 
If choice RTs for items exceeded more than 20 seconds, they were classified as outliers and 
believed to be an error. Outliers were deleted and replaced with the new group mean for that 
particular variable. This was true for 10 trials. Huynh-Feldt corrections were used for factors that 
violated the assumption of sphericity. Participants were not aware of RT measurements, indicating 
that longer RTs may reflect unbiased decision making processes.  
Multiple Regression 
For the child sample, additionally, separate multiple regression analysis were run for mean 
scores from either the face or the voice condition with predictors of age, gender, non-verbal IQ (CPM) 
scores, Theory of Mind levels and number of siblings. Variables were either continuous or dummy-
coded into two categories.  
Confusion Matrices 
For the Analysis of Confusion, confusion matrixes were computed in order to illustrate the 
average rating profiles across participants for each modality by analysing the mean intensity ratings 
for all possible combinations of emotion pairs (36 conditions). Further, the correlations of response 
profiles across modalities for each individual participant were compared across the three age-groups 
in order to investigate whether the strength of correlation of face and voice rating profiles changes as 
a function of age. 
For more details on statistical analyses see Chapter 2. 
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3.1.3. Results 
3.1.3.1. Analysis 1: Target Emotions 
The following Table 3.1 displays Means (M) and Standard Error (SE) for intensity, accuracy and RT measures in the child sample. 
Table 3.1 
Means and Standard Errors for modality and emotions for children for intensity ratings, accuracy scores and choice reaction times 
 Emotion Means Intensity (SE) Mean Accuracy (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
 Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
 N = 26 
M *= 5.96 
(0.50) 
N = 28 
M = 8.96 
(0.88) 
N = 27 
M = 18.6 
(1.12) 
N = 81 
M = 11.2 
(5.47) 
N = 26 
M = 5.96 
(0.51) 
N = 28 
M = 8.96 
(0.88) 
N = 27 
M = 18.6 
(1.12) 
N = 81 
M = 11.2 
(5.47) 
N = 26 
M = 5.96 
(0.51) 
N = 28 
M = 8.96 
(0.88) 
N = 27 
M = 18.6 
(1.12) 
N = 81 
M =11.2 
(5.47) 
Face Happy 6.38  
(.21) 
5.92  
(.20) 
6.58 
(.21) 
6.29 
(.12) 
0.92  
(.04) 
0.86  
(.04) 
1.00 
(.04) 
0.93 
 (.02) 
4.76 
(.35) 
5.06 
(.35) 
2.89 
(.36) 
4.24  
(.20) 
 Sad 5.56  
(.26) 
5.94 
(.25) 
6.10  
(.26) 
5.87 
(.15) 
0.79  
(.05) 
0.77  
(.05) 
0.82  
(.05) 
0.79  
(.03) 
5.79 
(.29) 
4.62 
(.29) 
3.15  
(.30) 
4.52 
(.17) 
 Angry 5.14  
(.31) 
4.87 
(.31) 
4.23 
(.31) 
4.75 
(.18) 
0.40  
(.06) 
0.39  
(.06) 
0.68 
 (.06) 
0.49  
(.03) 
5.83 
(.39) 
4.36 
(.39) 
3.44 
(.39) 
4.54 
(.22) 
 Fear 5.30  
(.33) 
4.91 
(.33) 
6.11 
(.34) 
5.44 
(.19) 
0.40  
(.07) 
0.45  
(.07) 
0.66  
(.07) 
0.51  
(.04) 
5.92 
(.31) 
3.91 
 (.30) 
2.91 
(.31) 
4.24 
(.18) 
 Surprise 5.59  
(.23) 
5.09  
(.22) 
6.59 
(.23) 
6.03 
(.13) 
0.40 
(.07) 
0.50  
(.06) 
0.84  
(.07) 
0.58  
(.04) 
5.21 
(.41) 
4.40  
(.30) 
3.02 
(.41) 
4.21 
(.23) 
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  Means Intensity (SE) Mean Accuracy (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
   
  Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
 Disgust 4.04 
(.37) 
4.39 
(.36) 
5.79 
(.37) 
4.74 
(.21) 
0.14  
(.05) 
0.16  
(.05) 
0.62 
(.05) 
0.30  
(.03) 
5.37 
 (.30) 
4.84  
(.30) 
3.28 
(.31) 
4.50 
 (.18) 
 All  5.33 
(.16) 
5.32 
(.16) 
5.90  
(.16) 
5.52 
(.09) 
0.51  
(.03) 
0.52 
 (.02) 
0.77 
(.03) 
0.60 
(.01) 
5.48 
 (.20) 
4.53 
(.19) 
3.11 
 (.20) 
4.38 
(.13) 
Voice Happy 5.35 
(.29) 
5.79 
(.28) 
6.40  
(.29) 
5.85 
(.16) 
0.58  
(.06) 
0.75 
(.06) 
0.91  
(.06) 
0.75  
(.04) 
6.45 
(.35) 
4.29 
(.34) 
3.43 
(.35) 
4.72 
 (.20) 
 Sad 5.25 
(.28) 
5.38 
(.28) 
6.09 
(.28) 
5.57 
(.16) 
0.29  
(.06) 
0.52 
(.06) 
0.87 
(.06) 
0.56  
(.04) 
7.27 
(.44) 
6.00 
(.44) 
3.92 
(.45) 
5.71 
(.26) 
 Angry 3.58 
(.27) 
3.26 
(.26) 
4.08 
(.27) 
3.64 
(.15) 
0.27  
(.06) 
0.23 
(.05) 
0.64  
(.06) 
0.38 
(.03) 
5.97 
(.37) 
5.22 
(.36) 
3.95 
(.38) 
5.05 
(.21) 
 Fear 4.78 
(.33) 
4.95 
(.33) 
5.59 
(.34) 
5.11 
(.19) 
0.19  
(.06) 
0.38 
(.06) 
0.50 
(.06) 
0.36 
(.04) 
6.28 
(.43) 
6.06 
(.42) 
3.63 
(.43) 
5.32 
(.25) 
 Surprise 4.35 
(.32) 
4.75 
(.32) 
5.30  
(.33) 
4.80 
(.19) 
0.15  
(.06) 
0.27 
(.06) 
0.53 
(.06) 
0.31  
(.03) 
6.49 
(.38) 
4.41 
(.38) 
3.09 
(.39) 
4.66 
(.22) 
 Disgust 4.49 
(.32) 
4.63 
(.31) 
4.97 
(.32) 
4.70  
(.18) 
0.29  
(.06) 
0.43 
(.06) 
0.77 
(.06) 
0.50  
(.03) 
6.70 
(.40) 
5.41 
 (.40) 
3.87 
(.41) 
5.32 
(.23) 
 All  4.63 
(.16) 
4.79 
(.16) 
5.41 
(.16) 
4.94 
(.09) 
.030  
(.03) 
0.43  
(.03) 
0.70  
(.03) 
0.48 
(.02) 
6.52 
(.26) 
5.22 
(.26) 
3.65 
(.08) 
5.13 
(.15) 
Overall  
Happy 5.87 
(.19) 
5.85 
(.18) 
6.49 
(.19) 
6.07 
(.11) 
0.75  
(.04) 
0.80  
(.04) 
0.96  
(.04) 
0.84  
(.02) 
5.60 
(.26) 
4.67 
(.26) 
3.16 
(.27) 
4.48 
(.15) 
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 Means Intensity (SE) Mean Accuracy (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
 
 Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
Young 
Children 
Old 
Children 
Young 
Adults 
All 
 
            
 
Sad 5.40  
(.21) 
5.66 
(.21) 
6.09 
(.21) 
5.72 
(.12) 
0.54 
(.05) 
0.64 
(.04) 
0.84 
(.05) 
0.67 
(.03) 
6.53  
(.30) 
5.29 
(.29) 
3.63 
(.27) 
5.12 
(.17) 
 
Angry 4.36  
(.23) 
4.07 
(.23) 
4.16 
(.24) 
4.19 
(.13) 
0.34 
(.04) 
0.31 
(.04) 
0.66  
(.04) 
0.44 
(.02) 
5.09  
(.33) 
4.79 
(.32) 
3.70  
(.33) 
4.79 
(.19) 
 
Fear 5.04  
(.28) 
4.93 
(.27) 
5.85 
(.28) 
5.27 
(.16) 
0.30  
(.05) 
0.41 
(.05) 
0.58 
(.05) 
0.43 
(.03) 
6.10 
(.27) 
4.98 
(.27) 
3.27 
(.28) 
4.78 
(.16) 
 
Surprise 4.97 
 (.22) 
5.33 
(.22) 
5.95 
(.23) 
5.41 
(.13) 
0.28 
(.05) 
0.38  
(.05) 
0.68  
(.05) 
0.45 
(.03) 
5.85 
(.32) 
4.41 
(.32) 
3.05 
(.32) 
4.44 
(.19) 
 
Disgust 4.26  
(.28) 
4.51 
(.28) 
5.38 
(.29) 
4.72 
(.16) 
0.21 
(.04) 
0.30 
(.04) 
0.69 
 (.04) 
0.40  
(.02) 
6.03 
(.29) 
5.12 
(.28) 
3.57 
(.29) 
4.91 
(.17) 
All Female 
stimuli   
 4.76 
 (.18) 
5.09 
(.18) 
5.65 
(.19) 
5.17 
(.11) 
- - - - 5.97 
(.24) 
4.86 
(.23) 
3.41 
(.24) 
4.76 
(.13) 
All Male 
Stimuli 
 5.21 
 (.15) 
5.03 
(.14) 
5.56 
(.15) 
5.30  
(.08) 
- - - - 6.03 
(.22) 
4.90  
(.21) 
3.35 
(.22) 
4.75 
(.14) 
Grand 
Means**  
 4.98  
(.15) 
5.06 
(.14) 
5.65 
(.15) 
5.23 
(.08) 
0.40  
(.02) 
0.48 
 (.02) 
0.74  
(.02) 
0.54  
(.01) 
6.00 
(.31) 
4.88 
(.18) 
3.38 
(.07) 
4.76 
(.12) 
 
Note. * = Mean Age in years. ** = Average scores across all participants and conditions. 
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a) Intensity Ratings  
Results from intensity ratings suggested that emotional intensity perception depended on 
modality, emotion category and age of participants. A repeated measures ANOVA of modality (2) x 
emotion (6) x gender stimulus (2) x age group (3) x gender of participants (2) revealed a significant 
main effect for modality, F(1, 75) = 51.21, p < .001, 2 = .41, emotion, F(5, 375) = 32.95, p < .001, 2 
= .31 and for age group, F(2, 75) = 6.35, p < .01, 2 = .15. Emotions in faces were rated with higher 
intensity than voices and Sidak post-hoc test for multiple comparisons revealed that participants rated 
happiness with highest intensity ratings which differed from all emotions, then followed by sadness 
which also different from all emotions, followed by ratings for surprise and fear which did not differ 
from each other and disgust, with anger receiving lowest overall intensity ratings, all at p < .001. 
Furthermore, whilst the two child groups did not differ from each other in their average intensity 
ratings, adults yielded higher average intensity ratings than either of the child groups. This pattern was 
true for both modalities, p < .05. There was no significant main effect for average intensity ratings for 
gender of the stimulus or gender of participants (p > .05). For M and SE see Table 3.1.  
There was also a significant interaction effect between (i) modality and emotion, F(5, 375) = 
5.49, p < .001, 2 = .07 and between (ii) modality and gender of the stimuli, F(1, 75) = 11.9, p <.01, 
2 = .14. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied in order to further investigate the 
interactions. 
i: The significant modality effect with higher intensity ratings for faces compared to voices 
was true for happy, angry and surprised stimuli whilst the other three emotions of sadness, fear and 
disgust did not differ as a function of modality. For both modalities, happiness reached highest 
average intensity ratings and anger lowest average intensity ratings, which did not differ from disgust 
in the voice condition, p < .05.  
ii: Male faces received ratings which were significantly higher than for female faces, 
suggesting rating differences in faces as a function of stimulus gender. Gender of the stimulus did not 
influence emotion intensity perception in the vocal condition, p < .05. In addition, male faces received 
highest intensity ratings which were significantly higher than for male voices, showing that the face 
over voice advantage was significant for male stimuli. For female stimuli, intensity perception did not 
vary as a function of modality. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings. Significant interaction between modality and gender 
of stimulus for all participants, N = 81, *p < .05. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between (i) modality, emotion and gender 
of the stimulus, F(5, 375) = 12.19, p < .001, 2 = .14 and between (ii) modality, emotion and age 
group, F(10, 375) = 2.36, p < .01, 2 = .06. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied 
in order to further investigate the three-way interactions. 
i: The gender effect in faces with male faces being perceived as more intense than female 
faces was true for angry stimuli. In addition, the gender stimulus effect in the voice condition with 
female voices being perceived as more intense than male voices was true for stimuli displaying anger 
and disgust, p < .05. For surprise, female voices were perceived as less intense than male voices. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 Figure 3.2. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings. Interaction between modality and gender of 
stimulus, dependent on emotion category for average intensity ratings, p < .05. 
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ii: The youngest age-group containing children aged 5 to 7 showed significant modality 
effects for intensity ratings with faces being perceived as more intense than voices for stimuli 
displaying happiness, anger and surprise. The older child group showed the same modality pattern for 
anger and surprise, p < .05 whilst the adult control group showed modality effects for stimuli 
displaying surprise and disgust, p < .05. In addition, all three-age groups showed lowest overall 
intensity ratings for anger in the voice condition and lowest ratings for anger or disgust in the face 
condition. Happiness received highest overall ratings for faces in both child conditions and for voices 
in the older child and in the adult group, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings. Interaction between age and modality, dependent on 
emotion category for intensity ratings.  
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b) Accuracy Ratings 
In order to support results from intensity ratings, accuracy scores suggested that correct 
recognition rate depended on modality, the specific emotion category as well as age of participants. A 
repeated measures ANOVA of modality (2) x emotion (6) x age group (3) was conducted. Accuracy 
ratings were computed in order to demonstrate a link between intensity perception and recognition 
accuracy. Since the main focus of the current analysis remains on intensity perception and choice 
reaction times of stimuli, accuracy measures were collapsed across gender of stimuli and gender of 
participants.  
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for modality, F(1, 77) = 51.56, p < .001, 2 = 
.4, for emotion, F(4.9, 377.55) = 55.99, p < .001, 2 = .42, as well as for age-group, F(2, 77) = 66.89, 
p < .001, 2 = .64. Faces received higher mean accuracy rates than voices. Post-hoc Sidak test for 
multiple comparisons revealed that happiness received higher accuracy rates than any other emotion, 
followed by sadness which was lower than happiness but higher than all other emotions, followed by 
surprise, anger, fear and disgust which did not differ from each other in accuracy rates, all at p < .05. 
Lastly, the youngest age group received lower accuracy ratings than the older child group which in 
turn received lower accuracy ratings than the adult group, p < .05.  For M and SE see Table 3.1. 
There was also significant interaction effects between (i) modality and age-group, F(2, 77) = 
6.77, p < .005, 2 = .15, between (ii) emotion and age-group, F(10, 385) = 2.18, p < .05, 2 = .05, and 
between (iii) modality and emotion, F(4.92, 378.55) = 14.13, p < .001, 2 = .16. Post-hoc Sidak test 
for multiple comparisons was applied in order to further investigate the interactions. 
i: The modality effect with higher accuracy scores for faces than for voices was true for all 
three age-groups, p < .05. After splitting for modality, it becomes apparent that for faces, the younger 
and older child-group did not differ significantly from each other whilst the adults had higher mean 
accuracy scores than both child-groups, p < .05. For voices on the other hand, the younger child group 
had significantly lower scores than the older child group which in turn had lower scores than the adult 
group, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 4. 
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Figure 3.4. Means and Standard Errors for accuracy scores. Significant interaction between modality and age-
groups, p < .05. 
ii: For the youngest child-groups, accuracy scores were highest for happiness which was 
higher than for all other emotions. This was followed by sadness which had lower mean ratings than 
happiness but higher ratings than all other emotions. This again was followed by anger, fear and 
surprise which did not differ from each other. Disgust received lowest accuracy ratings which, 
however, were not significantly different from anger or surprise. For the older child group, accuracy 
ratings were highest for happiness, followed by sadness which was significantly different than for all 
other emotions. This was followed by fear, surprise, anger and disgust. Again, disgust received lowest 
ratings but this did not differ significantly from anger and surprise. For the adult group, happiness 
again received highest accuracy ratings, followed by sadness, disgust, surprise, anger and fear 
received lowest accuracy ratings but did not differ from each other significantly. Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests confirmed that all differences were significant at p < .05. For M and SE see table 3.1.  
iii: The significant modality effect with higher accuracy scores for faces compared to voices 
was evident in all six emotions. For both modalities, happiness received highest accuracy scores 
which were higher than for all other emotions. For faces, this was followed by accuracy rates for 
sadness which differed from all others, then by surprise, fear and anger which did not differ 
significantly from each other. Disgust in faces received lowest accuracy rates which was lower than 
for all other face expressions. For voices on the other hand, ratings for happiness were followed by 
sadness and disgust which did not differ from each other and fear and surprise received lowest 
accuracy scores which did not differ significantly from each other. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
confirmed that all differences were significant at p < .05. For M and SE see table 3.1. 
Lastly, there was also a significant three-way interaction between modality, emotion and age-
group, F(10, 385) = 2.51, p < .05, 2  = .06. Post-hoc split file ANOVAs revealed that the significant 
modality effect with higher accuracy rates for faces than for voices within the youngest age group was 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
5-7 year olds 8-10 year olds Young Adults
A
cc
u
ra
cy
 
Faces
Voices
 81 
 
true for all emotions but for disgust, where ratings were higher for voices than for faces. Anger did 
not show a significant modality effects. For the older child group, face over voice superiority was true 
for sadness, anger and surprise. For disgust, again, there was accuracy superiority for voices. For 
happiness and fear, accuracy ratings did not differ for modality. For the adult group, there was a 
modality effect for surprise with higher ratings for faces compared to voices, whilst the opposite was 
true for disgust with higher ratings for voices compared to faces. All other emotions did not show a 
significant modality effect. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5. Means and Standard Errors for accuracy scores. Interaction between age and modality, dependent on 
emotion category, p < .05. 
c) Choice RTs 
Results from RTs suggested that speed of rating stimuli depended on modality, emotion 
category and age group of participants. A repeated measures ANOVA of modality (2) x emotion (6) x 
gender stimulus (2) x age group (3) x gender of participants (2) revealed a significant main effect for 
modality, F(1, 75) = 44.77, p < .001, 2 = .48, emotion, F(5, 375) = 3.88, p = .002, 2 = .05 and for 
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age group, F(2, 75) = 38.64, p < .001, 2 = .51. Choice RTs for faces were faster than for voices in all 
three age groups and Sidak post-hoc test for multiple comparisons revealed that whilst happiness and 
surprise were rated fastest, this did not differ significantly from anger or fear. This was followed by 
disgust which was significantly slower than happiness and surprise. Participants took longest to rate 
sadness which did not differ significantly from anger and disgust, all at p < .05. Furthermore, RTs 
increased linear with age, with younger children being significantly slower than older children who, in 
turn, were slower than the adult control group. This pattern was true for both modalities, p < .05. 
There was no significant main effect for gender of the stimulus or gender of participants (p > .05). For 
M and SE see Table 3.1. 
There was also a significant interaction effect for RTs between modality and gender of the 
stimuli, F(1, 75) = 24.97, p <.001, 2 = .25. Sidak post-hoc test for multiple comparisons revealed that 
participants also rated male faces significantly faster than female faces, suggesting differences in 
rating speed in faces as a function of stimulus gender. The opposite pattern was true for the voice 
condition, with female voices receiving faster ratings than male voices, p < .05. In addition, – in 
accordance with IR data - male face stimuli were rated fastest which was significantly faster than 
male voices. For female stimuli, rating speed did not vary as a function of modality. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6. Means and Standard Errors for reaction times. Interaction between modality and gender of the 
stimulus, p < .05.  
 
There were also significant three-way interactions between (i) modality, emotion and age-
group, F(10, 375) = 3.09, p = .001, 2  = .08, between (ii) age-group, modality and gender of the 
stimulus, F(2, 75) = 3.13, p =.05, 2  = .08, and between (iii) age-group, modality and gender of 
participants, F(2,75) = 4.03, p < .022, 2 = .1. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was 
applied in order to further investigate the three-way interactions. 
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i: Post-hoc Sidak comparisons revealed that the youngest group containing children aged 5 to 
7, showed faster RTs for faces than for voices across emotions displaying happiness, sadness, surprise 
and disgust.  The older child group containing children aged 8 to 10 showed the same modality effect 
for stimuli displaying sadness, anger and fear, p < .05. The adult control group on the other hand did 
not show any modality effects for any of the emotions displayed (p > .05). When split for modality, 
the face condition revealed significant age-effects between both child-groups for sadness, anger and 
fear whilst speed for happiness, surprise and disgust did not differ between both child groups. For all 
emotions in the face but anger, were adults significantly faster than both child groups, all at p < .05. 
For the voice condition, speed for happy, sad surprise and disgust changed significantly between both 
child groups whilst anger and fear did not vary between both child groups. For all emotions displayed 
in the voice but happiness, were adults significantly faster than both child groups, p < .05. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Means and Standard Errors for reaction times. Interaction between emotion category and age group 
for RTs, split for modality, p < .05. 
ii:  The interaction of age-group, modality and gender of the stimuli suggests that children in 
the youngest age group showed differences in RTs depending on the gender of the stimuli across both 
modalities. As illustrated in Figure 3.8., the younger children made decisions faster for male than 
female faces and slower ratings for male compared to female voices, p < .05. The older child group 
did not show gender stimuli effects for the face condition; however, for the voice condition, a 
significant gender of stimuli effect remained with female voices being rated faster than male voices, p 
< .05. For the adult control group, choice RTs did not differ depending on stimulus gender across both 
conditions, suggesting similar rating patterns of modalities independent of external factors such as 
gender of the stimulus (p > .05).  
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Figure 3.8. Means and Standard Errors for reaction times. Interaction between stimulus gender and modality, 
split for age. *p < .05. 
iii: The interaction of age-group, modality and gender of participants revealed that the linear 
increase of choice speed - with the younger child-group taking longer than the older child-group 
which in turn took longer than the adult control group - was true for female participants across both 
modalities and for male participants within the face condition only. However, for male participants 
within the voice condition, the younger boys were just was quick as the older boys in rating voices, 
outperforming younger girls, p < .05. Figure 3.9 illustrates that this gender effect in the voice 
condition was eliminated in both older age-groups (p > .05).  
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Figure 3.9. Means and Standard Errors for reaction times. Interaction between age and gender of participant, split 
for both modalities. *p < .05 
 
3.1.3.2. Multiple Regression 
For the child sample (N = 54), multiple regression analysis was used to test whether 
additional factors such as age, gender, non-verbal IQ, level of Theory of Mind or number of siblings 
influenced emotion recognition in voices and faces. Six separate regression analyses were conducted: 
two for intensity ratings for both modalities, two for accuracy scores for both modalities and two for 
RTs for both modalities. The following Table 3.2 summarises results and statistics for the multiple 
regression model. Across all six regression analyses, unsurprisingly, age correlated positively with the 
non-verbal IQ scores (r = .71, p < .001), with Theory of Mind Level 3 (r = .6. p < .001) and non-
verbal IQ also correlated positively with having Theory of Mind Level 3(r = .49, p < .001).   
a) Intensity Ratings 
For face intensity ratings, all five predictors together only explained 18% of the variance and 
the overall model was not successful in predicting the emotional intensity ratings of faces (R
2
 = .18, 
F(8, 53) = 1.22, p > .05). However, two factors correlated with intensity perception of faces: Having 
two siblings as compared to none correlated negatively with the intensity perception of faces and 
having three or more siblings compared to none correlated positively with facial intensity ratings. The 
other variables did not contribute to the overall multiple regression model (p > .05).  
For voice intensity ratings, all five predictors only explained 19% of the variance and the 
overall model was not successful in predicting the emotional intensity ratings of faces, F(8, 53) = 
1.34, R
2
 = .19,  p > .05). None of the individual factors correlated with the ratings of intensity in 
children (p > .05).  
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b) Accuracy Scores 
For face accuracy scores, the overall multiple regression model was not successful in 
explaining the variance [F(8, 53) = 1.22, R
2 
= .18, p > .05]. However, non-verbal IQ (CPM correlated 
positively with accuracy rates for rating face expressions. The other variables did not contribute to the 
overall multiple regression model, p > .05.  
For voice accuracy scores, the overall multiple regression model predicted 37% of the 
variance. The overall model was successful in predicting accuracy rates for rating emotional voices, 
F(8, 53) = 3.32, R
2
 = .37, p < .005. Age, non-verbal IQ (CPM), having 2 as compare to no siblings as 
well as having a ToM level 3 compared to level 1 all correlated positively with accuracy scores in the 
voice condition.  
c) Reaction Times 
For face RTs, all five factors explained 34% of the variance and the overall model was 
significant in predicting the choice RTs for rating faces , F(8, 53) = 2.87, R
2
 = .34, p = .01. As 
expected, for children, age correlated negatively with rating speed as did having a Theory of Mind 
Level 3 as compared to Level 1. Having one sibling as compared to none correlated positively with 
speed for rating faces.  
For voice RTs, all five factors explained 35% of the variance and the overall model was 
significant in predicting the choice RTs for rating voices, F(8, 53) = 3.01, R
2
 = .35, p < .01. As 
expected, age correlated negatively with children’s speed of rating voices and non-verbal IQ also 
correlated negatively with voice RTs. Further, having Theory of Mind Level 3 compared to Level 1 
also correlated negatively with speed for rating voices. Finally, having one as compared to no siblings 
correlated positively with voice RTs.  
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Table 3.2. 
Means, Standard Errors and Statistics for correlations of age, gender, non-verbal IQ, number of siblings and 
level of ToM with intensity ratings, accuracy scores and RTs for faces and voices.  
  Age Gender  Nonverbal 
IQ (CPM) 
Siblings 
1 vs 0 
Siblings 
2 vs 0 
Siblings 
3+ vs 0 
ToM  
2 vs 1 
ToM  
3 vs 1 
   Mean 
   SE 
7.52 1.57 27.48 .57 .20 .13 .15 .48 
1.72 0.50 6.21 0.50 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.50 
INT 
Faces 
Corr 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.32** 0.24* -0.10 -0.03 
B 0.08 0.22 -0.01 0.02 -0.57 0.56 -0.40 -0.30 
β 0.18 0.13 -0.06 0.01 -0.28 0.23 -0.17 -0.18 
INT 
Voices 
Corr 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.04 
B 0.25 0.24 -0.05 0.64 0.39 1.11 -0.15 -0.17 
β 0.50 0.14 -0.37 0.38 0.19 0.45 -0.06 -0.10 
ACC 
Faces 
Corr 0.14 0.21 0.26* -0.19 0.16 0.12 0.11 -0.04 
B 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 
β 0.06 0.22 0.32 -0.29 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.29 
ACC 
Voices 
Corr 0.44** 0.22 0.50*** -0.07 0.28* 0.07 0.08 0.29* 
B 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.04 
β 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.40 0.48 0.28 0.09 0.11 
RT 
Faces 
Corr -0.40*** -0.07 -0.19 0.23* -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 -0.37*** 
B -0.31 -0.23 0.07 0.29 0.01 -0.09 -1.22 -0.98 
β -0.43 -0.08 0.35 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.35 -0.40 
RT 
Voices 
Corr -0.48*** 0.11 -0.31** 0.30* -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.27* 
B -0.48 0.31 0.02 0.92 0.37 0.26 -1.38 -0.42 
β -0.47 0.09 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.05 -0.42 -0.12 
 
Note. INT = intensity, ACC = accuracy, RT = reaction times, Corr = correlation, * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < 
.001 
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3.1.3.3. Analysis 2: Confusion data 
In order to investigate how the full emotion rating profiles of faces and voices change with 
age, the present chapter presents the confusions data from voices and faces. As illustrated in Figure 
3.10, the mean intensity ratings for each of the possible 36 emotion-pairs seem to change with age and 
also the overall rating profiles for voices and faces seem to become more similar with age. Confusions 
such as between surprise and fear as evident in higher intensity ratings seem to exist in all age-groups 
and also across both modalities. 
In order to statistically investigate whether the confusion matrices across two modalities 
become more similar with age or whether even the youngest children show high correlations between 
voice and face ratings, the full rating profiles for all displayed emotions in voices were correlated with 
the rating profiles for faces – individually for each participant. The individual correlation scores for 
each participant were then entered into a one-way ANOVA. Since correlations usually don’t show 
normal distributions, the scores have been z-transformed to fulfil the basic assumptions of ANOVA. 
A one-way ANOVA with age-group (3) revealed a significant main effect for age, F(2, 79) = 
33.31, p < .001. Post-hoc Bonferroni correction for age-groups reported that adults had a significantly 
higher mean correlation for voices and faces compared to both child groups. As illustrated in Figure 
3.11., the two child groups did not differ significantly in their mean correlation for voice and face 
ratings (p > .05). However, there was a trend and the mean correlation was higher for older compared 
to younger children.  
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Figure 3.10. Illustration of mean intensity ratings (1-7) for each of the 36 possible emotion combinations, split 
for modality and age-groups.  
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Figure 3.11. Mean score (z-transformed) for all individual face-voice correlations for each participant within each 
age-group, *p < .05. 
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3.1.4. Discussion Experiment 3-I  
Since previous studies delivered evidence for continuous emotion recognition development 
during early (Nelson & Russell, 2011) as well as late childhood (Tonks et al., 2007), the aim of the 
present experiment 3-I was to investigate how emotion recognition across two independent modalities 
develops in primary school aged children. For the first time, this comparison was based on contrasting 
static face expressions with non-verbal emotion exclamations. In a cross- sectional design, the 
developmental pathway of intensity perception, accuracy rates as well as choice reaction times for 
vocal and visual emotion perception has been observed in children aged 5 to 10 and in an adult 
control group. In connection to adult data from Chapter 2, it was of interest how similarities in 
emotion recognition across modalities develop in childhood. Further, additional variables that may 
contribute to individual variance such as children’s non-verbal intelligence or Theory of Mind levels 
during emotion decoding - across vocal and visual domains – were investigated.  
Results from the present study suggest that emotion recognition develops with age and even 
past the age of 10 as reflected in higher intensity judgements, higher accuracy scores and faster speed 
for adults as compared to children. This was true for both modalities, supporting Hypothesis 1. In 
addition, children from the current experiment rated faces with higher intensity, higher accuracy rates 
and with faster speed than voices, supporting Hypothesis 2 which assumed a face advantage in 
emotion rating. There were also significant interactions between modality and emotions and only 
certain emotions showed face superiority effects whilst for other emotions, ratings were independent 
of mode of presentation and showed similar patterns across modalities. Overall, the similarity in 
rating profiles as illustrated by confusion matrixes between faces and voices seemed to increase with 
age, suggesting a developmental effect of modality-independent emotion processing which supports 
Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, although neither non-verbal IQ nor Theory of Mind influenced intensity 
ratings of emotions, this was true for both modalities. For accuracy scores, non-verbal IQ was 
positively associated with accuracy and again, this was true for both modalities. For RTs of emotion 
ratings, age, having one as compared to no sibling as well as having Theory of Mind Level 3 as 
compared to Level 1 significantly correlated with emotion rating speed across both modalities which 
partly supports Hypothesis 4.  
 
3.1.4.1. How does emotion recognition develop with age?  
In line with neurological studies that suggested changes in brain structures such as increased 
frontal lobe activation across childhood and adolescence (e.g. Vink et al., 2014), the current study 
found significant behavioural age affects with older age-groups showing better emotion recognition 
skills than younger age-groups.  
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Accuracy ratings continued to improve across all three age-groups whilst for intensity ratings, no 
significant changes in perception from both types of modalities between the ages of 5 to 10 occurred. 
However, the adult group perceived emotions as significantly more intense than all children together, 
suggesting that intensity perception does not develop in a linear trend across childhood but increases 
sharply in teenage years. This indicates that some further development for emotion perception 
happens between the ages of 10 and adulthood. Those findings are not unexpected and have been 
supported individually for the face (De Sonneville et al, 2002; Vicari et al., 2000) and for the voice 
domain (Aguert et al., 2013).  
The current study suggested that age-effects affected both modalities in parallel, indicating 
that developmental changes in brain structures may not only affect visual emotion recognition but 
could potentially be extended to the auditory domain. In line with neurological evidence, activity in 
children’s temporal lobe has, for example, been associated with emotion recognition from faces 
(Cantalupo et al., 2013) as well as from voices (Cohen, Prather, Town, & Hynd, 1990). This could 
hint at similar underlying emotion recognition trajectories in childhood across two separate 
modalities. However, due to a lack of neuroimaging data, the current interpretation is of hypothetical 
nature. 
Further, results demonstrated that for younger children, speed was influenced by external cues 
like gender of stimuli to categorise emotions in the voice as well as in the face condition. Emotion 
classification speed from the adult control group – as well as from the adult Chapter 2 - on the other 
hand across both modalities was not prompted by gender of stimuli at all. This goes in hand with 
evidence suggesting very early ERP signals around 200ms in adults for recognising emotional and 
non-emotional voices independent of individual characteristics of the speaker such as gender 
(Paulmann & Kotz, 2008). It is possible that young children’s emotion recognition is guided by 
external features such as gender of actor more than it is for adults.  
3.1.4.2. Does the degree of modality similarity change with age? 
Although abilities to recognise emotions improved with age for both modalities, the degree of 
modality similarity also changed with age and depended on additional factors such as specific 
emotions expressed. Children in the younger child group seemed to perceive faces with higher 
intensities and also with higher accuracy rates than voices for a wider range of emotions. This 
discrepancy between face and voice was less evident in the older child group. Adults showed this 
pattern only for more complex emotions like surprise and disgust; all other emotions had comparable 
ratings irrespective of whether they were displayed in the visual or in the auditory domain. Findings 
from the current within-subject study go in hand with previous findings suggesting reliance on visual 
cues early in life whilst auditory emotion recognition starts to play a role in older children (Nelson & 
Russell, 2011).  
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From the confusion analysis, it becomes evident that the degree of similarity of rating profiles 
- as measured by comparing the individual correlations for each participant from voices and faces – 
changes as a function of age. The correlations between rating emotions in voices and faces became 
stronger with age and adults had significantly higher correlations compared to both child-groups. 
Overall, results indicate that whilst younger children may rely more on faces than on voices, ratings of 
target as well as of confused emotions become more similar between voices and faces the older 
children were. For the youngest child-group, is it is not likely that the way children rated emotional 
faces can reliably predict how children will rate emotions in voices.  
 
3.1.4.3. Time course of specific emotion-recognition within each modality 
Whilst there may be a common underlying emotion recognition mechanism as evident in 
similar recognition patterns across modalities, onsets of recognition of specific emotions seems to be 
moderated by modality. For faces, children’s decisions about sadness, anger and fear became faster 
with age, whilst happiness, surprise and disgust did not become faster over age and only demonstrated 
significant changes in RTs in adulthood. However, speed for rating happiness, surprise and disgust 
may have started off with a ceiling effect in children’s rating speed. For sadness, anger and fear on the 
other hand, rating speed caught up with happiness, surprise and disgust in the older child group. 
Intensity ratings did not change with age. It is possible that fast RTs reflect a genuine rating speed 
improvement in youngest children, independent of intensity perception. For voices, children’s 
decisions about happiness, sadness, surprise and disgust became faster with age whilst anger and fear 
did not become faster with age and only demonstrated changes in RT in adulthood – which was later 
than for the face condition.  
Overall, threatening emotions such as anger and fear had slower RTs than non-threatening 
emotions and for the face condition, speed for those two emotions during childhood seemed to peak 
between the ages of 5- 7 and 8-10. For the voice condition on the other hand, the peak happened 
between the ages of 8-10 and adulthood. Hence, the overall rating pattern of emotions seems to be 
comparable between both modalities with happiness, surprise and disgust improving earlier than anger 
and fear; however, the onset for all emotions in the voice conditions seems to be one age-step behind 
the face condition, suggesting possibly difficulties for rating emotions displayed in the voices as 
compared to faces in younger children.  
In addition, for accuracy rates in faces, the younger and older child-group did not differ which 
suggests that even younger children were equally equipped to categorise emotions as efficiently as 
older children. For voices on the other hand, younger children were significantly poorer at correctly 
recognising emotions compared to older children.  
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Again, present findings support the idea of earlier visual reliance during emotion recognition whilst 
auditory emotion recognition develops later in childhood children (Nelson & Russell, 2011). The 
ability to discriminate between acoustical information representing specific information may develop 
later in childhood, in line with Quam and Swingley’s (2012) findings who suggests that children only 
start to make use of prosody information during middle childhood.  
Although improvement occurred at different time-points depending on modalities, patterns of 
emotion improvement were comparable across modalities. One likely explanation for this finding is 
the possibility of the same brain mechanisms being responsible for emotion recognition across 
different modalities. This interpretation goes in hand with brain imaging data which, for example, 
suggested decreased medial prefrontal activation that was visible equally during visual and auditory 
emotion recognition tasks in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (Wang et al., 2007). However, 
the story of supramodal emotion recognition in childhood undoubtedly is not as straightforward as 
this and future neuroimaging studies are needed to investigate the development of emotion areas in 
children across modalities.  
 
3.1.4.4. Individual factors contributing to emotion recognition 
The present study could not find gender effects in children for intensity ratings and speed of 
categorising emotions. This supports previous research on children’s visual emotion recognition by 
Thomas and colleagues (2007) as well as on auditory emotion recognition (Sauter et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, the adult Chapter 2 did not find any significant effects of participants’ gender on 
intensity ratings during emotion recognition either. In fact, the only occasion where gender of 
participants seemed to play a role was for the youngest child group in the voice condition. Whilst 
younger boys and older boys did not differ in their speed for rating voices, younger girls were 
significantly slower than boys in the same age range for rating voices. This difference was not evident 
in the face condition and seemed to have disappeared in the older child group, suggesting speed for 
rating voices and faces was at similar level - independent of gender of participants - by the time 
children were 8 years old. However, this interaction for RTs was not replicated for intensity ratings, 
suggesting slower responses in young girls but not lower intensity perception compared to young boys 
in the voice condition.  
How could this gender difference be explained? Hypothetically, young girls may have found 
the voice condition more difficult than face condition, resulting in girls taking more time to make their 
judgements. Alternatively, young boys may just generally be faster in making judgements based on 
emotional voices than young girls. Interestingly, gender differences for changes in brain volume have 
been reported in children aged 6 to 17 (de Bellis et al, 2001). For example, de Bellis and colleagues 
(2001) reported a faster increase in white matter and corpus callosum volume in boys compared to 
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girls between the ages of 6 to 17. This may reflect growth of neurons and myelination to enhance 
neuronal communication. Underlying anatomical brain development could be the reason for 
behavioural gender differences in the younger child sample; however, data from the present study 
only allows making hypothetical interpretations due to the lack of brain imaging data to support this 
idea.    
Whilst results were less clear for intensity ratings of emotional stimuli, for accuracy rates, 
recognition accuracy for both modalities benefited from non-verbal IQ (CPM) abilities. Accuracy in 
voices additionally benefited from an advanced Theory of Mind and having two compared to no 
siblings. For choice speed, having an advanced Theory of Mind Level 3 – which correlated positively 
with age - contributed significantly to faster choice reaction times. Additionally, non-verbal IQ scores 
were also related to speed of rating emotions – but only for the vocal condition, suggesting IQ-
independent RTs for the face but not for the voice modality. Interestingly, having one as compared to 
none siblings seemed to slow down the performance for rating speed - which was true for both 
modalities. At first, this direction of effect seems counterintuitive; however, a negative relationship 
between recognising fear in faces and number of siblings has also been reported by Felisberti, Chipi 
and Trueman (2014). One possible interpretation could be that sibling rivalry and jealousy in children 
(Volling, 2003) results in focusing on one’s own emotions in order to gain most attention from parents 
rather than in trying to understand the feelings of siblings and other children.  In contrast, it is possible 
that children with siblings have learned from the beginning to put effort and consideration (i.e. time) 
into understanding others whilst children with no siblings may make more rapid and less well 
considered other-judgements as their necessity to understand others is less developed.  
Findings from the present study support previous findings by Ketelaars et al. (2010)  and 
Weimer et al. (2012) who linked emotion understanding and ToM development – although only for 
the speed of rating emotions and not for accuracy or intensity perception. However, for the first time, 
the present data suggests that the link between emotion understanding and ToM abilities is not limited 
to visual emotion recognition and extends to the auditory domain as well. The dependence on ToM 
abilities for choice RTs across two separate modalities during emotion recognition hints at modality-
independent cognitive requirements for rating speed of emotions. However, it is important to note that 
the present study used a very basic paradigm for assessing ToM abilities. In order to draw reliable 
conclusions about emotion understanding across modalities and ToM, one needs to include a more 
holistic ToM task as used for example in Ketelaars and colleagues’ study (2010).  
 
3.1.4.5. Implications from the current study 
Results from the current study suggested that emotion recognition develops continuously 
across childhood and information from the vocal domain may only be recognised to a higher standard 
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later in childhood. In addition, children seem to be especially equipped to recognise happiness across 
modalities from a very early age onwards and this pattern seemed to be similar to data from adults and 
becomes even more adult-like with age. Anger generally was not well recognised. Findings may have 
implications for children in primary or even secondary schools: Young children seem to be better at 
seeing than hearing what other people feel. This may be a helpful feature in noisy situations such as 
playground settings where children might not be able to hear what other peers say, but can see their 
expressions on faces rapidly and from far away. However, the present finding also indicates that 
settings where voice information is the only available source such as during radio advertising, young 
children may benefit from visual input; auditory emotion communication must be targeted at the 
appropriate age group and may not communicate the intended emotion to children under the age of 8 
to 10. Present data suggests that young boys aged 5 to 7 might be more susceptible to vocal emotions 
than girls whilst the girls’ performance catches up with boys’ abilities around the age of 8 to 10.  
In addition, whilst children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and especially Asperger’s 
Syndrome commonly show impaired emotion recognition abilities across faces as well as voices 
(Linder & Rosen, 2006), findings from the current study suggested that - although both modalities 
may have slight differences in onset and easiness - modalities showed parallel recognition patterns. 
This suggests that some intervention programs which were aimed at improving ASD patients’ facial 
emotion recognition abilities such as by Baron-Cohen, Golan and Ashwin (2009) could potentially 
become extended to auditory emotion training in children as has been done previously in adults 
(Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006).  
 
3.1.4.6. Limitations & Future Research 
The current study presented data on children’s emotion recognition across two independent 
modalities in a within-subject design. It was found that speed of rating decisions increased in linear 
manner with age and so one could argue that faster speed may simple be a result of increased 
exposure to handling computers with age and underlying maturation of general executive functions. 
Whilst this is a likely interpretation, it is important to note that accuracy rates also increased in a 
linear manner with age. Further, all young children completed a training session before the main 
experiment to get used to pressing the buttons on the computer mouse as quickly as possible. The 
similar pattern across all three age groups with faster speed for happiness as compared to angry 
emotions suggests that speed in younger children is tied to specific emotion recognition rather than to 
more general and emotion-independent cognition. 
The current study included children aged 5 to 10 which covers the range of primary school 
children.  
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However, present data as well as several previous studies (e.g. De Sonneville et al., 2009) suggested 
that developmental changes for speed of emotion recognition occurred even later in childhood and 
early adolescent years. Hence, it is advisable for future studies to also include older children in order 
to localise the peak of emotion rating abilities at which they become adult-like.  
In addition, the present study delivered behavioural evidence about possible shared 
mechanisms across modalities which may develop with age but could be influenced by other external 
factors in childhood. However, to be best of the researcher’s knowledge, no studies have investigated 
children’s development of emotion recognition across several modalities from a neuroimaging 
perspective. It would be interesting to see whether children and adults employ the same brain regions 
for rating emotions delivered in faces as well as in voices which could hint at supramodal emotion 
recognition circuits which are either already existing in childhood or develop as a function of age and 
possibly emotion category.   
 
3.1.4.7. Conclusion  
For the first time, the current study provided data for children at primary-school age for 
emotion recognition across faces and non-verbal vocalisations in direct comparison. By including 
intensity, accuracy as well as choice reaction times measures from two separate modalities, the 
present study tested whether potential similarities in emotion recognition across modalities developed 
with age. It was demonstrated that whilst children were slower than adults and intensity perception as 
well as accuracy improved with age, this was true for both modalities. Further, there was a face-
superiority effect which was evident for all age-groups although rating patterns for face and voice 
became more similar with age. This was also evident in increasing correlation-strength for full rating 
profiles of voices and faces which suggests that modality-independent rating of emotions is a feature 
of development. Whilst general patterns for rating emotions within the voice and the face in children 
represented adult-like emotion understanding such as highest ratings for happiness across all age and 
modality groups, this was not consistent. For example, young children’s decision speed was 
influenced by gender of stimulus for both modalities but this effect disappeared with age. Further, 
young girls were slower in rating emotions than young boys but this was limited to the auditory 
domain and again, this effect disappeared with age.  In addition, individual factors such as levels of 
ToM or having one sibling influenced the speed of rating faces and voices alike, suggesting general 
cognitive factors that influence emotion recognition on a supramodal level.  
However, the present study provided data from a cross-sectional design; hence, one cannot 
draw conclusions about age-related changes between 5 to 7 and 8 to 10 year-olds that hold up in a 
longitudinal design.  
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By comparing children of different age-groups at only one time point increases the likelihood of 
measuring external differences such as family settings or classroom structure rather than true emotion 
understanding development. A longitudinal design could allow drawing conclusions about the 
relationship of cause and effect (Farrington, 1991), such as age and emotion understanding. Hence, 
the following Experiment 3-II will address this exact issue by re-testing a smaller sub-sample of 16 
children with a time-gap of 18 months between the first and the second session.  
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3.2. Experiment 3-II  
A Longitudinal Perspective on Children’s Emotion Recognition in Faces: 
What Difference do 1.5 Years Make? 
 
Since Experiment 3-I provided cross-sectional data of children’s emotion rating abilities 
development across three different age–groups, the researcher returned to the same primary school 1.5 
years later in order to collect some longitudinal face recognition data from a number of previously 
included participants. Children were in the younger age-group for 5 to 7 year-olds at Time 1 (autumn 
term 2012) and would have been in the older age-group for 8 to 10 year-olds at Time 2 (spring term 
2014). The longitudinal data was collected as part of Experiment 3-III, comparing children’s 
performance of rating emotional adult as compared to emotional child faces. Hence, due to the lack of 
a non-verbal vocalisation children database, Experiment 3-III only collected data from faces, 
providing Experiment 3-II with longitudinal data from the face conditions only.  
Previous longitudinal data has suggested that emotion recognition abilities are changing with 
age and develop with experience. For example, Hills (2012) suggested that 6 to 10-year-old children’s 
everyday experiences, such as exposure to school mates of the same age, over a period of three years, 
influenced the own-age bias for perceiving faces from the own or other age group. In addition, 
Bracovic, de Heering and Maurer (2012) reported that recognising child faces as compared to adult 
faces suddenly improved in young children once they had entered primary school which increased 
contact with other children of the same age. Further, emotion understanding abilities in 3-year-olds 
was related to the same children’s emotion understanding three years later (Brown & Dunn, 1996). 
Developmental changes in facial emotion recognition may partially be due to gradual development of 
emotion-related structures within the developing brain between the ages of 7 and adulthood. For 
example, Mills and colleagues (2014) suggested that brain structures typically associated with 
mentalizing developed with age: grey matter volume as well as thickness for anterior temporal cortex 
peaked in early adulthood. In addition, Wierenge and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that the 
development of emotion related structures like the amygdala or hippocampus increased with age 
across childhood.  However, as may be evident from the current literature review – longitudinal data 
on age-related changes on emotion recognition in voices is sparse. 
3.2.1.1. The Present Study 
Comparing two age groups in a longitudinal design seemed of particular interest since results 
from the previous cross-sectional study (Experiment 3-I) indicated that speed for making judgements 
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increased significantly between both child groups. In addition, for RTs, the younger child-group relied 
on external cues such as gender of stimuli in both modalities whilst gender of the stimulus in faces did 
not prompt emotion rating speed for either the older child group or the adult control group. A clear 
direction on the involvement of external features like gender of stimuli and emotion recognition 
cannot be given from a cross-sectional study alone.  
Consequently, a longitudinal study – as proposed here – may be able to identify 
developmental trajectories on the use of external features such as gender of stimuli during emotion 
recognition over a prolonged period of time. In order to exclude the possibility that developmental 
changes in emotion recognition are due to external or individual factors amongst participants such as 
differences in family structure or classroom setting, a smaller sub-sample of the original participant 
group was re-tested.  
The present study predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Across a time-span of 1.5 years, children’s emotion recognition will improve; 
this should reflect results from a larger sample in Experiment 3-I and may apply especially to RTs of 
rating emotions. 
Hypothesis 2: External factors such as gender of the stimuli may play a critical role at 
children’s emotion recognition at Time 1, but may disappear at Time 2, suggesting that emotion 
recognition may become more independent of external perceptual features with age as indicated by 
Experiment 3-I.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
3.2.2. Methods 
3.2.2.1. Participants 
The 16 child participants (6 male, 10 female) in this present experiment were part of the 
original child sample (Experiment 3-I) and re-tested after 18 months on their ability to rate emotional 
faces, providing some longitudinal data for rating emotional adult faces. At Time 1 (autumn term 
2012), children had a mean age of 7 years 2 months (SE = 1.14). At Time 2 (spring term 2014), 
children had a mean age of 8 years 8 months (SE = 1.1). When returning, the two groups differed in 
CPM non-verbal IQ scores which is a reflection of normal development (Raven et al., 1998, p. 
CPM55). Children did not receive feedback at time one in order to ensure they wouldn’t remember 
the correct answers. At Time 1, children on average scored 28.13 (SE = .17) and at Time 2, 32 (SE = 
.85) out of 36 possible correct answers. Two out of 16 children scored lower at Time 2 than at Time 1.  
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
officer (17/10/2012) and informed consent as well as a child-friendly version of the consent form was 
filled in both by participants and parents prior to the study. All participants were debriefed after the 
study. Forms are detached in Appendix B. 
 
3.2.2.2. Research Material 
Child and Adult Faces 
See Experiment 3-I but containing visual face stimuli only. 
Computer Program, Intelligence Assessment, Demographics  
See Experiment 3-I. 
 
3.2.2.3. Procedure 
See Experiment 3-I. 
 
3.2.2.4. Statistical Analysis 
For the present study, data from matching target emotions were included. Two separate 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for Intensity Ratings and Reaction Times (RTs) 
comparing data from two time points. The repeated measures were time-point (2), emotion (6) and 
gender of stimulus (2). Since there were only 16 children included in the longitudinal data, no 
between-subject variables such as age or gender were included. 
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3.2.3. Results 
a) Intensity Ratings  
Due to the small samples size, the variable of gender or age of participants was not included in 
this analysis. A repeated measures ANOVA of time-point (2) x emotion (6) x gender stimulus (2) 
revealed a significant main effect for emotion, F(5,75) = 8.96, p < .001, 2 = .37, as well as for gender 
of the stimulus, F(1,14) = 7.11, p = .018, 2 = .32, but no effect of time points (p > .05). Post-hoc 
LSD comparisons suggested that for the subset of participants used in the longitudinal study (N = 16), 
happiness and surprise had highest intensity ratings whilst anger, fear and disgust received lowest 
intensity ratings, p < .05. Additionally, male stimuli (M = 5.56, SE = 19) were perceived as more 
intense than female (M = 5.4, SE = .22) stimuli.  
The study also revealed a significant interaction effect for emotion and gender of the stimulus, 
F(5,75) = 2.4, p = .045, 2 = .14. The significant main effect for gender of stimulus was only true for 
faces displaying anger with higher intensity perceptions for angry male faces (M = 5.19, SE = .44) as 
compared to angry female faces (M = 3.59, SE = .44). For all other emotions, gender of stimuli did not 
influence intensity perception. However, there was no significant main or interaction effect for the 
variable of time point, suggesting stable intensity ratings over time (p > .05). This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings from the same participant group at two different 
time points (2012 and 2014) for each of the six emotions, N = 16. N.s.  
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b) Reaction Times (RTs) 
Individual trials with RTs of 20 seconds and above were classified as outliers and replaced 
with the mean (N trials = 3). Due to the small samples size, the variable of gender or age of 
participants was not included in this analysis. 
A repeated measure ANOVA of time-point (2) x emotion (6) x gender stimulus (2) revealed 
no significant main effects for either time - point, emotion category or gender of the stimulus (p > 
.05). Although there was a trend of rating stimuli faster at Time 2 than at Time 1, this was not a 
significant difference and speed of rating emotions was stable over 1.5 years (p > .05). This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.13.  
 
Figure 3.13. Means and Standard Errors for Reaction times from the same participant group at two different time 
points (2012 and 2014) for each of the six emotions, N = 16, n.s. 
 
In fact, the only significant interaction effect for this cohort of participants for RTs was 
between time point, emotion and gender stimulus, F(5,75) = 2.51, p = .034, 2 = .14. Opposite to 
predictions, post-hoc LSD comparisons revealed that whilst children at Time 1 did not show any 
stimulus-gender effects for RTs across the six emotions, at Time 2, children now showed stimulus-
gender effects in speed for rating happy and disgusted faces: at Time 2, male faces were rated faster 
than female faces for happy and disgusted stimuli. In addition, children rated happy stimuli faster at 
Time 2 than at Time 1, but only if they were expressed by male actors. Further, children rated angry 
stimuli faster at Time 2 than at Time 1 when they were expressed by female actors, p < .05. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.14. Means and Standard Errors for reaction times. Significant interaction effects between time of 
experiment and gender of stimulus, split by each of the six emotions. *p < .05. 
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3.2.4. Discussion Experiment 3-II 
The present study on longitudinal age effects for emotion recognition within the visual 
domain aimed to replicate developmental effects from the cross-sectional Experiment 3-I within a 
sub-sample of child participants. The current study reported children’s emotion recognition abilities 
with a mean age of 7 years 2 months at Time 1 and were re-tested 18 months later at a mean age of 8 
years 8 months. By providing longitudinal data, the current study aimed to validate findings from the 
cross-sectional experiment by reducing external variables and pinning down developmental effects of 
emotion recognition across a time span of 1.5 years. Data suggests that RTs as well as intensity 
ratings for the sub-sample used in Experiment 3-II were stable between Time 1 and Time 2. Results 
do not support either of the two hypotheses in relation to developmental changes in RTs or intensity 
ratings.  
3.2.4.1. Age effects 
Results for intensity ratings from the longitudinal study somewhat reflect the findings from 
the cross-sectional Experiment 3-I. Neither the cross-sectional (Experiment 3-I) nor the present 
longitudinal experiment reported age-related effects for intensity perception between the two age-
groups. Data from the adult control sample in Experiment 3-I, however, indicates that intensity ratings 
increase between the age of 9 to10 and adulthood and important developmental changes may happen 
during teenage years. Findings from Experiment 3-I and 3-II equally support the idea that intensity 
perception of emotion in faces may require a higher degree of cognitive flexibility; hence, sensitivity 
to emotion expression may change in early adulthood which is not captured in the present study. 
However, the reader is to remember that the actual intensity of faces was not modified for the purpose 
of the current study.  
For RTs data, results from the current experiment did not replicate findings from the cross-
sectional Experiment 3-I. Time of data collection did not influence RTs, although there was a trend 
towards faster RTs at the second data collection time. A relationship between age and speed is 
typically a common finding in emotion literature and has often been reported (e.g. de Sonneville et al., 
2009). It is possible that the sample size for Experiment 3-II was not sufficient and including a larger 
sample of participants may result in a significant difference of speed over time. Another potential 
explanation is that the children included in the present experiment were younger (M = 8.1) than the 
average child in age-group II in Experiment 3-I (M = 8.96). It is possible that age-related effects for 
speed, which resulted in faster RTs for older versus younger children in Experiment 3-I, is not seen in 
the older child group at Time 2 in Experiment 3-II because the age does not match completely.  
However, the interesting fact remains: children did not improve in RTs between the ages of 
6.5 and 8 in a longitudinal design, suggesting that speed-related changes may happen in stages which 
may be longer than the included 1.5 years period.  
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In support, Mills and colleagues (2014) conducted several MRI scans in children 2 years apart and 
reported changes in brain structures related to emotion mechanisms such as the anterior temporal 
cortex at a time gap of 2 years.  
3.2.4.2. External Variable (Gender of Stimulus) 
For the cross-sectional Experiment 3-I, results suggested heightened intensity perception in 
children for angry male versus female faces. Interestingly, the same finding was reported in the 
longitudinal study in the present Experiment 3-II.  The male superiority effect in angry faces seemed 
to be a robust finding and also supports previous literature such as Becker and colleagues (2007) who 
reported a connection between increased masculinity in a male face and perceived angriness. Becker 
and colleagues suggested that ‘the angry face naturally looks more masculine’ (p. 189).  
Further, the present Experiment 3-II aimed to demonstrate a link between stimulus gender-
related effects and emotion rating speed in younger children which may change over the period 1.5 
years. Experiment 3-I reported gender stimulus effect for RTs for faces in younger but not in older 
children or adults. This possibly indicate that younger children relied on external factors such as 
gender of stimulus for making faster decisions about emotional meaning whilst older children and 
adults blocked out external factors and focus on the emotions displayed per se. However, findings 
from the current experiment led to a rejection of this hypothesis because the sub-sample from the 
longitudinal study actually demonstrated the opposite effect. The present smaller sub-sample did not 
exhibit gender stimulus effect for faces at Time 1 but on return after 1.5 years, the same children now 
showed gender-stimulus effects for rating speed of happy and disgusted faces with male superiority 
effects.  
There are two possible explanations for this finding. It is quite likely that the sub-sample used 
in the longitudinal data collection is too small and hence does not deliver significant statistical effects. 
Including a larger sample and observing development over a longer period of time may give more 
reliable conclusions about emotion recognition across childhood. Alternatively, it is also possible that 
children between the aged of 6 and 8 – as included in the present longitudinal study - become indeed 
more sensitive to gender effects in stimuli with age. It is possible that this effect was overshadowed in 
the cross-sectional Experiment 3-I due to a higher degree of variability and external influences 
between the two child age-groups. Current results suggest that further investigation of the link 
between emotion recognition and external factors such as stimulus gender during development is 
necessary, especially with a larger sample that may include a wider range of age-groups and adult 
control groups.  
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3.2.4.3. Limitations & Future Research 
One drawback of the current longitudinal study is that the sample size was relatively small 
and the current study only included data from face – rather than voice - stimuli due to the study design 
requirements for Experiment 3-III which compared emotion recognition in child versus adult faces. 
For future investigations, it would be important to include a voice emotion recognition task in order to 
observe children’s emotion recognition developments across two independent modalities over time.  
 The lack of changes in intensity ratings and RTs whilst rating adult faces in the given child 
sample over time may be the result of children’s stable exposure to adults over a period of 1.5 years. 
However, when children enter primary school, they are suddenly surrounded by a large number of 
same- age peers. Young children between the ages of 7 to 10 make more friends than they break up 
with and relationships only become more stable with age (Berndt & Hoyle, 1985). Whilst adults such 
as parents or teachers are usually a more or less consistent and stable component in a child’s life, 
young children may encounter many new social situations with same-aged peers. This may include 
becoming a new member in a football club or attending after-school clubs which requires the ability 
to adhere to a social group and efficiently read emotions of same-aged peers. In order to validate the 
usefulness of including adult faces to be rated by children, it would be useful to investigate children’s 
ability to rate emotions expressed in children as well as in adults. 
3.2.4.4. Conclusion 
Overall, the current longitudinal data was not able to answer questions that resulted from the 
cross-sectional Experiment 3-I. However, it did replicate findings such as stable intensity perception 
in middle childhood and also suggested that important developmental changes in emotion perception 
in faces may happen after the age of 10. One must include a larger sample and possibly observe 
performance over a longer period of time in order to make a more qualified judgement regarding the 
development of emotion perception based on external factors such as gender of the stimuli. The 
following Experiment 3-III aims to investigate the contribution of including adult rather than child 
faces to the inability to report significant changes in emotion perception across 1.5 years.  
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3.3. Experiment 3-III  
Children’s Emotion Recognition in Faces and the Role of Age-
Group Biasing 
In Experiment 3-I and 3-II, stimuli produced by adult actors were judged by adults and 
children alike. However, several face recognition studies have reported in-group advantage for 
identifying familiar faces (Sporer, 2001) and emotional faces (Vogel, Monesson, & Scott, 2012) from 
the own race as well as from the own age group (Kuefner et al., 2008) as compared to out-group 
faces. This finding may be a result of increased contact with own-group members which in turn leads 
to expert recognition of individual in-group faces (Sporer, 2001). For example, adult teaching trainees 
may demonstrate enhanced recognition of child-faces despite the age difference as they are exposed to 
children on an every-day basis (Harrison & Hole, 2008).  Enhanced ability to recognise others of 
similar age-groups may be related to enhanced temporal brain dynamics in younger adults for 
memorizing younger compared to older adult faces (Wiese, Schweinsberger, & Hansen, 2008). 
However, previous studies usually focused on adults’ perception of faces from members of different 
age-groups. Interestingly, Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) added child participants to the equation and 
found that 5 to 8-year old children also showed enhanced identity recognition abilities for faces 
displayed by children of similar age, suggesting in-group age effects for adults and children alike. 
Furthermore, a longitudinal paradigm demonstrated age-related face identity recognition biases in 
children which changed over time, depending of own experiences with the particular age group in 
question (Hills, 2012). 
However, only a limited number of studies have investigated adults’ as well as children’s age-
biases towards emotional faces of either child or adult faces. For example, Ebner and Johnson (2009) 
suggested no interaction between the age of faces and emotions in younger and older adult 
participants. However, in terms of children, friendships amongst individuals are generally more fluid 
and younger children may change their friendship bonds within very short periods such as three weeks 
(Cairns, Leung, Buchanan, & Cairns, 1995). Children move in between friendships and are usually 
exposed to a varying number of peers which may enable them to rapidly recognise emotions from 
friends of the same age. Adults such as parents or teachers on the other hand usually play a more 
stable role in a child’s life. This pattern will obviously change as a function of age during childhood - 
until adults are the new own-age in-group members. It is possible that the lack of age-effects for 
intensity ratings or RTs from the longitudinal Experiment 3-II may be a result of stable encounter of 
adult faces over a period of 1.5 years.  
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Possibly, there could have been age- related effects for rating child faces which may have an adaptive 
function during early childhood. Further, whilst other children are usually at a similar height to the 
child observer, adult faces are further away from a child face, possibly resulting in different viewing 
angles which in turn may influence the emotion expression observed by children. Hence, the present 
experiment aims to investigate children’s perception of emotions in child versus adult faces in order to 
validate the appropriateness of using adult faces to examine children’s developmental effects over 
age. 
Apart from the NIMH-ChEFS database (Egger et al., 2011) or the Radboud Faces Database 
(Langner et al., 2010), the number of available child-face databases are limited. For this exact reason, 
Dalrymple, Gomex and Duchaine (2013) have developed and validated the Dartmouth Database of 
Children’s Faces with pictures of Caucasian children aged 6 to 16, displaying eight emotions which 
had been recorded from five different angles. However, to the researcher’s knowledge, this database 
has not previously been evaluated for the use in child participants nor has it been used explicitly to 
investigate children’s own-age bias for recognising emotional face expressions.  
 
3.3.1.1. The Present Study 
 
The present study aimed to investigate these exact issues reported above as it is important to 
understand potential age-in-group effects in emotion processing in order to improve social 
interactions. Data that indicates that children may have heightened sensitivity to emotions which are 
expressed by one age-group but not by another could help explain behaviour observable in 
playground settings. For example, children might be more likely to copy peers of a similar age as they 
can identify better with them. Teaching children to understand emotions displayed by other children 
of a similar age group could encourage prosocial behaviour and may be used in an attempt to explain 
antisocial acts such as bullying.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure that children’s lower efficiency in rating emotional faces 
compared to adult participants –as found in the previous Experiment 3-I - is not simply due to the 
disadvantage of rating out-group faces, but rather represents a general developmental effect, the 
present study with a smaller sub-sample was conducted to investigate children’s capabilities for either 
rating emotional adult or emotional child faces. Additionally, this present experiment will produce 
data that allows investigation of whether children show own-age biases for certain emotions when 
using the newly developed Dartmouth Database of Children’s Faces. Although verbal databases for 
children speaking emotional sentences have been produced (DANVA2-CP, Nowicky & Duke, 1994), 
the lack of child databases for non-verbal emotional vocalisations limits the researcher to the 
investigation of emotional faces only. 
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The present experiment predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Children show a small in-group advantage for rating emotions from children of 
a similar age as compared to the adult database as a result of increased exposure associated with 
entering primary school.  
Hypothesis 2: Similar patterns of emotion perception across both adult and child data-bases 
are also expected, demonstrating that children can reliably recognise emotions from faces of different 
age groups.  
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3.3.2. Methods 
3.3.2.1. Participants 
Participants in this present experiment were part of the original child sample (Experiment 3-I) 
and re-tested after 18 months on their ability to rate emotional faces. The longitudinal data – 
comparing children’s performance on rating emotional adult faces across two time points - was 
presented in Experiment 3-II. At the same time, the returning 16 children (6 male, 10 female) also 
performed a rating task of child-faces displaying the six basic emotions. The current Experiment 3-III 
investigated children’s ability to compare between emotional adult faces and new stimuli containing 
emotional child faces. At Time 2 (spring term 2014), children had a mean age of 8 years 8 months. 
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
officer (17/10/2012) and informed consent as well as a child-friendly version of the consent form was 
filled in both by participants and parents prior to the study. All participants were debriefed after the 
study. Forms are attached in Appendix B. 
3.3.2.2. Research Material 
Child and Adult Faces 
For details on adult face stimuli, see Experiment 3-I. Here, an additional child face condition 
was implemented and the condition displayed children’s face expressions  for happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear, surprise and disgust from one male (identity 87, 9 years old) and one female (identity 77, 
10 years old) Caucasian child actor from the Dartmouth Database of Children’s Faces (Dalrymple et 
al., 2013). Each of the 24 pictures was randomly presented in the middle of a computer screen. Each 
stimulus was rated on each of the six basic emotions (2 x 6 x 6 adult faces and 2 x 6 x 6 child faces) 
on a 7-point Likert-scale scale ranging from ‘not happy/sad/… at all = 1’, to ‘extremely happy/sad/… 
= 7’.  
No definition of emotions was provided in order to avoid biasing the responses into any 
direction; however, all children were verbally tested on their understanding on each of the six basic 
emotions prior to the task to ensure they were familiar with the emotions displayed. Within each 
block, order of stimuli was randomised. Across participants, the order of the blocks (child faces or 
adult faces) was counterbalanced.  
Computer Program, Intelligence Assessment, Demographics  
See Experiment 3-I. 
 
3.3.2.3. Procedure 
See Experiment 3-I.  
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3.3.2.4. Statistical Analysis 
 
See Experiment 3-I, but within-subject variable was ‘face-type’ (child versus adult face). 
Since there were only 16 children in the present experiment, participants were not divided into 
different age-groups but instead analysed as one sample.  Data was collapsed across gender. Further, 
no adult control group was included in the present experiment.   
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3.3.3. Results  
a) Intensity Ratings 
A repeated measures ANOVA of face-type (2) x emotion (6) x gender stimulus (2) revealed a 
significant main effect for emotion, F(5,70) = 4.35, p = .002, 2  = .24 but not for face type (p > .05). 
Post-hoc LSD comparisons revealed that happiness and surprise received highest intensity ratings 
whilst the other emotions did not differ from each other significantly, p < .05.  
There was no significant main effect for face-type.  Paired t-tests were performed for each of 
the six emotions between adult and child faces. Paired t-test revealed that for anger, child faces were 
perceived with higher intensity than adult faces, t(15) = 2.11, p = .05, whilst for surprise, adult faces 
were perceived with higher intensity than child faces t(15) = -2.3, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 
3.15. 
 
 
Figure 3.15. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings for the child as well as the adult face database for 
each of the six emotions, N = 16, *p < .05. 
 
Further, there was a significant interaction effect between emotion and gender of the stimulus, 
F(3.31, 28.34) = 7.78, 2 = .36. Post-hoc univariate comparisons revealed that for angry faces, male 
stimuli (M = 6.07, SE = .27) were perceived with almost double the intensity than female faces (M = 
3.77, SE = .34) whilst for surprise, the opposite was true and female faces (M = 6.53, SE = .2) were 
rated with higher intensity than male faces (M = 5.67, SE = .3), p < .05.  
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b) Choice RTs 
A repeated measures ANOVA of face type (2) x emotion (6) x gender stimulus (2) revealed 
no significant main or interaction effects for any of the three variables (p > .05), suggesting that faces 
from the child database were perceived with similar RTs than faces from the adult database, 
independent of all six emotions and gender displayed. This was confirmed by six individual t-tests for 
each of the six emotion pairs (p > .05). For illustration of rating similarity across both face databases, 
see Figure 3.16. 
 
Figure 3.16. Means and Standard Errors for RTs for the child as well as the adult face database for each of the six 
emotions, N = 16, n.s. 
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3.3.4. Discussion Experiment 3-III 
The current Experiment 3-III investigated whether children perceived emotions differently 
depending on whether faces are expressed by adult or by child actors. Additionally, the present study 
aimed to deliver pilot data for own-age bias of child participants for rating either adult faces or the 
newly developed Dartmouth Database of Children’s Faces DDCF (Dalrymple et al., 2013). Whilst the 
present data suggests that adult faces are reliable stimuli to assess children’s emotion perception 
because they did not differ significantly from child faces in RTs and intensity, results also implicate 
that children did not exhibit own-age bias towards emotional faces of their own age groups. The 
present findings support Hypothesis 1 partially, suggesting children’s in-group age-bias towards 
higher intensity perception of angry faces when displayed by children as compared to adult actors. 
However, in contrast to Hypothesis 1, intensity ratings for surprised stimuli seemed to benefit from 
presentation by adult faces rather than child faces. In addition, results support Hypothesis 2, 
suggesting that children can recognise emotions from adult and child faces alike in a similar manner, 
independent of the age-group of actor.  
 
3.3.4.1. Stimulus-Effect 
Investigating the potential own age bias effect in child participants rating emotions from the 
DDCF, results suggested that children aged 7-10 did not rely on age information of the actor when 
judging emotions. Results could not demonstrate general age-related biases within the DDCF. Fluid 
and often changing relationships in younger children as described by Cairns et al (1995) did not seem 
to cause enhanced rating abilities of emotional faces in same-age peers – in direct contrast to research 
from face identity recognition in children (e.g. Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005). In addition, the angle of 
viewing emotional expressions that children are used to when talking to either children of the same 
height or taller adults did not seem to influence children’s recognition abilities of emotional faces.  
The present results are in line with Ebner and Johnson’s (2009) findings who suggested that 
the age of adult participants did not interact with the age of the actors displaying emotional faces. It is 
possible that the lack of own-age bias in adults during the rating of emotional faces can be extended to 
children as well. However, when looking at the data in more detail, the present study found that for 
faces displaying surprise, adult faces were perceived as more intense than child faces. This possibly 
suggests that children had a higher degree of certainty when judging surprise in adult as compared to 
child faces. The current findings could indicate that children are wired to perceive surprise with 
higher intensity in adults than in children. This may be an important evolutionary feature for survival 
as it may be beneficial to be sensitive to the caregiver’s facial expression in response to the onset of 
sudden events.  
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In turn, emotions expressing anger resulted in children’s in-group age effect with heightened 
sensitivity towards angry children as compared to angry adults. Since angry stimuli displayed in 
Experiment 3-I received lowest intensity ratings across all child groups, it is possible that this is – at 
least partially – due to the fact that stimuli were displayed by adult actors. Had the researcher used 
child stimuli instead of adult stimuli, anger may not have yielded lowest scored for intensity ratings. 
In addition, children’s in-group age bias towards angry child faces may be adaptive in nature. 
Children that have entered primary schools and have to acclimatize to new social groups and 
friendships that may change often may benefit from recognising anger in peers rapidly. It is possible 
that the average middle-class child is less often exposed to aggressive anger displayed by adults as 
compared to anger displayed by children in playground situations who have yet to learn how to 
regulate their feelings. Hence, recognising anger in peers or similar age-groups could help to avoid 
bullying situation or getting into arguments.  
 
3.3.4.2. Limitations & Future Research 
Infants’ understanding of visual and auditory congruency of emotional stimuli seems to 
underlie the concept of own-race group biasing (Vogel et al., 2012) but little is known about the age 
in-group biasing of emotional voice processing in primary school children. The researcher is not 
aware of a child database for non-verbal affect vocalisations which would be needed in order to 
investigate children’s own- age-group bias across modalities. Investigating age-group biases across 
two separate modalities during emotion perception in children could contribute to a deeper 
understanding of supramodal mechanisms facilitating emotion understanding. Furthermore, such a 
vocal child database could help to validate the use of adult voice samples as used within the previous 
child Experiment 3-I.  
Since this current study was designed as a small pilot study for assessing children’s own-age 
bias in emotional faces within a newly developed child face database, including a larger sample size 
could also allow controlling for gender effects on own-gender bias in face emotion recognition in 
children. For adults, this has been found to exist for general face recognition memory with females 
being better at recognising female faces, independent of attentional load (Loven, Herlitz, & Rehnman, 
2011). It would be interesting to see whether female children also demonstrate enhanced processing 
mechanisms for emotional faces of the own-gender group.  
In addition, it would be interesting to collect data from children rating child stimuli over a 
longer period of time which can then be compared to the longitudinal study in Experiment 3-II. The 
lack of developmental changes for RTs and intensity ratings for rating adult stimuli over a period of 
18 months may be due to the stability of exposure to adults during childhood.  
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Ever changing exposure to different social networks during primary school may elicit more enhanced 
developmental effects for rating child faces in a longitudinal context which may not be visible for 
adult faces. 
 
3.3.4.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, data from Experiment 3-III suggested that overall, children were equally able 
to rate child as well as adult faces and did not show age-related in group effects for stimuli displayed 
by actors of a similar age. This suggests that the stimuli used in Experiment 3-I are reliable and 
findings are not due to age-effects of adult faces. However, looking into data in more detail, this may 
depend on specific emotions and especially anger was perceived by children as more intense when 
displayed by children as compared to adults. In addition, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
present study is the first to evaluate the newly developed DDCF (Dalrymple et al., 2013) for the use 
with child participants. Current results indicate that this particular database elicited proficient ratings 
in children which are comparable to adult stimuli. However, the lack of a non-verbal child data base 
on affect bursts limited this current study to the investigation of visual stimuli.  
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3.5.General Discussion 
The main aim of this Chapter 3 was to investigate findings from the Chapter 2 within a 
developmental context in order to examine children’s emotion recognition of two separate, yet 
parallel modalities. Data from adults in Chapter 2 showed similar patterns of emotion recognition 
across voices and faces but it is not clear whether this –potentially supramodal – emotion processing 
mechanisms already exists in similar manner in children. It is possible that the modality-independent 
emotion processing develops with age, experience and maturation of certain brain structures. Chapter 
3 aimed to answer the questions of how similar children’s emotion perception is to adults (i.e. how 
performance changes as a function of age) and whether children’s emotions recognition shows 
parallel patterns in separate modalities. More specifically, the researcher tested the above issue in a 
cross-sectional as well as in a smaller longitudinal study and also evaluated the usefulness of adult 
stimuli to be judged by children.  
Overall, results from Chapter 3 suggested that children showed superior emotion recognition 
for visual compared to auditory emotion recognition. Speed for rating emotional voices decreased at a 
later onset than for faces and accuracy for rating voices also improved later than for faces, depending 
on the specific emotions displayed. However, interestingly, children showed parallel patterns for 
emotion recognition across modalities with individual factors such as levels of Theory of Mind not 
only affecting speed for rating emotional faces bur also for emotional voices. Similarly, gender of 
participants did not influence emotion recognition in either voices or faces. This was also replicated 
the findings for intensity ratings in the adult data. Further, superior recognition for happy emotions 
was evident in both modalities, in all age groups, in the longitudinal as well as cross-sectional study 
and independent of the age of actors portraying the stimuli. Hence, certain patterns of children’s 
emotion recognition seemed to be independent of the mode of presentation and reflected adult-like 
performance, maturing with age. 
 In addition, the present data found that children can rate emotional adult faces without 
presenting out-group age disadvantages. Results indicated similar patterns for rating individual 
emotions and did not show significant differences for either RTs or intensity ratings of adult or child 
faces across different emotions. Hence, the fact that children decode emotions less efficient than 
adults - is not due to children rating out-group faces from a different age group but rather exists due to 
more general developmental effects – at least within the visual condition. Across all three 
experiments, Experiment 3-I, 3-II and 3-III, in Chapter 3, three common themes emerged. Those are 
the superior emotion recognition from faces as compared to voices, enhanced recognition of happy 
stimuli as compared to threatening stimuli and age-related effects across modalities and will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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3.5.1. Happiness Superiority 
Across modalities, age groups, longitudinal or cross-sectional designs and adult versus child 
faces, Chapter 3 consistently found superior emotion recognition for happy stimuli which was also 
replicated findings from the adult Chapter 2. Enhanced effects for happy faces may be a result of 
obvious configural features within the face such as showing teeth as well as open mouth during a 
smile (Schyns, et al., 2009). However, finding happiness superiority effect across independent 
modalities suggests that visual, perceptual features are not sufficient in explaining happiness 
superiority. Rather, modality independent cognitive processes may modulate emotion recognition 
which may already be deployed within a child’s brain and may be robust to age. 
In spite of this, it is important to note that the current Chapter 3 only examined one positive 
emotion (happiness) as compared to multiple negative emotions (such as anger, fear, sadness and 
disgust). Hence, critics may argue that advanced recognition of happy stimuli is due to lack of similar 
emotions. However, Sauter, et al. (2013) tested children’s non-verbal vocalisation recognition of 
several positive as well as negative emotions and findings suggested that children still recognised 
positive emotions like amusement and relief better than negative non-verbal affect bursts. Hence, the 
current finding of happiness superiority effects may replicate a general enhancement for positive 
emotion recognition which may be independent of visual features within the voice or – at least – be 
accompanied by equally distinct acoustic features within the voice. For a more detailed discussion see 
Chapter 2. 
Further, the categorical classification of the six basic emotions may be problematic as it is 
possible that emotion classification is based on the dimensions of valence and arousal rather than 
specific categories. It is possible that especially younger children base their emotion perception on 
valence-based judgements (Widen & Russell, 2010). The dimensional Circumplex Model of Affect 
(Posner, Pussell, & Peterson, 2005) suggests that different combinations of valence and arousal 
ratings which result in physiological responses describe emotions better than separate responses for 
each of the basic emotions. For example, ‘calm’ would be classified as low in arousal and high in 
pleasantness. Hence, the happiness superiority effect in children could be a result of the lack of 
sensitivity to similar negative emotions as children may base their judgements on a continuum such as 
‘good versus bad’ rather than on individual categories. 
3.5.2. Age Effects 
The present Chapter 3 provided evidence for continuous changes in emotion recognition 
abilities across two separate modalities which were evident across childhood and continued beyond 
the ages of 10. This was especially true for speed and accuracy but was also somewhat related to the 
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specific emotion category in questions. However, data from the longitudinal study did not support 
changes over a period of 18 months and it is possible that a) the child sample was not large enough, b) 
the period of 18 months was too short and did not capture a crucial stage of improvement or c) 
children did not change in their recognition abilities of adult stimuli but may have shown changes 
over time in recognising child stimuli as a result of increased exposure to other children.  
In contrast, data from Chapter 3 did suggest that young children were less stable than older 
children and adults in their emotion perception and often relied on additional external factors such as 
gender of stimulus to classify the emotion in questions. Further, the similarity of emotion recognition 
across two separate modalities seemed to be evident in children but matured with age. Although basic 
emotion recognition is thought to be universal and even innate (Darwin, 1872) and emotion imitation 
is already evident in new-born infants (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989) recent studies – including the 
present – have delivered ample evidence for the continuous improvement of emotion recognition over 
time. This could be due to maturation of brain mechanisms (e.g. Vink et al., 2014) or advances in 
cognitive development (Herba & Phillips, 2004).  
Further, it is possible that young children are learning to make eye contact during 
conversations as a cultural norm of politeness and social skills in Western cultures which could 
promote more observant behaviours of emotion expressions in others as a function of age. The 
discussion about nature versus nurture for emotion recognition abilities continuous but present results 
suggest that nurture and social development certainly influences the sensitivity of emotion perception 
with age. Social learning theories support this notion, suggesting that social behaviour can be learned 
by observing others (Bandura, 1965). This in turn supports the idea that children improve their 
emotion recognition abilities during their years of primary school which results in increased exposure 
of social situations. Further, Denham, Mitchell-Copeland, Strandberg, Auerbach and Blair (1997) 
suggested that children’s emotion competence and emotion expression abilities was directly linked to 
their parent’s emotional expressiveness, indicating environmental learning effects on emotion 
recognition rather than recognition abilities at adult standard from very early age on. 
 
3.5.3. Implications 
Results from the current study indicate that children’s emotion recognition abilities across 
two separate modalities improved during their years of primary school, i.e. between the ages of 5 
to10. Hence, the present data fills gap in existing emotion research in children during either early 
childhood (Nelson & Russell, 2011) or during late childhood (Tonks et al., 2007). More precisely, 
children between the ages of 5 to 7 might be able to recognise certain emotions like happiness in faces 
whilst this develops a little later for voices.  
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In general, children continued to show improvement in speed and intensity perception as well as 
accuracy over childhood and even 10-year old children were not as competent as adults in 
categorising emotions. This finding has to be taken into consideration for parenting or teaching 
guidelines as it might help to understand miscommunications between adults and children. Especially 
in the light of rising figures for children under the Child Protection Register which reached 50,732 
registered children in the UK in March 2013 (NSPCC, 2013) or rising numbers of care applications 
(CafCass, 2009), parents that are unable to cope may benefit from education about their children’s 
emotion understanding abilities. It may shed light on young children’s inability to efficiently classify 
negative emotions – especially when expressed in the voice – suggesting that carers as well as 
teachers need to communicate emotions in very obvious and prototypical ways.  
In addition, the notion that younger children may be better at seeing rather than hearing what 
other people feel, might be beneficial for noisy playground situations where children might not be 
able to hear what other children say, but can see their expressions on faces from far away. In turn, 
results indicate that emotional intention in radio advertising as well as audio books or puppet shows 
such as ‘Punch and Judy’, which is based on vocal story telling rather than changing face expressions, 
might only be understood by children from the ages of 8 to 10 onwards. However, this obviously 
depends on the individual and may be influenced by factors such as gender of child or number of 
siblings.  
In terms of research implications, findings from Chapter 3, which suggested similar emotion 
recognition patterns between two independent modalities that are already to some extend visible 
within children, provide the basis for enhanced inclusion of auditory emotion recognition tests in 
research. This may apply especially to non-verbal emotion vocalisations. Further, it may advance 
investigations of links between emotion recognition and future social behaviour as well as for autism 
research and the development of emotion recognition training programs which have previously been 
based on visual emotion recognition only (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).  
 
3.5.4. Limitations & Future 
The current child chapter focused on one aspect of emotion understanding: namely the basic 
emotion recognition of faces and voices. It did, however, not include further general emotion 
comprehension factors such as external cause attribution, mixed emotions or socially influenced 
emotion recognition such as recognition of shame or pride which may all show age-related effects 
during development (Albanese et al., 2010). Future studies on child development ought to control for 
several additional emotion understanding factors and their relationship to emotions expressed across 
several independent modalities. 
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In addition, the current chapter investigated emotion recognition in British children who were 
either born or raised in England and were exposed to the British culture. However, although the basic 
emotions in faces as well as in voices are believed to exist and be recognised universally (e.g. Bryant 
& Barrett, 2008; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1980), emotion recognition and perception may differ 
as a function of culture and certain display rules. For example, culture may influence intensity 
perception of emotions for Mexican and Canadian children (McCluskey & Albas, 1981) as well as 
accuracy of emotion categorisation (Markham & Wang, 1996) for Chinese and Australian children as 
use and expression of specific emotions may be encouraged or discouraged in some but not in other 
cultures. Further, certain cultural values which are displayed within the family setting such as power 
distance or the way parents express emotions influences children’s socialisation and emotion 
recognition (Halberstadt & Lozada, 2011; Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 2009).  
Further, different schooling systems as well as differences in child-care facilities depending 
on countries may influence parent’s contribution to emotional development in their offspring and 
children’s social networks. Hence, the present data is limited to interpretations within a British 
context and might not be replicable in other cultures. Since Chapter 3 used non-verbal auditory as 
well as visual stimuli, a cross-cultural adaptation of the paradigm is possible in order to investigate 
children’s emotion recognition development across different cultures – independent of language. Data 
for this exact issue will be presented in a cross-cultural Chapter 4. 
 
3.5.5. Conclusion 
Overall, across three experiments in Chapter 3, results demonstrated that children during 
primary school had similar emotion recognition patterns to adults such as enhanced sensitivity to 
happy as compared to threatening stimuli. However, performance stabilised with age - which was 
especially true for the auditory condition - and speed improved significantly between the age of 10 
and adulthood. Whilst faces generally communicated emotions better than non-verbal vocalisations, 
patterns for individual emotions or contributing factors such as participants’ age paralleled 
performance across modalities, suggesting shared emotion recognition mechanisms which may 
already exist in childhood. However, modality-similarities matured and became stronger with age, 
suggesting that modality-independent emotion processing may be a result of development. Findings 
are independent of the use of child or adult faces as children did not exhibit in-group age bias for 
stimuli expressed by actors from the same age-group. However, in order to extend data from Chapter 
2 and 3 to other cultures, a cross-cultural comparison of children’s emotion recognition is of interest 
and will be conducted in the following Chapter 4.  
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4 
 
Cross-Cultural Comparison of Emotion Recognition 
in British and Germans: Not so Similar After All? 
 
When we see someone smiling, our natural assumption is that this person must be happy; 
when we hear someone groan, we probably conclude that that person is angry or frustrated. Results 
from the previous Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested that we are able to categorise basic emotions 
presented in the voice and the face – and this ability improved throughout childhood. However, an 
important question remains: Do people from different cultures vary in the way they perceive emotions 
when watching or listening to other people?  
The effect of cultural variation within emotion recognition has been studied extensively 
within either the facial (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) or the auditory domain (Bryant & Barrett, 2008). 
However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has specifically investigated whether the 
recognition of emotions - not only in one, but in two separate modalities – is influenced by cultural 
context. Hence, the present study will expand previous literature by including within-subject 
comparisons of emotion recognition in faces as well as in voices. This will be set within a cross-
cultural as well as a developmental research context. It will introduce more specific ideas regarding 
variation in basic emotion recognition across two modalities in German and British participants by 
firstly analysing cross-cultural data from an adult sample in Experiment 3-I and then analysing cross-
cultural data from a child sample in Experiment 3-II.  
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4.1. Experiment 4-I 
Emotion Recognition Across Cultures and Modalities 
 
Does everyone recognise emotions in the same way? How much influence do cultural norms 
have on the experience and expression of emotion? The last decades have attempted to answer those 
questions by investigating emotion recognition across different cultures (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 
1971). Early research has proposed that emotions are universally recognised (e.g. Izard, 1980). There 
seem to be certain factors within basic emotions which allow different cultures to agree about the 
emotion displayed by others. In order to exclude the confounding factor of shared access to Western 
media, literate as well as illiterate cultures showed that facial (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1980) as 
well as vocal emotions (Bryant & Barrett, 2008) could be recognised in a similar manner – 
independent of culture or media influence. This finding has been interpreted as evidence that emotion 
recognition and therefore expression seemed indeed to be universal and accessible from birth 
onwards. The universal communication of basic emotions may be rooted in evolution as it aids 
identification of dangerous situations and would therefore be a result of universal biological heritage 
(Darwin, 1872/1965; Russell, 1994).  
On the other hand, however, the cultural universality of emotion recognition has also been 
contested. In 2009, Jack, Blais, Scheepers, Schyns and Caldara collected behavioural and eye-
movement data and proposed that Eastern groups relied mainly on the eye region to decode emotional 
face expressions whereas Western groups focused on the whole face. This explains how emotions 
such as fear and disgust which share the feature of wide open eyes can cause recognition problems 
within the East-Asian group. Similarly for the auditory domain, recent data has brought fresh air into 
the discussion of the universality of emotion recognition. Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver and 
Barrett (2014) for example have proposed that emotional non-verbal vocalizations may not be 
universally recognised. A remote cultural group from parts of Namibia did not use the same emotion 
terms as American participants during a label task of the emotion sounds. In contrast, the Himba 
culture in Namibia categorise emotions mainly on valence and arousal ratings and tended to describe 
the action (e.g. ‘scream’) rather than the emotion (e.g.  ‘fear’). From the above, the debate about the 
universality of emotion recognition within the auditory and visual domain across two very different 
cultures is still ongoing. It is, however, possible, that certain basic elements of emotion recognition 
are universal whilst culture adds some variation to emotion perception as proposed by interactionist 
theorists.  
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4.1.1.1. Interactionist account of emotion recognition across cultures 
In 1971, Ekman and Friesen reported that accuracy of facial emotion recognition in illiterate 
cultures such as New Guinea was comparable to recognition abilities of Western, literate cultures – 
although there was some slight cultural variation in distinction between certain emotion pairs. By 
reviewing 97 studies, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) concluded that certain emotions were indeed 
recognised universally but recognition was often influenced by society and cultural boundaries. 
Happiness and anger were the most accurately recognized facial expressions across several cultures; 
however, the degree of understanding those emotions varied slightly depending on external factors 
such as the similarity between the person that expressed the emotion and the person that perceived the 
emotion. Generally, emotions were better recognised when they were expressed by members of the 
same culture as compared to another culture.  
For vocal emotion recognition, Sauter, Eisner, Ekman and Scott (2009) demonstrated overall 
agreement in identifying basic non-verbal vocal emotion expressions between British and remote 
Namibian participants. However, recent data has called into question the universality of emotion 
recognition. Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver and Barrett (2014a) for example have proposed that 
emotional non-verbal vocalizations may not be universally recognised when focusing on discrete 
emotions alone. The Himba, a remote cultural group from parts of Namibia did not use the same 
emotion terms as American participants during a label task of the emotion sounds. In contrast, Himba 
emotion categorisation seemed to be mainly based on valence and arousal ratings and tended to 
describe the action (e.g. ‘scream’) rather than the emotion (e.g.  ‘fear’). Similarly, for face expressions 
of emotions, Himba participants did not show the anticipated universal pattern of emotion 
categorization and this was especially true when no conceptual context was provided such as forced-
choice labelling (Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014b).  
In response to this, Sauter et al. (2015) replied that this cross-cultural difference in emotion 
recognition may be due to the inclusion of culture-specific positive emotion vocalisations which are 
generally less well recognised across cultures (e.g. triumph) rather than simply valence-based 
judgements on part of the Namibian sample. However, this discussion also shows that a ‘Western 
way’ of setting up the experiment (such as cross-checking that remote cultures understand the 
‘Western way’ of correctly completing the task) as done by Sauter et al. (2015) provides conceptual 
context itself to participants. This in turn could influence the universality of categorical emotion 
recognition negatively in remote cultures and only free-labelling tasks can truly investigate cultural 
variation in emotion recognition (Gendron, Roberson, & Barrett, 2015). Hence, the discussion 
whether different cultures perceive emotions universally based on discrete categories or on 
dimensional valence and arousal ratings is ongoing and may be going back to the appropriate use of 
experimental design to answer the experimental question. 
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Overall, however, the majority of recent cross-cultural studies have now consistently reported 
a subtle degree of variation on otherwise universally recognised emotions across cultures. In the light 
of those findings, Elfenbein and colleagues postulated the ‘Dialect Theory of Emotion Recognition’ 
which acknowledges the role of cultural specificity on emotion recognition (Elfenbein, 2013; 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003). This theory proposes the idea that general emotion recognition abilities 
of basic emotions are controlled by innate and biological processes. However, this universal process 
would then vary across cultures like a dialect within an otherwise universal language. Hence, social 
learning and different social norms could therefore contribute to emotion expression and create an in-
group advantage for recognising emotions expressed by some member of one’s own culture. 
Elfenbein, Beaupre, Levesque and Hess (2007) presented evidence for actual culture-specific 
differences in the use of face muscles to create expressions of emotions: Canadian as well as African 
French-speakers posed emotional face expressions and those expressions were then compared for 
their differences in typical muscle activations. Whilst an universal understanding and expression of 
the basic emotions was clear, emotions such as happiness, anger or surprise showed ‘dialects’ in their 
expression and members of different cultures used different face muscles to communicate the 
intended emotion. Those dialects can account for in-group advantages of recognising emotions better 
when they are expressed by members of one’s own culture as compared to a foreign culture 
(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
Very recently, this particular in-group advantage for emotion recognition has also been 
extended to the vocal domain by Laukka, Neiberg and Elfenbein (2014). English-speakers from 
Australia, India, Kenya, Singapore and the United States expressed emotions verbally by speaking a 
neutral sentence with different emotional prosody. Acoustic features used to express the intended 
emotion were then compared across cultures. Similarly to facial expressions, many acoustical features 
were shared across participants. However, in accordance with the Dialect Theory, classification 
analyses revealed an ingroup-advantage for matching vocal stimuli produced by speakers of the same 
versus other culture. Therefore, it is of interest how culture-specific values and norms contribute to 
differences in emotion expression as well as emotion recognition between members from two 
different Western nations. 
 
4.1.1.2. How do display rules influence recognition of emotions? 
 
The term ‘display rules’ of emotions (Buck, 1984) attempts to describe the process of social 
learning within any culture which creates social norms and influences social behaviour and in turn the 
display of emotional information. If certain emotional behaviours are doomed to be inappropriate, 
members of a culture will learn to either mask or even ignore unfavourable emotion displays. In 
contrast to ‘dampening’, ‘amplification’ of emotion defines the opposite and describes a situation 
where emotions are expressed or decoded more intensely than the actual experience (Matsumoto, 
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Kasri, & Kooken, 1999). Often times, people from collectivistic nations - such as Asian nations - 
display and perceive emotions in a less intense way than their individualistic counter parts - such as 
Americans - do due to the existence of certain social norms such as emotional restraint (Friesen, 1972; 
Matsumoto et al., 2008). To illustrate this, Soto, Leveson and Ebling (2005) for example could not 
find any physiological differences such as changes in finger temperature or skin conductance levels 
across Chinese-Americans and Mexican-Americans during acoustic startle conditions. Interestingly, 
however, Chinese-American participants reported experiencing less emotional feelings of ‘being 
startled’ than Mexican-Americans which suggests culture-related ‘dampening’ of subjective emotion 
experience.  
How exactly are emotion perception, emotion expression and emotion recognition linked in 
the light of display rules such as emotion suppression? When suppressing one’s own emotional face 
expressions – which may be seen as appropriate in certain cultures – emotion recognition sensitivity 
can be impaired as a result. For example, Schneider, Hempel and Lynch (2013) demonstrated that 
preventing emotional face expressions whilst watching emotional faces – and therefore hindering 
facial mimicry – slowed down emotion recognition and also negatively affected sensitivity to the 
expressed emotion. This phenomenon has further been supported by limiting the mimicry of facial 
expressions of emotions such as by biting on a pen (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007) 
or after Botulinum Toxin injections of participants (Neal & Chartrand, 2011) which resulted in lower 
emotion recognition accuracy.  Those findings have demonstrated that changes in facial emotion 
expression are indeed linked to emotion recognition abilities. It is believed that by reducing afferent 
facial feedback from contractions of face muscles to the brain, subjective emotion perception is also 
dampened as a result (Neal & Chartrand, 2011).  
In the present experiment, participants were residents of two nations –Germany and Great 
Britain – with a high degree of shared cultural heritage. Consequently, it is expected that overall 
recognition abilities of facial as well as vocal emotion expression may not necessarily differ as a 
function of culture: Chances are high that in both nations, a happy face is indeed labelled as happy. 
However, certain subtle differences in display and decoding rules and small but important differences 
in cultural and social behaviour might still give cause for variation in emotion detection. A more 
detailed account of the assumption of typically British and German display rules which may affect 
emotion recognition are given below.  
 
4.1.1.3. Why compare Great Britain and Germany? 
Traditionally, emotion recognition has been investigated between different ethnic groups such 
as individualistic or collectivistic nations, based on very different display rules (Ekman, 1987; 
Matsumoto et al., 2008). As defined by Triandis (1990), collectivist nations such as East Asia 
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represent harmony and are taught to value the need of the group over the need of the individual. 
Individualistic western countries such as the United States of America on the other hand value 
autonomy and independency over social unity. Up to this date, it remains unclear whether emotional 
judgement differs between two similar cultures as is often the case for cultures with obvious 
differences in social and cultural behaviour. 
Germany and Great Britain form a particular interesting comparison because of their 
increasingly strong goods and service trading bond.  In 2013, Germany was UK’s largest import 
partner with 13.7% of total UK imports for 2013 and Germany was UK’s second largest export 
trading partner after the United States contributing to 9.8% of total UK exports (Office for National 
Statistics, March 2014). For Germany, the UK was the third most important export partner in 2013, 
exporting goods and services in the excess of 75bn € and in 6th place for import trade (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2014). Further, in 2012, after India, Poland, Pakistan and Republic of Ireland, Germany 
was the 5
th
 most common country of birth from oversea residents currently living in the United 
Kingdom which amounts to about 300000 UK residents (Office for National Statistics, August 2013). 
German companies provide work for about 330000 people in Great Britain (British Chamber of 
Commerce in Germany e.V., April 2014). 
From those statistics, it is apparent that Great Britain and Germany have one of the strongest 
bonds within Europe which requires a high degree of understanding of the opposite partner for 
example during business negotiations. This in turn requires the awareness of potential cultural 
differences in display rules between countries and emotion perception in face-to-face meetings as well 
as in situations where only vocal information is available, for example, during telephone 
conversations. Indeed, being able to accurately recognise facial emotions expressed by others 
increases business negotiation success: Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan and Aik (2007) demonstrated that 
during a negotiation task sellers with high personal emotion recognition abilities were more successful 
in completing business transactions than individuals with lower emotion scores.  
 
4.1.1.4. How similar are Germans and the British? 
Why should German and British participants show differences in emotion recognition? 
Hofstede (2001) has developed five cultural dimensions to compare up to 76 different countries by 
investigating differences in power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and 
pragmatism. In 2010, this has been extended to include the dimension of indulgence (Hofstede et al., 
2010). Hofstede’s data suggests that Germans scored lower on individualism than British which 
suggests more society oriented behaviour in Germans. This other-direction behaviour might result in a 
willingness to restrain their emotional expression to avoid drawing attention to oneself (Schneider, 
Hempel, & Lynch, 2013). British participants on the other hand may be less concerned about their 
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emotional expressivity and the impact it has on others, resulting in higher emotion expression and 
hence increased sensitivity to intensity perception of expressive emotions such as happiness and 
disgust.  Similarly, indulgence scores are higher for British than for German citizens, suggesting that 
British participants are more likely to be led by impulses.  
Most behavioural evidence regarding cultural variation between European countries comes 
from business and leadership studies. In 2002, Brodbeck et al. investigated desired leadership 
characteristics within 22 European countries and over 6000 participants rated common leadership 
attributes on a 7-point Likert Scale which the participants valued to be desirable for a successful 
leadership in business.  In regards to the Anglo and Germanic cluster
12
, differences in cultural values 
seemed to account for over 60% of overall variance in leadership styles.  
Within Europe, it seemed that features like being administrative and organised was highly valued in 
Germanic cultures. Further, ´integrity` which included being honest and trustworthy as well as 
‘autonomy’ was a more important perceived trait in leaders for Germanic nations than for Anglo 
countries. On the other hand, Anglo countries valued traits such as being generous and compassionate 
as high in business leaders, rating warmth and interpersonal relationships (Brodbeck et al., 2000).  
However, although Brodbeck and colleagues’ study was conducted in 2000, data stems from a large 
international study (GLOBE project, Hanges et al., 1999) with original data collected between 1995 
and 1997. Hence, some of the findings regarding personal attitudes may be outdated by now and 
reflect views of a previous generation of business managers.  
In addition to leadership studies, the second strand of research which claims to reveal 
information about cultural differences of behaviour and norms between countries is the field of 
communication and language. If communication styles vary over time and generations, one can 
assume that underlying cultural norms and attitudes change as well (Wierzbicka, 1998). For example, 
a change in the use of formal titles may indicate underlying changes in social distance. Hence, lexical 
hints within the language of a society can reveal information about cultural values within that society. 
Grieve (2009) qualitatively investigated structure and content of workplace telephone conversations 
and reported that Germans were more likely to overtly show disappointment, tell the truth and 
apologized more often compared to Australians. In addition, the German language was more direct 
than English because German speakers used more infinitives and imperatives, showed less verbal 
concern about others and believed in fixed rules. Germans demonstrated a higher degree of social 
distance by including the formal you (´Sie`) as well as the informal you (´Du`) within their vocabulary 
(House, 2006) which clarifies hierarchy between two individuals (Wouters, 2011). It has been 
attempted to explain this social distance with events in German history or as a result of strict 
educational systems which focus on education rather than on social acts (House, 2007).  
                                                     
12
 European countries can be clustered according to their cultural values or leadership styles. The anglo cluster 
contains Ireland and United Kingdom, whilst Germany, Austria and Switzerland form their own Germanic 
cluster (Brodbeck et al., 2002). 
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Overall, data from business and conversation-style studies have suggested that there may 
indeed be differences in social norms and therefore display rules between two very similar 
individualistic countries such as Germany and Great Britain. Assuming a link between one’s own 
emotional expression and emotion perception (Schneider et al., 2013), the question is whether those 
subtle differences in display rules between German and British nationals also rub off on emotion 
recognition abilities. Following previous findings presented above, the current study works on the 
assumption that Germans value a more reserved but direct style as compared to a more emotional and 
less hierarchical British style. However, it is to note that the present study did neither investigate 
actual physical differences in emotion expression between cultures nor differences in social norms.  
 
4.1.1.5 The Present Study 
The present study approached the question of universal emotion recognition from a novel 
perspective by comparing two similar, Western and individualistic countries. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the first attempt to investigate cross-cultural effects on emotion 
recognition not only within one – but also within two separate modalities such as the face and voice. 
Hence, the aim of the present study will be the investigation of emotion recognition abilities in the 
voice and face – based on intensity as well as choice reaction time data in German and British adults. 
Whilst general emotion categorisation concepts may be comparable between British and German 
people (according to the universality hypothesis), investigating differences in intensity perception will 
allow the investigation of more subtle differences in emotion recognition (according to the dialect 
hypothesis).  
Further, since most of the past research has been conducted either in the field of facial (e.g. 
Matsumoto et al., 2008) or vocal (Bryant & Barrett, 2008) emotion recognition, there is limited 
evidence regarding the interplay between emotion recognition across separate modalities and cultural 
aspects such as display rules. Extending previous research, the current project not only included facial 
but also vocal emotion recognition data in a within-subject design. Overall, possible differences 
between British and German participants could a) demonstrate whether cultural factors have equal 
influence on emotion recognition across modalities, suggesting a modality-independent vulnerability 
to cultural influences on emotion recognition and b) demonstrate that even similar countries with 
strong business and trading bonds ought to pay attention to cultural differences in emotion perception 
in order to avoid communication misunderstandings.  
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Overall, the experimental hypotheses of the present study are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Assuming general universality of basic emotion recognition across two 
individualistic countries, the current study predicts that both cultures have comparable patterns of 
emotion recognition. 
Hypothesis 2: Due to the observed differences in expected social norms between German and 
British participants in studies reported above, within the comparable patterns predicted by 
Hypothesis1, emotion intensity perception may deviate and Germans will perceive emotions as less 
intense than British participants. 
Hypothesis 3: Assuming common underlying emotion coding mechanisms across voices and 
faces as stated in Chapter 2, potential cultural differences between German and British participants 
should not only influence facial but will also affect vocal emotion processing abilities.  
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4.1.2. Methods 
4.1.2.1. Participants 
Adult participants were 45 British adults (15 male, 30 female), aged between 18 and 61, (M = 
30.8; SD = 16.81) from the adult Chapter 2 (see Chapter 2 for more details) as well as 32 German 
adults (15 male, 17 female), aged between 18 and 61 (M = 35.03, SD = 13.6). German as well as 
British participants were matched for age and non-verbal IQ which both did not differ significantly 
between groups (all p > .05). German adults were recruited via social networks and from a local 
horse-riding club.  All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal hearing and vision and 
English or German was the first language, respectively. Participants were tested in their native 
language. All material was translated by the experimenter (who is a native German speaker living in 
England) and, for verification, translated back by a native English-speaker living in Germany. A list 
of translated words is attached in Appendix A. 
In addition, all adult participants from the behavioural main study (ERS 1) as well as all adult 
participants from the larger online questionnaire study (ERS 2) completed an online or paper-version 
of the Emotional Reactivity Scale (Nock et al., 2008). Again, all participants were tested in their 
native language and the scale was translated from English into German by the experimenter (who is a 
native German speaker living in England) and, for verification, translated back by a native English-
speaker living in Germany. The German version of the ERS scale is attached in Appendix A. 
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
officer (01/03/2012 & 17/10/2012) and informed consent was filled in both by participants and 
parents prior to the study. All participants were debriefed after the study. Forms are attached in 
Appendix A. 
In addition, a separate online study was run to assess whether participants from different 
cultures actually differ in their emotional reactivity. For this, data was collected from a larger online 
sample of British and German adults (ERS 2). For the Emotional Reactivity Scale questionnaire 
(ERS, Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008), 104 British adults (15 male, 89 female), aged 18 to 
62 (M = 23.49, SD = 10.07) as well as 111 German adults (41 male, 70 female) aged 18 to 56 (M = 
26.65, SD = 7.14) completed the online questionnaire. Participants were recruited via Brunel 
University’s participation pool and through social networks. Informed consent was given online and 
debriefing was sent out via emails. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel 
University, PsyREC officer (08/11/2012). Again, all participants were tested in their native language 
and the scale was translated from English into German by the experimenter (who is a native German 
speaker living in England) and translated back by a native English-speaker living in Germany. The 
German version of the ERS scale is attached in Appendix A. 
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4.1.2.2. Stimuli  
See Chapter 2. The stimuli were chosen according to their appropriateness for the use in 
cross-cultural research. Both visual and auditory stimuli are created by white-Caucasian actors in 
order to avoid potential out-group biasing (Russell, 1994) and do not contain any verbal or language 
content.  
In addition, all adult participants from the behavioural main study (ERS 1) as well as all adult 
participants from the larger online questionnaire study (ERS 2) completed an online or paper-version 
of the Emotional Reactivity Scale (Nock et al., 2008). The ERS score is based on a 21-item self-
reported questionnaire on a 5-point Likert scale and measures subjective experience of emotions such 
as intensity or persistence in response to emotional situations. The ERS questionnaire includes items 
such as ‘When I experience emotions, I feel them very strongly/intensely’ and shows internal 
consistency of .94 (Nock et al., 2008). For a copy, see Appendix A. 
4.1.2.3. Procedure 
See Chapter 2. 
4.1.2.4. Statistical Analysis 
For the main analysis of intensity ratings and reaction times, a mixed measures ANOVA was 
conducted for matching target emotions. Between-subject variables were country (Great Britain or 
Germany) and gender of participants (male or female). The within-subject variables were modality 
(face or voice) and emotion category (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise or disgust). For the current 
analysis, gender of stimuli was not included in order to limit a loss of power due to multiple 
comparisons. 
For the Emotional Reactivity Scale online questionnaire, independent t-tests were conducted 
with country (Germany or Great Britain) as between-subject variable and a continuous ERS score 
(sum of all answers) as within-subject variable. 
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4.1.3. Results  
This section will present results from the current cross-cultural chapter which includes results 
from the Emotional Reactivity Scale (ERS 1 & 2), intensity ratings as well as choice reaction times. 
For M and SE see Table 4.1. To ensure that British and German adults were matched for age and non-
verbal IQ scores, two independent t-tests were performed. The tests were not significant for either 
variables which suggests that both groups had comparable age and non-verbal IQ scores (p > .05).  
a) Emotional Reactivity Scale (ERS 1 & 2) 
ERS 1: To control whether both cultures significantly differed in the degree of emotional 
reactivity and sensitivity to emotional events, participants completed the 21-item Emotional 
Reactivity Scale Questionnaire (Nock et al., 2008). An independent t-test revealed no significant 
difference in emotional reactivity scores between German (M = 27.41, SD = 9.61) and British (M = 
25.56, SD = 16.15) participants [t(65) = -.37, p > .05]. However, only 22 Germans and 48 English 
adults completed the ERS which suggests an unequal and relative small sample size. 
ERS 2: In order to investigate how representative the above result was, a larger-scale online 
survey with British (N = 104) and German (N = 111) adults was conducted. Due to a technical error, 
only answers for 17 out of 21 question items were recorded; however, internal consistency was 
measured by Cronbach alpha and was still very high, with .93 for the British sample and .85 for the 
German sample. With a score calculated from 17 answers, an independent t-test revealed no 
significant difference between British (M = 24.78, SD = 13.54) and German (M = 26.05, SD = 10.42) 
scores for emotional reactivity. Hence, there were no significant difference in the way participants 
perceived their own emotional reactivity across Germany and England.  
b) Intensity Ratings  
The following Table 4.1 displays Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings for British and 
German adults.  
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Table 4.1 
Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for intensity ratings for modality and emotions for British and German adult participants 
  Mean Intensity (SE) 
  British German  
Female Male All Female Male All Total 
N = 30 
M = 26.72 
(15.82) 
N = 15 
M = 35.53 
(16.67) 
N = 45 
M = 30.47 
(16.81) 
N = 17 
M = 34.78 
(13.67) 
N = 15 
M = 35.33 
(13.98) 
N = 32 
M = 35.03 
(13.60) 
N = 77 
M = 32.58 
(15.62) 
Face Happy 6.54 (.10) 6.62 (.14) 6.58 (.08) 6.17 (.19) 6.30 (.20) 6.23 (.14) 6.39 (.09) 
 Sad 5.35 (.19) 5.54 (.28) 5.34 (.16) 5.65 (.27) 4.97 (.29) 5.31 (.20) 5.32 (.13) 
 Angry 5.41 (.17) 4.79 (.25) 5.10 (.15) 6.13 (.19) 5.48 (.21) 5.80 (.14) 5.48 (.10) 
 Fear 5.87 (.18) 5.44 (.26) 5.66 (.16) 5.65 (.28) 5.17 (.30) 5.41 (.20) 5.53 (.14) 
 Surprise 6.40 (.12) 6.31 (.17) 6.35 (.10) 6.32 (.17) 6.10 (.18) 6.21 (.12) 6.27 (.08) 
 Disgust 5.82 (.19) 5.13 (.28) 5.47 (.16) 4.68 (.27) 4.35 (.30) 4.52 (.20) 5.00 (.14) 
 All  5.90 (.10) 5.60 (.15) 5.75 (.09) 5.77 (.15) 5.39 (.12) 5.58 (.11) 5.66 (.07) 
Voice Happy 6.12 (.16) 6.16 (.23) 6.14 (.13) 5.74 (.23) 5.40 (.26) 5.57 (.17) 5.84 (.12) 
 Sad 6.23 (.15) 5.85 (.22) 6.04 (.13) 6.54 (.21) 5.65 (.23) 6.10 (.16) 6.04 (.11) 
 Angry 5.07 (.20) 4.52 (.29) 4.81 (.17) 4.81 (.23) 4.32 (.25) 4.56 (.17) 4.70 (.11) 
 Fear 5.22 (.21) 5.10 (.30) 5.16 (.18) 4.60 (.28) 4.15 (.31) 4.37 (.21) 4.75 (.14) 
 Surprise 5.27 (.20) 5.14 (.29) 5.21 (.17) 5.18 (.26) 4.68 (.28) 4.93 (.19) 5.06 (.13) 
 Disgust 5.55 (.17) 5.58 (.25) 5.56 (.15) 6.17 (.23) 5.28 (.25) 5.73 (.17) 5.65 (.12) 
 All  5.58 (.11) 5.40 (.16) 5.49 (.10) 5.51 (.16) 4.91 (.18) 5.21 (.12) 5.34 (.08) 
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Note. * = Mean Age in years. ** = Average scores across all participants and conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  British  German   
  Female Male All Female Male All Total 
Overall  Happy 6.33 (.10) 6.39 (.14) 6.36 (.08) 5.95 (.17) 5.85 (.19) 5.90 (.13) 6.11 (.09) 
 Sad 5.79 (.13) 5.59 (.19) 5.69 (.11) 6.1 (.2) 5.31 (.22) 5.70 (.15) 5.68 (.10) 
 Angry 5.24 (.15) 4.67 (.22) 4.95 (.13) 5.47 (.17) 4.90 (.19) 5.18 (.13) 5.09 (.09) 
 Fear 5.55 (.17) 5.27 (.25) 5.41 (.15) 5.13 (.25) 4.66 (.27) 4.89 (.18) 5.14 (.12) 
 Surprise 5.84 (.12) 5.72 (.18) 5.78 (.11) 5.75 (.17) 5.39 (.18) 5.57 (.13) 5.67 (.08) 
 Disgust 5.68 (.15) 5.35 (.21) 5.52 (.12) 5.42 (.02) 4.82 (.22) 5.12 (.15) 5.32 (.10) 
Grand Means   5.74 (.09) 5.50 (.13)     5.62 (.08)     5.64 (.14) 5.15 (.15) 5.40 (.10) 5.50 (.07) 
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Results from intensity ratings across all German and British adults suggested that emotional 
intensity perception did not differ between countries in general but rather depended on specific 
emotions and modality. A mixed-measures ANOVA of modality (2) x emotion (6) x country (2) x 
gender of participants (2) revealed a significant main effect for modality, F(1, 73) = 23.49, p < .001, 
2 = .24, gender, F(1, 73) = 9.52, p = .003, 2 = .12 and for emotion, F(4.76, 347.46) = 26.94, p < 
.001, 2 = .27. Faces were rated with higher intensity than voices and female participants associated 
stimuli with higher intensity ratings than male participants. Sidak post-hoc test for multiple 
comparisons revealed that participants rated happiness with highest intensity ratings which was higher 
than for all other emotions, then followed by sadness and surprise and fear which did not differ from 
each other. Anger received lowest overall intensity ratings; however ratings were not significantly 
different to fear and disgust, all at p < .001 (for M and SE see Table 4.1). There was no significant 
main effect for country (p > .05).  
There was also a significant interaction effect between (i) country and emotion, F(5, 365) = 
3.39, p = .005, 2 = .04 and between (ii) modality and emotion, F(4.62, 336.98) = 41.29, p <.001, 2 = 
.36. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied in order to further investigate the 
interactions. 
i: Although there was no overall main effect for country, for happy, fearful and disgusted 
stimuli, British participants rated emotions with higher intensity than German participants. In 
addition, the same pattern of happiness superiority was visible in both countries. In Great Britain, 
happiness was rated higher than all other emotions and anger received lowest ratings. For Germany, 
happiness was rated highest which did not differ significantly from sadness and fear received lowest 
intensity ratings which was not significantly different from anger and disgust (p > .05). This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings. Significant interaction effect between country and 
emotion, *p < .05. N = 77. 
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ii: There was a significant modality effect visible for all emotions. However, higher ratings 
for faces as compared to voices were only true for stimuli displaying happiness, anger, fear and 
surprise. For sadness and disgust, the opposite was true and voices received higher intensity ratings 
than faces, p < .05. In addition, for faces, happiness received highest ratings which did not differ 
significantly from surprise, followed by fear, anger and sadness. Disgusted faces received lowest 
intensity ratings which were lower than all other emotions displayed in the face. For the voice on the 
other hand, sadness received highest ratings which was not significantly different from happiness. 
This was followed by ratings for disgust which did not differ from happiness ratings, followed by fear 
and anger. Interestingly, surprised voices received lowest intensity ratings which was the opposite 
pattern compared to surprised faces.  
There was also a significant three-way interaction between country, modality and emotion 
[F(5, 365) = 7.62, p < .001, 2 = .09]. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied in 
order to further investigate the three-way interaction. Although no overall country effect, both cultures 
differed in their intensity perception for happy, angry, fearful and disgusted stimuli – depending on 
the modality. British participants rated happy and fearful voices as well as disgusted faces as more 
intense than Germans. Germans on the other hand, perceived angry faces as more intense than British 
participants, p < .05. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings. Significant three-way interaction between country, 
modality and emotion, *p < .05. N = 77. 
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Further, for happy, fear and surprise, both countries rated faces with higher intensity than 
voices, and the opposite for sadness: voices with higher intensity than faces. Interestingly, the nations 
differed in their ratings for anger and disgust as only Germans demonstrated a modality effect with 
higher intensity perception for angry faces over angry voices and disgusted voices over disgusted 
faces. British judges rated voices and faces with similar intensity for the emotions of anger and 
disgust.     
The following Table 4.2 summarises mean reaction times (RTs) and Standard Errors (SE) for 
adults across Germany and Great Britain. 
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Table 4.2 
Means and Standard Errors for reaction times for modality and emotions for British and German adult participants 
  Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
  British German  
Female Male All Female Male All Total 
N = 30 
M = 26.72 
(15.82) 
N = 15 
M = 35.53 
(16.67) 
N = 45 
M = 30.47 
(16.81) 
N = 17 
M = 34.78 
(13.67) 
N = 15 
M = 35.33 
(13.98) 
N = 32 
M = 35.03 
(13.60) 
N = 77 
M = 32.58 
(15.62) 
Face Happy 3.31 (.13) 3.63 (.19) 3.47 (.11) 4.16 (.32) 3.62 (.35) 3.89 (.24) 3.70  (.16) 
 Sad 4.28 (.22) 4.29 (.32) 4.28 (.19) 4.52 (.36) 4.54 (.38) 4.53 (.26) 4.44 (.17) 
 Angry 3.76 (.21) 4.34 (.30) 4.05 (.18) 3.69 (.30) 3.96 (.32) 3.82 (.22) 3.93 (.15) 
 Fear 4.04 (.25) 4.47 (.36) 4.25 (.21) 4.90 (.38) 4.47 (.41) 4.69 (.28) 4.47 (.19) 
 Surprise 3.33 (.24) 4.63 (.34) 3.98 (.20) 3.38 (.29) 3.43 (.30) 3.40 (.21) 3.71 (.14) 
 Disgust 3.57 (.28) 5.04 (.41) 4.31 (.24) 4.15 (.35) 3.74 (.37) 3.94 (.25) 4.13 (.17) 
 All  3.82 (.09) 4.40 (.23) 4.06 (.13) 4.13 (.25) 3.96 (.26) 4.05 (.12) 4.06 (.12) 
Voice Happy 3.66 (.15) 4.39 (.22) 4.03 (.13) 4.48 (.67) 6.70 (.71) 5.59 (.49) 4.82 (.33) 
 Sad 4.16 (.16) 4.53 (.23) 4.35 (.14) 4.55 (.23) 4.70 (.25) 4.62 (.17) 4.51 (.11) 
 Angry 4.02 (.18) 4.38 (.26) 4.20 (.15) 4.53 (.24) 4.77 (.26) 4.65 (.18) 4.42 (.12) 
 Fear 3.80 (.17) 4.24 (.25) 4.02 (.15) 4.43 (.27) 4.99 (.28) 4.71 (.20) 4.37 (.13) 
 Surprise 3.45 (.11) 3.49 (.16) 3.41 (.10) 4.44 (.34) 4.23 (.36) 4.34 (.25) 3.91 (.17) 
 Disgust 3.82 (.13) 4.33 (.19) 4.08 (.11) 4.19 (.21) 4.26 (.22) 4.22 (.15) 4.13 (.10) 
 All  3.82 (.09) 4.23 (.13) 4.02 (.08) 4.44 (.18) 4.94 (.19) 4.69 (.13) 4.36 (.09) 
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Note. * = Mean Age in years. ** = Average scores across all participants and conditions. 
   British   German   
  Female Male All Female Male All Total 
Overall  Happy 3.48 (.11) 4.01 (.16) 3.75 (.10) 4.32 (.37) 5.16 (.39) 4.74 (.27) 4.26 (.18) 
 Sad 4.22 (.14) 4.41 (.21) 4.32 (.12) 4.53 (.23) 4.62 (.25) 4.58 (.17) 4.47 (.12) 
 Angry 3.89 (.16) 4.36 (.23) 4.12 (.14) 4.11 (.21) 4.36 (.23) 4.24 (.16) 4.18 (.10) 
 Fear 3.92 (.16) 4.36 (.23) 4.14 (.14) 4.67 (.24) 4.73 (.26) 4.70 (.18) 4.42 (.12) 
 Surprise 3.39 (.13) 4.06 (.19) 3.72 (.11) 3.91 (.24) 3.83 (.25) 3.87 (.17) 3.81 (.12) 
 Disgust 3.70 (.15) 4.68 (.22) 4.19 (.13) 4.17 (.22) 3.99 (.24) 4.08 (.16) 4.13 (.11) 
Grand Means   3.77 (.10) 4.31 (.15)     4.04 (.09)       4.28 (.17) 4.05 (.18) 4.37 (.13) 4.21 (.09) 
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c) Choice RTs 
Speed of making decisions about judgements for emotional stimuli depended on the 
interaction of modality, specific emotions and culture. A mixed measures ANOVA with modality (2) 
x emotion (6)  x country (2) x gender of participants (2) revealed a significant main effect for 
modality, F(1, 72) = 5.85, p = .02, 2 
 
= .08, for emotion, F(3.54, 530.95) = 5.48 p < .001, 2  = .07, 
and for gender, F(1, 72) = 6.37, p = .01, 2 = .08.  
Post hoc comparisons revealed that across all participants, decisions were made faster for 
faces as compared to voices and male participants (M = 4.43 , SE = .13) took longer to categorise 
emotions than female participants (M = 4, SE = .11). For emotion category, surprised stimuli were 
rated fastest which did not differ significantly from happy stimuli. Happy in turn was not significantly 
different to all other emotions displayed. Sadness and fear were rated slowest, all at p < .05.  
There was no significant main effect for country, indicating that Germans and British participants 
took equally long to rate emotional stimuli. For M and SE see Table 4.2. 
There was also a significant interaction effect between (i) modality and country, F(1, 72) = 
7.72, p = .01, 2  = .1, between (ii) emotion and country, F(5, 360) = 3.51, p = .004,  2 
 
= .05, and 
between (iii) modality and emotion, F(3.24, 232.98) = 4.45, p = .991, 2 = .06. Post hoc Sidak 
comparisons were applied to investigate the interactions in more detail.  
 
i: Although there was no overall main effect for country, the significant interaction between 
country and modality suggested that for voices, British participants were faster than German 
participants. For faces, both countries showed similar speed for rating stimuli. In addition, the 
significant main effect of modality with faster ratings for faces as compared to voices was only true 
for the German sample. For the British sample, voices and faces were rated with similar speed. These 
results are illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Means and Standard Errors for significant interaction effect, *p < .05. N = 77. 
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ii: Again, although there was no overall main effect for country, results indicated that for 
happiness and fear, British participants categorised emotion stimuli faster than the German sample. 
For sadness, anger, surprise and disgust, countries did not differ in their speed for rating emotions. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Means and Standard Errors for significant interaction effect between country and emotion category of stimuli. *p 
< .05, N = 77. 
 
iii: Although there was a significant main effect for modality, this depended on the emotion 
displayed and was only true for happiness and anger. Across all participants, happy and angry faces 
were rated with faster speed than their vocal counterparts. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between (i) country, modality and gender, 
F(1,72) = 5.43, p = .02, 2  = .07, and between (ii) modality, emotion and gender, F(5, 360) = 3.68, p 
= .003, 2  = .05. Post hoc Sidak for multiple comparisons gives a more detailed insight into those 
interactions. 
i: The interaction of decision making speed between country, modality and gender of 
participants suggested that there was a country effect in voices which was true for both male and 
female participants. Both gender had faster reaction times for rating voices when they belonged to the 
British as compared to the German sample although women outperformed men in both countries. For 
faces, there was no significant country effect and this was true for male as well as female participants, 
suggesting that German and British nationals rated faces with similar speed - independent of gender.  
In addition, for British participants, neither men nor women demonstrated a significant modality 
effect, suggesting that for Britain, gender did not affect rating speed of modality. Germans on the 
other side demonstrated a significant difference for modality with faces being rated faster than voices.  
However, this was only true for German men as German women rated voices and faces with similar 
speed. For faces, German men and women demonstrated same speed but whilst women were equally 
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
happy sad anger fear surprise disgust
R
T
s 
(s
) 
Great
Britain
Germany
 144 
 
fast in rating voices, men’s speed decreased significantly when rating voices (these results are 
illustrated in Figure 4.5). 
                   
                                                   
 
 
Figure 4.5. Means and Standard Errors for significant three-way interaction between country, modality and gender, p < .05. 
N = 77. 
 
iii: Although results suggest an overall main effect for gender as well as for modality and 
emotion, those three factors interacted with each other. Whilst men generally were slower in making 
decisions about emotion categorisation, in faces, this was only true for surprise. In the voice 
condition, this was only significant for happy and fearful voices. For all other emotions across 
modalities, rating speed did not differ as a function of gender. Further, the significant modality effect 
in happy and angry stimuli also was dependent on the gender of participants. Men took longer to rate 
happiness if it was displayed in voices as compared to faces whilst women took longer to rate anger - 
and additionally surprise - if it was displayed in voices as compared to faces. For happiness, sadness, 
fear and disgust, women had equally fast decision times across modalities and for sadness, anger, fear, 
surprise and disgust, men also showed equal rating speed across modalities. 
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4.1.4. Discussion Experiment 4-I 
The purpose of the present experiment was to investigate the contribution of culture on 
emotion recognition in British and German adults. Whilst Chapter 2 and 3 have found behavioural 
support for emotion processing which was comparable across voices and faces and which continued 
to develop with age, Experiment 4-I from this Chapter 4 investigated cross-modal emotion 
recognition within a cultural context across two similar Western nations. Overall, current findings 
support Hypothesis 1 of universality of emotion recognition because there was no significant main 
difference in rating speed as well as intensity perception between German and British adults. There 
were, however, subtle differences in intensity perception within the adult sample: some emotions were 
rated as more intense by the British compared to the German sample which was in accordance with 
Hypothesis 2. Accordingly to Hypothesis 3, in terms of intensity ratings, both modalities seem to be 
equally affected by culture whilst for reaction times, the culture effect was only seen in voices. 
4.1.4.1. Do German and British adults recognise emotions in similar manner? 
The present Experiment 4-I did not report a significant main effect of culture for either 
measures of choice reaction times or intensity ratings during emotion recognition, suggesting that in 
general, emotion recognition was comparable between British and German adults. This present 
finding is, however, expected and in accordance with Hypothesis 1 of the current study as it supports 
the theory of universal emotion recognition across cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Since Germany 
and Great Britain are both individualistic countries in North-Western Europe, it is probable that 
overall emotion recognition does not vary as a function of cultural differences in the present sample 
due to political, social and geographical proximity.  
However, it is of considerable interest whether there are some more subtle differences in 
emotion recognition between two comparable cultures as suggested by the Dialect Theory (Elfenbein 
& Ambady, 2002). As hypothesised, data from the present study indeed suggests a relationship 
between emotion recognition and culture as evident in variation in emotion intensity perception, 
depending on the specific emotion or modality displayed. For happiness, fear and disgust, British 
participants perceived the displayed emotion as more intense than their German counterparts. British 
participants also took less time than Germans to rate happiness and fear, whilst the other emotions did 
not differ in processing speed as a function of culture and suggest culture-independent emotion 
processing. This did not depend on the modality of the presented emotion. In addition, participants 
from both countries rated happiness with highest and anger with lowest intensity ratings which 
suggests a similar emotion rating pattern independent of culture. This pattern also replicates findings 
from Chapter 2.  
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4.1.4.2. Are display rules really the source of cultural emotion recognition differences? 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no existing questionnaire that measures 
emotional processing abilities as a function of differences in underlying display rules. In an attempt to 
investigate whether participants actually differed in their emotional temperament and emotion 
regulation across two cultures, the Emotional Reactivity Scale (ERS, Nock et al., 2008) was used to 
investigate this exact issue. However, in neither the participants from the main ERS 1 study (N = 77) 
nor from a larger online sample ERS 2 (N = 215) did the present study find significant differences 
based on culture, suggesting that participants experienced emotional everyday situations on a similar 
emotional level. Assuming that display rules can indeed affect emotion expression (Matsumoto et al., 
2008) and in turn emotion recognition (Schneider et al., 2013), the present finding may indicate that 
there were no major differences in underlying cultural norms that significantly influence emotional 
experience between German and British participants in accordance with the universality hypothesis 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971). It is possible that the ERS is not sensitive enough to measure subtle 
differences in display rules such as emotional reactivity as suggested by the present finding of 
differences in emotional rating patterns of certain emotions between German and British participants. 
Alternatively, however, it is possible that the ERS may not be an adequate test for capturing 
differences in emotion recognition based on underlying display rules. Self-reported emotional 
reactivity may not be a reliable indicator of differences in underlying display rules which have an 
effect on emotion expression and perception. In summary, the present findings of the ERS could not 
explain the subtle variation of emotion recognition across two countries that were found in the main 
analysis of emotion recognition across cultures. 
 
4.1.4.3. Cultural differences: what’s the role of modality on emotion recognition? 
Assuming the German appreciation of reservedness and emotional restrained as suggested by 
leadership (Brodbeck, 2000) and communication studies (Wouters, 2011), it is possible that the link 
between masking emotion expressions and decreased emotion perception skills may not only apply to 
the facial domain as suggested by Schneider et al. (2013) but also the vocal domain. Indeed, for 
intensity ratings, in accordance with Hypothesis 3, the present results suggested that both modalities 
may be prone to culture effects: Emotions displayed in faces as well as in voices were rated with 
varying intensities depending on the culture of participants. However, this pattern depended on 
specific emotions displayed and different emotions were affected in different modalities whilst the 
direction of the country effect also varied. For voices, happiness and fear received higher ratings by 
British than by German participants.  
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In the visual domain, disgust was also rated higher by British than by Germans. Interestingly, the 
opposite pattern was true for anger which received higher ratings from German compared to British 
adults. This indicates a particular German sensitivity to anger expressed in faces which is contrary to 
the expectation of reduced emotion intensity perception in the German sample. For the remaining 
emotions in both modalities, there was no variation in emotion recognition across two cultures.  
For rating speed of categorising the perceived emotions, however, modality played a 
significant role between both participating countries. The current data demonstrated that there was a 
culture-effect on rating speed for voices. However, contrary to Hypothesis 3, this was not true for 
faces, suggesting that culture does not affect emotion recognition speed equally across separate 
modalities. Influence of culture and display rules may depend on the mode of presentation and voices 
may be more vulnerable to cultural variation whilst rating speed for faces seemed to be constant 
across countries.  
 
4.1.4.4. Modality similarities: What’s the role of culture and gender on emotion recognition? 
Germany and Great Britain showed different patterns of modality reliance: Germans were 
faster in rating faces and particularly slow at rating emotional voices whilst British participants 
showed no significant overall modality effect for rating speed as already demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
Interestingly, a meta-analysis by Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) also suggested enhanced emotional 
face over voice processing across cultures, supporting present data for the German sample. In 
addition, the modality effect within the German sample was only true for male participants whilst all 
other participants (that is British men and women as well as German women) demonstrated modality-
independent emotion processing speed. In fact, German men seemed to be particularly poor at 
recognising emotions expressed in the voices which probably drove the significant modality effect 
within the German sample. Hence, the similarity in processing speed across two modalities may to 
some degree not only depend upon culture but also on gender of participants.   
In terms of intensity perception, the current data replicated modality effects for happiness, 
sadness, fear and surprise across both countries. This suggests a similarity in the pattern of emotion 
intensity perception across two modalities for two countries in parallel. However, German adults also 
showed additional modality effects for anger and disgust so there were significant modality effects for 
all six emotions in the German sample. Overall, for speed, the degree of modality similarity varied 
depending on the culture and participants’ gender whilst intensity perception of both modalities 
seemed to be comparable across German and British participants. 
Across all British and German participants, females perceived emotions as more intense and 
also categorised emotions faster than their male counterparts.  
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Interestingly, whilst emotion recognition in general seemed to be inferior when communicated by 
voices as compared to faces, this effect was enhanced for men when the voice expressed ‘happiness’ 
and for women when the voice expressed ‘anger’. Often, in face expression studies, ‘happiness’ is 
associated with a female face and ‘anger’ associated with a male face (Hess, Adams Jr, Grammar, & 
Kleck, 2009).  For the present auditory data, the vulnerability of recognising emotions within the 
voice also seems to be increased by rating gender-stereotypical emotions which were opposite to the 
gender of the judge. This indicated that male participants are poor at identifying the ‘female’ 
expression of happiness in the voice and female participants are poor at identifying ‘male’ expression 
of anger in the voice, possibly lending support to Hess et al.’s (2009) finding from face expression 
data.  
 
4.1.4.5 Conclusion 
As summarized above, adult data from Experiment 4-I suggested that whilst there were 
universal patterns of emotion recognition across German and British participants such as happiness 
superiority in both countries, there was also evidence for subtle differences in intensity perception. 
British participants tended to perceive some emotions with higher intensities than German 
participants. In order to investigate how these cultural differences affect emotion recognition in 
childhood, the following Experiment 4-II will investigate British and German children’s abilities to 
recognise emotion from faces and voices. 
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4.2. Experiment 4-II 
Children’s’ Emotion Recognition Across Cultures and Modalities 
 
Following results from the adult Experiment 4-I, the interesting question emerges how those 
cultural differences in emotion recognition are being transferred across generations and how children 
learn to apply cultural norms in emotion understanding via socialization processes. For example, 
differences in primary school entry age (Eurydice National Foundation for Educational Research, 
2013) between British and German children as well as in social norms discussed in Experiment 4-I 
show the importance of investing more into comparative research between similar North-western 
European countries. 
As results from the child Chapter 3 indicated, emotion recognition in faces as well as in 
voices develop over the course of childhood in accordance with previous studies (e.g. De Sonneville, 
Verschoor, Njiokiktjien, Op het Veld, Toorenaar, & Vranken, 2002). However, little research has 
been conducted regarding cultural influences on emotion processing development in children – 
especially across more than one modality. McCluskey and Alba (1981) suggested that vocal emotion 
recognition abilities also increased with age in Mexican as well as Canadian subjects. Further, they 
also noted that Mexican children perceived emotions in speech more intensely than Canadian children 
did. In 1996, Markham and Wang investigated developmental differences in facial emotion 
processing between Chinese and Australian children aged 4 to 8 and also reported increased accuracy 
depending on age. However, they also suggested that children across both cultures differed in their 
emotion perception with Chinese children recognising facial emotions more accurately than 
Australian children. According to the Dialect Theory (Elfenbein, 2013; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003), 
display rules, which encourage or discourage the expression of specific emotions within one culture, 
may be established early in life (McCluskey & Albas, 1981) due to parental socialisation. 
What are the mechanisms behind cultural differences in emotion recognition not only in 
adults but also within children? Halberstadt and Lozada (2011) reviewed how culture impacts parents’ 
socialization processes of infants’ emotional development. They stated that cultural factors such as 
power distance within a family, the way a child learns, collectivistic versus individualistic values 
within a family and the value of emotional expression between family members all influences 
children’s socialization processes and in turn their emotional development. The way children grow up 
within a family setting will influence future interpretations of emotional events and factors such as 
parent’s beliefs or parent’s own social behaviour affects children’s emotion recognition skills (Castro, 
Halberstadt, Lozada, & Craig, 2014).   
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Hence, family expressiveness may be a product of affective display rules which in turn influences 
children’s emotion understanding. It is believed that emotional expressiveness in infants as young as 
three months old is related to the mother’s emotional behaviour which suggests very early 
socialisation of emotions (Malatesta & Haviland, 1982).  
Further, the understanding of display rules and emotion regulation seems to increase with age 
throughout primary school (Jones, Abbey, & Cumberland, 1998) in line with general cognitive 
development. Lastly, apart from parenting style, media may also be driven by cultural norms and vice 
versa: American children books included more powerful and negative emotions like anger in their 
stories compared to Turkish or Romanian children books (Wege, Gonzales, Friedlmeier, Mihalca, 
Goodrich, & Corapci, 2014), confronting children with cultural emotion expectations from an early 
age onwards. 
 
4.2.1.1. The Present Study 
 
Following the above evidence, it seems that culture plays a role in children’s emotion 
development, although, again, most studies concerning emotional development in varying cultures are 
based on significant differences in display rules between two very different countries (e.g. Markham 
& Wang, 1996). No previous study has investigated the difference in children’s emotion perception 
across two similar cultures such as Germany and Great Britain. Hence, the aim here is to fill this gap 
by providing a cross-cultural comparison of emotion recognition development across German and 
British children aged 5 to 10. It is predicted that due to socialisation processes, German and British 
children will also exhibit subtle differences in emotion perception across modalities that correspond to 
the equivalent adult sample (Hypothesis 1). 
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4.2.2. Method 
4.2.2.1. Participants 
Child participants were 54 British children (23 male, 31 female), aged 5 to 10 (M = 7.52, SD 
= 1.72) from the child Chapter 3 (see Chapter 3 for more details) as well as 44 German children (15 
male, 29 female), aged 5 to 10 (M = 7.36, SD = 1.63). Since there were 98 children all together, 
children were divided into three age groups: one younger group including children aged 5 and 6, one 
older age group including children aged 7 and 8 and one oldest child group with children aged 9 and 
10. This included 32 children in age-group 1 (12 male, 20 female, M age = 5.47, SD = .51), 37 
children in age-group 2 (16 male, 21 female, M age = 7.59, SD = .6) and 29 children in age-group 3 
(10 male, 19 female, M age = 9.45, SD = .57). All three age groups were matched for age and non-
verbal IQ between both countries resulting in non-significant differences between German and British 
children for any of the three age groups (p > .05). German children were recruited from two local 
primary schools and one local nursery. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
hearing and vision and English was the first language. 
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
officer (17/10/2012) and informed consent as well as a child-friendly version of the consent form was 
filled in both by participants and parents prior to the study. All participants were debriefed after the 
study. Forms are detached in Appendix B. 
4.2.2.2. Stimuli  
See Chapter 3. It is important to note that children completed 2 (actors) x 6 (face expressions) 
x 6 (voice expressions) trials per modality to avoid loss of concentration, while adults completed 4 
(actors) x 6 (face expressions) x 6 (voice expressions) trials per modality 
4.2.2.3. Procedure 
See Chapter 3. 
4.2.2.4. Statistical Analysis 
For children, between-subject variables were country (Great Britain or Germany) and age-
group of participants (age-group 1, age-group 2 or age-group 3). The within-subject variables were 
modality (face or voice) and emotion category (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise or disgust). For the 
current analysis, neither the variable of gender of participants nor gender of stimuli were included in 
order to limit a loss of power due to multiple comparisons. 
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4.2.3. Results  
 
The following Table 4.3 displays Means and Standard Errors for measure of intensity and choice reaction times for British and German children. 
Table 4.3 
Means and Standard Errors for intensity ratings and reaction times for modality and emotions for British and German child participants 
 Emotion Mean Intensity (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
 British Children German Children All Children British Children German Children All Children 
 N = 54 
M* = 7.52 (1.70) 
N = 44 
M = 7.36 (1.63) 
N = 98 
M = 7.45 (1.68) 
N = 54 
M = 5.96 (0.51) 
N = 44 
M = 18.6 (1.12) 
N = 98 
M = 18.6 (1.12) 
Face Happy 6.14 (.18) 6.02 (.20) 6.08 (.13) 4.63 (.24) 4.82 (.27) 4.72 (.18) 
 Sad 5.70 (.22) 5.13 (.25) 5.42 (.17) 5.03 (.19) 5.33 (.22) 5.18 (.15) 
 Angry 4.98 (.21) 5.24 (.23) 5.11 (.16) 4.59 (.21) 5.16 (.23) 4.87 (.16) 
 Fear 5.07 (.26) 4.66 (.29) 4.86 (.19) 4.49 (.21) 5.75 (.24) 5.12 (.16) 
 Surprise 5.78 (.22) 4.41 (.25) 5.09 (.17) 4.17 (.20) 5.48 (.22) 4.83 (.15) 
 Disgust 4.29 (.26) 4.72 (.29) 4.50 (.20) 4.69 (.22) 5.72 (.25) 5.21 (.17) 
 All  5.33 (.11) 5.03 (.13) 5.18 (.09) 4.60 (.13) 5.53 (.16) 4.99 (.09) 
Voice Happy 5.61 (.22) 5.55 (.25) 5.57 (.17) 5.09 (.21) 5.66 (.24) 5.38 (.16) 
 Sad 5.26 (.22) 5.33 (.24) 5.30 (.16) 6.15 (.26) 6.25 (.29) 6.20 (.20) 
 Angry 3.43 (.23) 3.65 (.25) 3.54 (.17) 5.44 (.26) 6.05 (.29) 5.75 (.19) 
 Fear 4.84 (.26) 4.79 (.29) 4.81 (.20) 5.63 (.26) 6.10 (.29) 5.86 (.20) 
 Surprise 4.65 (.24) 3.88 (.27) 4.27 (.18) 5.01 (.21) 5.57 (.24) 5.29 (.16) 
 Disgust 4.66 (.27) 4.95 (.30) 4.81 (.20) 5.87 (.27) 6.34 (.30) 6.11 (.20) 
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  Mean Intensity (SE) Mean Choice RTs (SE) 
British Children German Children All Children British Children German Children All Children 
All  4.74 (.13) 4.69 (.22) 4.72 (.09) 5.38 (.14) 6.00 (.18) 5.76 (.12) 
Overall  Happy 5.87 (.16) 5.78 (.18) 5.83 (.12) 4.86 (.17) 5.24 (.19) 5.05 (.13) 
 Sad 5.38 (.18) 5.23 (.20) 5.36 (.13) 5.59 (.18) 5.79 (.20) 5.69 (.14) 
 Angry 4.20 (.18) 4.44 (.20) 4.32 (.13) 5.02 (.20) 5.60 (.22) 5.31 (.15) 
 Fear 4.95 (.20) 4.72 (.23) 4.84 (.15) 5.06 (.18) 5.92 (.20) 5.49 (.14) 
 Surprise 5.22 (.19) 4.15 (.21) 4.68 (.14) 4.59 (.16) 5.52 (.18) 5.06 (.12) 
 Disgust 4.48 (.19) 4.83 (.21) 4.65 (.14) 5.28 (.19) 6.03 (.22) 5.66 (.15) 
Grand Mean**   5.03 (.11) 4.86 (.12) 4.95 (.08) 5.07 (.13) 5.69 (.14) 5.38 (.10) 
Note. * = Mean Age in years. ** = Average scores across all participants and conditions. 
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a) Intensity Ratings  
Results from intensity ratings from all children across Germany and Great Britain suggest that 
emotional intensity perception depended on a combination of emotions and modalities presented as 
well as the age-group and culture of participants. A mixed measure ANOVA with modality (2) x 
emotion (6) x country (2) x age-group (3) suggested a significant main effect for modality, F(1, 92) = 
33.82, p < .001, 2  = .27, for emotion, F(5, 460) = 20.34, p < .001, 2 = .18, and for age-group, F(2, 
92) = 3.81, p = .03, 2  = .08. Faces were rated with higher intensity than voices and Sidak post-hoc 
test for multiple comparisons revealed that children associated happiness with highest intensity ratings 
which was higher than for all other emotions, then sadness, which was significantly different from all 
other emotions, and followed by fear, surprise and disgust. Anger received lowest intensity ratings 
which were significantly lower than for all other emotions, all at p < .05. Further, the middle age 
group with children aged 7 and 8 rated emotional stimuli with lowest intensity whilst the youngest (5 
and 6-year old) and the oldest child group (9 and 10-year old) did not differ from each other in their 
intensity perception. For M and SE see Table 4.3. 
There was no significant main effect for country of participants, p < .05 
There was, however, a significant interaction effect between intensity ratings for (i) country 
and emotion, F(5, 460) = 4.34, p = .001, 2 =  .18, and between (ii) modality and emotion, F(5, 460) = 
9.12, p < .001, 2 = .09. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied in order to further 
investigate the interactions. 
i: Although there was no overall main effect for country, there was one exception and for 
surprise stimuli, British children perceived them with higher intensity than German children. For all 
other emotions, ratings did not significantly vary as a function of culture. Further, for both countries, 
happiness and sadness received highest ratings. For British, disgust and anger received lowest ratings 
whilst for the Germans, anger and surprise received lowest ratings. This is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
 
Figure 4.6. Means and Standard Errors for significant interaction effect between country and emotions within the 
child sample, *p < .05. 
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ii: Although there was a significant main effect for modality, this was only true for some but 
not for all emotions displayed. For happiness, anger and surprise, faces received higher intensity 
ratings than for voices, whilst for sadness, fear and disgust, voices and faces were perceived with 
similar intensity across all children. Further, for both modalities, happiness received highest ratings 
followed by sadness. For faces, disgust received lowest ratings whilst for voices, anger received 
lowest ratings. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction effect between country, emotion and age, 
F(10, 460) = 3.19, p = .001, 2 =  .09. Post-hoc Sidak test for multiple comparisons was applied in 
order to further investigate this interaction. In the youngest child group, happiness, anger and disgust 
was perceived with higher intensity in the German as compared to the British child sample whilst 
surprise was rated higher by British compared to German children.   
In the second child group, the German ratings decreased significantly for happiness, anger 
and disgust compared to the youngest child group. For happiness and surprise, British children rated 
emotions now as more intense than German children. In the oldest child group, the British intensity 
score for disgust has increased significantly compared to the middle child group and for Germans, 
ratings for surprise have also increased whilst ratings for anger decreased further. Overall, the oldest 
children from the British and German sample have now caught up with each other and had equal 
intensity perception scores for all six emotions. This is illustrated in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Means and Standard Errors for significant three-way interaction between age-group, country and 
emotions, *p < .05, N = 98. 
 
b) Choice RTs 
Results from RTs from all children across Germany and Great Britain suggested that speed 
for making decisions about emotional category membership depended on the country and age-group 
of participants as well as on the modality and emotions presented. A mixed measure ANOVA with  
modality (2) x emotion (6) x country (2) x age-group (3) suggested a significant main effect for 
modality, F(1, 92) = 61.99, p < .001, 2  =  .4, for emotion, F(5, 460) = 7.4, p < .001, 2  =  .15, for 
country, F(1, 92) = 10.47, p = .002, 2 =  .1, and for age-group, F(2, 92) = 36.82, p < .001, 2 =  .45.   
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Faces were rated faster than voices and Sidak post-hoc test for multiple comparisons revealed that 
judgements regarding happy and surprise stimuli were made fastest and did not differ significantly 
from anger. Sadness, fear and disgust were rated slower and anger and fear did not differ from each 
other significantly, all at p < .05. Further, British children rated emotional stimuli with faster speed 
than German children and speed increased linear with age: the youngest child group made slowest 
judgements, followed by the middle and by the oldest child group. The difference between all three 
age groups was statistically significant (for M and SE see Table 4.3). 
There was also a significant interaction effect between modality and age, F(2, 92) = 8.39, p < 
.001, 2 =  .15. Post hoc Sidak test confirmed that across all children, there was a significant effect of 
modality in all three age-groups. Further, speed for rating faces decreased continually between all 
three age-groups and the youngest child group was slower than the middle child group which was in 
turn slower than the oldest child group. For voices, however, the youngest child group was slower 
than both older child groups but the two oldest child groups did not differ from each other for speed of 
rating voices. Whilst speed for rating faces continued to decrease across all age groups, speed for 
rating voices did not change between the age of 7 to 8 and 9 to10. This is illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8. Means and Standard Errors for significant interaction between age-group and modality, p < .05, N = 
98. 
Further, there was a significant three-way interaction between modality, emotion and age-
group, F(10, 460) = 2.2, p = .02, 2 =  .05. In the youngest child group, there was a significant 
modality effect for all six emotions displayed with voices being judged at a slower pace than faces. 
For the middle year group, all emotions displayed in the voice have now significantly faster choice 
RTs compared to the youngest child group and ratings for faces displaying sadness, anger, fear and 
disgust have also accelerated.  
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This means that in the middle child group, only sadness and fear show a significant modality effect 
whilst the other emotions of happiness, anger, surprise and disgust have equal choice reaction times. 
In the oldest child group, ratings happy and surprise in faces have significantly accelerated compared 
to the middle child group and for voices, sadness and fear also continued to be rated with faster RTs. 
This consequently results in no significant modality RT effects – apart from the emotion of disgust – 
in the oldest child groups, suggesting that the speed of rating voices has caught up with the faster 
speed of rating faces as a function of age in five out of six emotions. This is illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Means and Standard Errors for significant three-way interaction between age-group, emotions and 
modality, *p < .05. N = 98. 
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4.2.4. Discussion Experiment 4-II 
The purpose of the present Experiment 4-II was to investigate whether potential cultural 
differences in emotion recognition are already seen within a group of children aged 5 to 10. If one was 
to follow Castro et al.’s findings (2014) of a link between family values and children’s emotion 
recognition abilities, it is to expect that culture effects in adults (as demonstrated in Experiment 4-I) 
will introduce comparable culture effects within the child sample due to early socialisation processes. 
The present results suggested that culture only affected speed but not intensity ratings in children: 
British children rated emotions faster than German children. This finding was unexpected since there 
was no significant country effect for rating speed within the adult sample of the current study.  
Further, the current data did not find significant country effects on emotion intensity 
perception in the child sample – contrary to rating speed. The similarity in the perceived emotion 
intensity between German and British children suggests that children were not prone to significant 
culture effects. However, ‘surprise’ was the only exception and British children rated surprised stimuli 
with higher intensity than German children – this effect is the same direction as seen for the adult 
group which higher intensity ratings from British compared to German adults. Consequently, the lack 
of significant effects on intensity perception between British and German children conflicts with 
previous findings by McCluskey and Albas (1981) who suggested early cultural effects in children 
from Mexico and Canada. It is possible that cultural values between German and British families are 
very similar and differences are too subtle in order to significantly interfere with children’s emotion 
intensity perception. 
When looking at the different age-groups within the child-sample in more detail, it becomes 
evident that there were, however, subtle differences in emotion recognition between cultures. Children 
across Germany and Great Britain differed in their intensity perception depending on the emotion 
displayed and the age of the judges. For the youngest child group including children aged 5 to 6, for 
four out of six emotions, ratings differed as a function of culture. For happiness, anger and disgust, 
young German children associated stimuli with higher intensity ratings whilst for surprise, young 
British children rated stimuli with higher intensity than German children. For the middle group with 
children aged 7 and 8, the difference between cultures was reduced to two out of six emotions whilst 
the oldest child-group with 9 and 10-year old children did not show culture effects for any of the six 
emotions displayed. Overall, whilst youngest children showed some variation for emotion intensity 
perception between countries, this variability decreased with age and ratings became more stable 
across both samples.  
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Data from the present experiment supported findings from the child Chapter 3 on the role of 
modality and emotion recognition during childhood: modality differences diminished with age. 
Across all children, for the youngest age-group, faces were perceived with higher intensity than 
voices for all six basic emotions – although the pattern for each modality was similar with faster 
ratings for happiness and slower ratings for negative emotions in both modalities. For the following 
age-group including children aged 7 and 8, this face superiority was only visible in two out of six 
emotions, namely sadness and fear. For all other emotions, speed for voices has decreased and caught 
up with rating speed for faces. For 9 and 10-year old children, faces and voices were rated with the 
exact same speed for all six emotions, indicating modality-independent processing speed in the oldest 
child-group. This pattern for rating speed did not interact with country of participants. For further 
discussion and interpretations of this finding, the reader is referred to Chapter 3. 
Further, children rated happiness, anger and surprise with higher intensity when they were 
displayed in faces compared to voices. Again, this was independent of the culture of participants. 
Interestingly, this exact same pattern was visible in adults suggesting that children demonstrate some 
adult-like emotion processing although at a less sophisticated level such as with slower speed. For 
sadness, fear and disgust, children did not show perceptual differences in intensity between voices and 
faces, suggesting comparable processing from the auditory and facial domain whilst adults exhibited 
voice superiority effects for rating sadness and disgust. 
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4.5. General Discussion 
Overall, the present Experiment 4-I and 4-II in Chapter 4 are the first to behaviourally 
investigate whether there are differences in basic emotion recognition between two similar Western-
European countries across two modalities. Current result demonstrated that whilst general recognition 
of the six basic emotions showed universal and country-independent processing pattern, at a more 
subtle level, culture seemed to influence intensity perception as well as choice speed. British adults in 
Experiment 4-I perceived half of the displayed emotions as more intense than German adults did; 
although, this varied depending on whether emotions were expressed visually or auditory. Germans 
seemed to react specifically to angry faces and perceived them as more intense than British adults. 
This seemed to be unrelated to the self-reported emotional temperament in participants as measured 
here by the Emotional Reactivity Scale (Nock et al., 2008). Whilst speed for rating emotions did not 
differ in the British sample as a function of modality, for Germans, voices took particularly longer to 
be rated, suggesting that different cultures may have a modality preference during emotion 
processing.   
Within the child Experiment 4-II, for five out of six emotions, children had comparable 
intensity rating across both cultures and only for surprise, British children perceived stimuli more 
intense than German children. This pattern suggests that children are less susceptible to cultural 
effects and socialisation of social norms between German and British children did not seem to 
influence emotion recognition. This, however, was influenced by age and younger children showed 
more cultural variation than older children. Similarly to findings from Chapter 3, modality effects for 
rating speed seemed to be more pronounced in younger children and diminished with increasing age.   
The direction of emotion recognition differences with higher intensity ratings for British 
compared to German adults supports the notion of the ‘reserved German’ as has been proposed by 
previous business leadership (e.g. Brodbeck, 2000) and communication (e.g. Wouters, 2011) studies: 
Germans tend to value hierarchy and directness rather than warmth during interpersonal relationships. 
As suggested by Schneider et al. (2013), display rules such as suppressed emotion expression may 
indeed be linked to emotion recognition abilities. Cultural differences such as a lower score on 
individualism in Germans (Hofstede, 2001) could indeed be a source of differences in emotion 
recognition across cultures. Note, however, that the present study did not specifically measure the 
existence of display rules or actual differences in face expressions (as investigated by Elfenbein et al., 
2007) between both participating countries. 
The finding of reduced emotion intensity perception in Germans that applies not only to faces 
but also to voices (with the exception of anger) is a striking and novel finding, which, however, may 
depend on specific emotions displayed. In accordance with facial feedback theories (e.g. Neal & 
Chartrand, 2011) it has previously been found that vocal emotion expression can also influence 
emotion experience.  
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For example, listening to and reproducing positive emotional sounds magnified the experience of 
positive feelings (Hatfield, Hsee, Costello, Schalekamp Weisman, & Denney, 1995). Consequently, it 
would be interesting to see whether suppressing vocal mimicry – as opposed to just replicating vocal 
sounds – could also reduce auditory emotion recognition as shown from facial feedback theories 
(Oberman et al., 2007). 
4.5.1. Development of culture effects across age: When do display rules kick-in? 
Whilst children in the youngest group did show rating differences between cultures, it is 
possible that this variation is the result of noise due to additional factors such as differences in 
schooling systems (see below) or generally large individual differences in cognitive abilities such as 
Theory of Mind abilities (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). With increasing 
age and equal school attendance for children across both countries, this variation decreased and 
children across two separate cultures seemed to catch up in their emotion recognition skills. By the 
time children reached the end of primary school, emotion recognition capacities in British and 
German children were at a comparable level and each of the six emotions were being perceived 
without significant differences. Hence, there were no cultural differences within older children. 
When looking at the oldest child-group (9 and 10-year old children) across cultures in the 
present chapter, it becomes evident that children demonstrated adult-like emotion intensity perception 
with almost identical intensity ratings for all six emotions. Following the current data, one possible 
interpretation is that cultural display rules do not contribute significantly to emotion recognition in 
children. In support, explicit understanding of display rules and emotion regulation develops with age 
throughout childhood (Jones et al., 1998). It is possible that the subtle culture effect in emotion 
recognition between German and British children only kicks in during teenager years in line with an 
awareness of cultural display rules. Indeed, even for undergraduate college students, expressiveness of 
social environment such as families continued to affect non-verbal communication skills in 
adolescence (Halberstadt, 1986). This finding suggests a long-lasting relationship between display 
rules and emotion development.  
So where does the cultural variation for the youngest child-group in the present chapter come 
from? One explanation could be differences in schooling systems: Whilst 5-year olds in Great Britain 
are already in primary school, in Germany they typically still visit community-run nurseries until the 
age of 6 (Eurydice National Foundation for Educational Research, 2013). The 5-year old German 
children tested in the present study attended nursery on a half-day basis and therefore, it is possible 
that the youngest children in the German sample – which were the slowest out of all groups - are 
driving this significant difference in rating speed between countries. In Germany, 80% of all nurseries 
only provide half-day care (Burger, 2010). Consequently, many toddlers spend a large proportion at 
home with the primary caretaker.  
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Indeed, within a British sample, attending preschool has been found to have a positive impact on later 
cognitive and social development (EPPA project, Sylva & Britain, 2003) but long-term effects of 
attending preschool on later school performance within a German sample were not evident (Burger, 
2010; Spiess, Büchel, & Wagner, 2002). This suggests that there could be a link between British 
system of early preschool attendance and faster rating speed for emotions.  
Further, because this study was based on a computer-task, it is possible that British children 
spend more time with media such as play consoles whereas Germans value free play time and outdoor 
play as evident from the existence of over 1500 ‘Waldkindergarten’ (forest nurseries) that provide 
child-care based in the outdoors rather than inside buildings (Bundesverband der Natur – und 
Waldkindergaerten in Deutschland e.V. 2014). Young German children may simple be not as familiar 
with handling computers as young children in Britain.  
 
4.5.2. Implications  
The present data suggested for the first time that even across two similar Western-European 
countries, there may be small differences in the way emotions from voices and faces are perceived. 
Because in the present chapter, Germans perceived certain emotions as less intense than their British 
counterparts, it is possible that this pattern reflects the German reservedness. For cross-cultural 
interactions, this suggests that emotional content during phone as well as face-to-face interaction may 
be interpreted in different ways, depending on the cultural background of business partners. As 
suggested by Elfenbein et al. (2007), the link between emotion recognition abilities and successful 
business negotiations explicitly demonstrated the importance of investigating differences in emotion 
recognition skills between trading partners such as Germany and Great Britain.  
The effectiveness of affective advertisements such as production of consumer guilt can also 
be influenced by cultural norms – and the perceived guilt in turn influences purchase intention (Kim 
& Johnson, 2012). For example, individualistic nations such as the United States value adverts that 
target individual benefit whilst collectivistic cultures value products that enhance benefit for a larger 
group (Han & Shavitt, 1994).  
Here, the researcher proposes that the perceived intensity of emotions communicated – which 
is guided by cultural norms - via adverts such as the radio or billboard could influence clients 
purchasing or donation behaviour. For example, the same picture of a child in distress may elicit 
higher perception of sadness in one compared to another culture; this may increase guilt perception 
and in turn donation intentions. In the present study, British participants perceived happiness, fear and 
disgust as more intense than German samples. Those emotions are prime example for communicating 
intentions in advertising: understanding of happiness in others may be targeted in humorous adverts or 
to demonstrate positive benefits of purchasing items.  
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Emotions of disgust can be associated with adverts in health-settings such as ‘NHS SmokeFree’ 
(Department of Health, 2014)  or ‘Think!’ road traffic campaigns (Department for Transport, 2014) 
and fearful expressions can be used to transmit topics of violence and abuse as often used by charity 
appeals. Additionally, due to the modality effect seen in the German sample, purchasing or donation 
behaviour may benefit from displaying affective advertisement in the visual domain such as billboards 
as compared to radio – this may be especially true for intentions of communicating anger.  
Results from the present Experiments 4-I & 4-II in Chapter 4 are interpreted on the 
assumption that there are cultural differences from previous leadership and communication studies 
due to underlying display rules. The researcher relied on cultural differences between Germany and 
Great Britain such as individualism as demonstrated by Hofstede’s cultural values survey (2001). 
However, it is beyond the scope of the current study to measure actual differences in display rules and 
social norms. There may be many other variables – apart from display rules and social norms – that 
may differ from country to country - which could cause variation in emotion recognition such as 
family size (Morand, 1999)  or  time spent in front of screen-based media (Uhls et al., 2014). Those 
factors were not controlled for in the present study and so the present study reported subtle cultural 
differences in emotion perception but cannot prove the importance of display rules as cause for 
variation. Hence, future studies would include measures such as the human value survey, 
summarising attitudes towards values such as authority, tradition such as acceptance of norms or 
security (Schwartz, 1992) across Germany and Great Britain.  
 
4.5.3. Conclusion 
Overall, Chapter 4 demonstrated that cultural differences may influence emotion recognition 
in adults. This pattern was not as clear within the child sample and it is possible that socialisation 
processes of emotions only kick in after the age of 10. Overall, the present data seems to support the 
dialect model of cultural emotion recognition (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003) with universal features 
that are influenced by cultural variation. 
So far, this thesis has tackled the issue of emotion recognition across modalities from a 
behavioural perspective. In order to investigate whether there may also be common underlying 
similarities in the temporal processing of emotions across modalities, the following Chapter 5 will 
present neurophysiological ERP data on the exact issue.  
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5   
An ERP study of emotion processing within faces 
and voices: How similar are modalities? 
Having demonstrated similar patterns of emotion recognition mechanisms across modalities 
in the previous behavioural chapters of this thesis, the question emerged whether the underlying 
temporal hierarchy of neural processes may also be comparable across two separate modalities. In the 
past, there has been conflicting evidence regarding the degree of similarities across modalities due to 
a large variation of methodologies deployed. Further, the lack of within-subject designs limits the 
comparability of emotion recognition across modalities. Hence, the main objective of this present 
EEG (electroencephalogram) study is to collect some data from event-related potentials (ERPs) on the 
temporal features of emotion processing across two separate and independent modalities in a within-
subject design. By comparing typical emotion processing stages for faces and non-verbal 
vocalisations, the researcher wants to examine whether both modalities have a comparable pattern of 
emotion processing in terms of timing of neural mechanisms.  
 
5.1.1. Faces 
5.1.1.2. Early processing: 70 – 200ms  
Early visual perception is believed to happen from 50ms after stimulus onset onwards at 
occipital and posterior sites and reflects visual processing within the primary and extrastriate visual 
cortex as well as parts of the fusiform gyrus (Di Russo, Martinez, Sereno, Pitzalis, & Hillyard, 2002). 
During this early visual processing, it is not thought that the brain pays much attention to the 
emotional content of stimuli (e.g. Krolak-Salmon et al., 2001) and common onset of emotion 
recognition seems to be between 200-400ms after stimulus onset (see below). On the other hand, 
Eimer and Holmes (2002) showed that fearful as compared to neutral face expressions were processed 
as early as 120ms after onset in frontocentral sites with increased positivity for fearful faces. Batty 
and Taylor (2003) have also reported emotion- related waveforms that were evident as early as 90ms 
after onset of emotional faces – this, however, did not differ for specific emotions in question.  
A negative peak at around 170ms (N170) after stimulus onset has also previously been 
associated with emotion processing.  
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This lateral negative peak at occipito-temporal sites between 140 and 200ms is commonly larger for 
faces compared to other visually evoked responses and may have a counterpart with positive polarity 
at more central sites (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer, 2011).  Kanwisher et 
al. (1997) originally reported a brain area called the fusiform face area (FFA) that specializes in 
processing faces as compared to objects. The N170 activity is thought to reflect this face-processing 
activity in lateral occipito-temporal regions such as the occipital and fusiform face area as well as 
superior temporal sulcus (Eimer, 2011).  
The role of the N170 component in regards to emotion processing in faces has not yet clearly 
been demonstrated. Several studies have reported that early face processing in the N170 time-range is 
independent of emotional content. For example, the N170 did not show emotion-specific responses 
and ERP amplitudes as well as latencies were comparable for different emotional as well as neutral 
faces in two studies conducted by Eimer and Holmes (2007) as well as Eimer, Holmes and McGlone 
(2003).  
On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that early face processing can also be affected 
by emotional expressions. For example, Blau, Maurer, Tottenham and McCandliss (2007) reported an 
enhanced deflection at 170ms after stimulus onset for fearful compared to neutral faces. Marinkovic 
and Halgren (1998) also found emotion effects in faces as early as 170ms after stimulus onset at 
temporal sites for positive versus neutral faces. Batty and Taylor (2003) demonstrated that N170 
waveforms even differed depending on the very specific emotion displayed. For example, at 140ms 
after stimulus onset, there was a later effect for fearful and disgusted faces as compared to positive 
emotions such as happy or surprised faces.  
In support, Pizzagalli, Lehmann, Hendrick, Regard, Pascual-Marqui and Davidson (2001) 
used tomographic source localisation to report early activity within the fusiform gyrus – which has 
previously been associated with face encoding mechanisms (Bruce & Young, 1986) – at around 
160ms post stimulus onset during the processing of liked versus disliked faces. Further, recent 
neuroimaging evidence also suggested shared activity in the posterior STS during the processing of 
face expression as well as face identity (Baseler, Harris, Young, & Andrews, 2014). This suggests that 
the STS may also modulate the perception of emotion to a certain degree. However, it is important to 
note that there are also studies that argue that the earliest signs of emotion processing are only visible 
after 200ms (e.g. Krolak-Salmon et al., 2001; Marinkovic, & Halgren, 1998) and hence separated in 
time from general face perception. 
5.1.1.2. Late processing: 300-600ms  
Neural processes which reflect processing for individual emotions may only reliably be found 
during processing stages that include higher cognition such as situation appraisal processes. Indeed, 
previous studies have reported emotion-specific effects at even later latencies, starting at around 
400ms.  
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For example, Krolak-Salmon et al. (2001) reported different ERP waveforms for happy and fearful 
versus disgusted faces at around 550 to 750ms after stimulus onset in right posterior-temporal brain 
regions. Additionally, later waveforms for disgust seemed to be emotion-specific and in this case 
appeared between 700 and 950ms in more frontal regions. According to Krolak-Salmon et al. (2001), 
deep subcortical emotion structures such as the amygdala or basal ganglia may be responsible for a 
more wide-spread activity distribution on the scalp and even feed back to the extrastriate cortex in a 
top-down manner (see also Sato et al., 2001).    
However, it is debatable how reliable those apparent emotion-specific ERPs really are. Eimer 
et al. (2003) for example did not find any evidence at all for emotion-specific ERP waveforms. 
Instead, it was suggested that - although all six basic emotions demonstrated typical ERP waveforms 
with an early frontocentral (120-180ms after stimulus onset) and a later posterior deflection (250-
1000ms after stimulus onset), this pattern of waveform was comparable across the six basic emotions. 
In contrast to emotion-specific ERP waveforms reported by studies cited above, results from Eimer et 
al. (2003) hinted towards a more emotion-general emotion processing mechanisms, independent of 
the presentation of specific emotions.  
Following previous – partly conflicting – results, the debate remains about the exact timing of 
emotion recognition onset.  Some studies have reported early differentiation which may even occur 
before the face-specific N170 response (Batty & Taylor, 2003) whilst others report late emotion 
processing that follows structural encoding in a hierarchical manner (Sato et al., 2001). Secondly, it is 
not clear when time-critical processes within the human brain start to categorise between distinct 
emotion-categories. Assuming modality-independent emotion mechanisms as suggested by previous 
behavioural chapters, it is of considerate interest to investigate whether a second, independent 
modality such as non-verbal affect bursts also shows distinct temporal stages for emotion processing 
that may be comparable to neural patterns within the face. 
 
5.1.2. Voices 
5.1.2.1. Early processing: 70 – 200ms 
The auditory signal rapidly travels from the ear to the thalamus and the primary auditory 
cortex (Goldstein, 2001). Early auditory processing happens within the first 50ms and reflects activity 
within medial geniculate nucleus and primary auditory cortex (Luck, 2005). Initial acoustical analysis 
of sounds is often reportedly found at fronto-central sites from 50ms onwards. In order to specific an 
ERP time-window that is specific to the auditory processing of human voices,  Charest and colleagues 
(2009) have compared the temporal dynamics of processing human voices, bird voices and 
environmental sounds.  
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They reported an increased positivity at frontal sites which was typically accompanied by a posterior 
negativity that peaked at occipital sites at 164ms after stimulus onset and which was specific to 
human voices. This early voice-sensitive peak has been referred to as fronto-temporal positivity to 
voices (FTPV) and its latency can be compared to the face-sensitive N170 component which typically 
occurs in a similar time range (Charest et al., 2009). The FTVP is thought to reflect temporal voice 
areas within the right anterior superior temporal sulcus (STS, Charest et al., 2009) which may reflect 
the auditory ‘what’-pathway that connects the anterior superior temporal gyrus with the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Rauschecker & Tian, 2000).  
Similarly to the N170 component during face processing, the important question emerges 
whether components in the time-window that is thought to process human voices is also modulated by 
emotional content. In support of pre-emotional processing of voices during the first 100-200ms, 
Chronaki et al. (2012) found a negative deflection between 90 and 180ms specific to human voices in 
6 to 11 year old children which did not differ as a function of emotional prosody. 
However, there is also evidence which suggests earlier processing of emotional information in 
human voices. Iredale, Rusby, Mcdonald, Di Marco and Swift (2013) reported that the early voice 
processing stage may in fact already be modulated by emotional content: Waveforms differed for 
emotional versus neutral voices in parietal areas as early as 100ms after stimulus onset.  At this early 
stage, however, there was no evidence for differentiation between different classes of emotions. 
Similarly, Sauter and Eimer (2009) also suggested early processing of fear, achievement and disgust 
versus neutral affect vocalisations which were reflected in an enhanced positivity at fronto-central 
electrodes between 150 and 300ms.  Overall, as pointed out by Eimer and Holmes (2002), this early 
processing of emotional voices from 150ms onwards is comparable with data from emotion face 
processing that shows early emotional versus neutral differentiation at around 150ms after stimulus 
onset.   
5.1.2.2. Late processing: 300 – 600ms 
Following previous findings, it does not seem likely that differentiation between specific 
emotion categories such as happiness or anger happens before 200-330ms after stimulus onset. A 
study that investigated non-verbal affect vocalisations as compared to semantically or verbal loaded 
stimuli suggested emotion differentiation between distressed or joyful exclamations from 300ms 
onwards (Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004). Similarly, in 6 to 11 year old children, Chronaki et al. 
(2012) found a larger effect between 380 and 500ms to angry versus happy or neutral voices. 
After establishing whether a voice is of emotional significance within the temporal voice area 
at around 150 - 200ms, the acoustical signal is then being passed on to more frontal areas like the 
prefrontal cortex.  
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This information transmission might reflect travel along the auditory ‘what pathway’ to prefrontal 
areas for higher cognitive analysis such as context interpretation (Rauschecker & Tian, 2000). Due to 
conscious analysis of the emotion stimulus, it may now possible to actively discriminate between 
several emotional states. Indeed, this statement has been supported by Iredale and colleagues (2013) 
who reported an enhanced negative deflection for happy versus angry voices at frontal sites between 
400 and 650ms which possibly indicated reallocation of cognitive resources. 
Following the review on auditory emotion processing, the exact timing onset of emotion 
processing within the human brain remains unidentified. Previous studies have suggested early 
emotion-processing that coincided with the general human-voice processing response (Eimer & 
Holmes, 2007) whilst other reported latencies up until 300ms after stimulus onset crucial for emotion 
processing (Paulmann & Kotz, 2008). Further, individual emotion discrimination did not seem to 
happen before 300-400ms post stimulus onset (Iredale et al., 2013). 
 
5.1.3. Hierarchical Emotion Processing 
Following past research, it seems possible that emotion processing happens in a hierarchical 
manner: from sensory processing to broad emotion discrimination finishing with narrow emotion-
category distinguishing. For voices, this has previously been summarised by Schirmer and Kotz 
(2006), who have created a working model of temporal emotion processing stages for prosody based 
on previous research (for illustration purposes see Figure 5.1 from Schirmer & Kotz, 2006).  
 
Figure 5.1. Hierarchical three-stage working model of emotion recognition for prosody (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006) 
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According to Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) three-stage model, the first voice processing stage peaks at 
around 100ms and defines the analysis of acoustical features such as sound intensity during initial 
sensory processing of voices as reported by Engelien, Schulz, Ross, Arolt and Pantev (2000). This 
stage would not be modulated by emotional content. Next, early emotion effects visible during the 
discrimination of emotional (e.g. angry) versus neutral prosody reflect emotion significance 
evaluation within the superior temporal sulcus (STS, Grandjean et al., 2005).The final stage then 
describes discrimination between individual emotion categories such as anger and happiness at around 
400ms which includes higher cognition and conscious semantic processing of prosody in more frontal 
areas. For example, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in the frontal lobe has previously been found to be 
active during the processing of semantic information (Schirmer, Zysset, Kotz, & von Cramon, 2004). 
In support, Iredale et al. (2013) have recently confirmed Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) 
hierarchical emotion processing model in voices. Their findings from an ERP study suggested early 
emotional versus neutral discrimination of prosody in parietal regions, followed by more specific 
discrimination of happy and angry prosody and an activation shift to more frontal brain regions during 
the final stage of semantic processing. However, in contrast to Schirmer and Kotz (2006) – Iredale et 
al. (2013) reported emotion versus neutral prosody discrimination that was already visible during the 
first processing stage at around 100ms after stimulus onset. Note, however, that the auditory stimuli 
used in the current study are not based on semantic or verbal content. 
Overall then, it seems likely that for voices, there may be three distinct stages of emotion 
processing: initial sensory processing which may are may not communicate emotional intent, a 
subsequent stage specific for the perception of emotion and a final stage of emotional evaluation that 
allows the differentiation between different emotion categories. Do those three primary stages of 
emotion processing also apply to emotions processed in non-verbal affect bursts and in faces? Some 
of the past research certainly suggests hierarchical processing of emotion across modalities: For 
example, Batty and Taylor (2003) reported earliest emotion effects in face expressions within the first 
100ms, followed by specific emotion discrimination after 140ms after stimulus onset and a third stage 
which was defined as late frontal activity after 330ms. This late stage seemed to be biased towards 
processing negative emotions expressed in faces. Assuming an emotion-general mechanism across 
modalities supports the idea of a hierarchical three-stage model of emotion processing that may be 
independent of modality. However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this claim of 
hierarchical emotion processing across several modalities has not previously been tested in a within-
subject design. 
Indeed, no one has previously investigated in a within-subject ERP design whether emotional 
stimuli derived from different sensory modalities show comparable temporal patterns of processing. 
Very recently, Bayer and Schacht (2014) attempted to investigate underlying event-related potentials 
in response to rating emotional faces, pictures and written words.  
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To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is one of the first accounts to compare three different 
types of emotion stimuli in a within-subject design during an ERP study – although all within the 
visual modality. Promisingly, results suggested that all stimulus types showed comparable emotion-
typical activity in early posterior negativity component (EPN) as well as in the late positive 
component (LPC). However, whilst words showed superior processing for happy stimuli as evident in 
larger amplitudes for positive words, there were larger amplitudes for angry faces and pictures 
eliciting anger which suggests stimulus-specific processing differences at a lower processing level. 
Further, by distinguishing intact faces and words from distorted faces or pseudowords (Schacht & 
Sommer, 2009), increased posterior negativity at occipito-temporal sites was evident for positive 
versus negative and neutral words between 388 and 438ms as well as for positive versus negative and 
neutral faces between 128 and 172ms.   
Hence, those previous results are promising as they suggest that different stimulus types 
within the visual modality have comparable stages of emotional processing; however, depending on 
the nature of stimulus, this may occur at different latencies. Consequently, although auditory and 
visual stimuli differ significantly in their basic perceptual features, it is of interest whether emotion 
signals within voices and faces may be processed on a supra-modal level with comparable emotion-
processing stages. 
 
5.1.4. The Present Study 
As evident from past research, several processing similarities between emotions presented in 
faces and in voices have been established. For example, not much emotion activity seems to be noted 
within the first 100ms after stimulus onset in either modality. Secondly, both the face and the voice-
sensitive stages N170 and FTVP may – or may not – already be modulated by emotional content of 
the stimulus. Lastly, both modalities have been shown to process emotions in a hierarchical manner, 
starting with broad discriminations between emotional and neutral stimuli and narrowing down to 
individual emotion category distinction at around300ms after stimulus inset. This may involve a shift 
from sensory and perceptual to more cognitive emotion processing.  
The main research aim of this present study is to investigate in a within-subject design 
whether the pattern of neural activity is comparable across two separate modalities. To keep variance 
between modalities limited, all stimuli were based on non-verbal emotion communication. In line with 
behavioural findings from the previous chapters in this thesis, shared cognitive mechanisms should 
result in comparable emotion processing patterns across early and late time-windows, independent of 
the modality of presentation.  
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Further, according to Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) model of hierarchical emotion processing in voices, 
it is of interest whether both modalities show a hierarchical processing of emotion information, 
starting with broad processing such as emotional versus neutral discrimination and proceeding to 
more narrow emotion processing such as the discrimination between happy and angry stimuli.  
In order to determine the onset of emotion processing abilities in faces as well as in voices, 
three time-windows have been determined for the present investigation. The first stage included a pre-
emotion period, ranging from 70 to 130ms which is thought to reflect sensory processing in the P1 
component (Luck, 2005). Further, in order to investigate whether the voice- as well as face-specific 
components N170 and FTVP are moderated by emotional content, the second stage was defined 
between 130 – 200ms. Lastly, in order to investigate the onset of emotion-specific discrimination such 
as between happy and angry stimuli, the late processing stage was defined between 300 and 600ms 
post stimulus onset.   
The current within-subject study predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 1: In line with supra-modal emotion networks (see behavioural results from 
previous chapters), emotional faces as well as emotional non-verbal vocalisations will show 
comparable temporal stages of emotion processing across all three time windows. 
Hypothesis 2: According to the hierarchical model of prosody processing (Schirmer & Kotz, 
2006), earliest emotion processing will not occur within the first 100ms after stimulus onset and then 
begin with broad discrimination between emotional and neutral stimuli. Later cognitive stages after 
300ms after stimulus onset will then show narrower emotion discrimination between angry and happy 
stimuli. Again, this pattern will be visible within both modalities. 
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5.2. EEG Methods & Task 
5.2.1. Participants 
The participants included in the present study were 13 healthy male adults and were either 
British or have lived in the UK for at least the previous four years to ensure good use of the English 
language. After controlling for outliers for each of the variables, two participants with extremely 
noisy data such as constant eye movements were removed from the analysis, resulting in a final 
sample of 11 male participants (M age = 28.9, SD = 7.04) with an age ranging from 22 to 47 years. 
Ten out of 11 participants were white-Caucasian and one was Black-African. Participants were 
recruited from Brunel University or online social networks and all were in higher education. Ten 
participants were right handed and one was ambidextrous. Participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal eyesight and hearing. Participants with corrected vision were asked to wear their prescription 
glasses rather than contact lenses in order to reduce excessive blinking due to dry eyes as a result of 
wearing contact lenses.  
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology, Brunel University, PsyREC 
Committee (07/05/2014) and informed consent was provided before and debriefing after the study 
(see Appendix C). 
 
5.2.2. Task & Material 
The task was programmed on the PsychoPy software in Python (Peirce, 2007), and visual 
stimuli were chosen from the Ekman Pictures of Facial Affect series (Ekman, 1976); for more details 
on stimuli see Chapter 1.  Five male and five female actors (identity: A, C, EM, JJ, MF, NR, PE, PF, 
SW & WF) displaying emotional (50% angry and 50% happy expressions) or neutral face expression 
based on the FACS system were chosen. Of the emotional faces, 50% were displayed with open 
mouth and visible teeth in order to control for salient visual features. Any background and external 
features of the face stimuli such as earrings or clothing were removed with Adobe Photoshop 
Elements 9. For illustration of faces see Appendix C.  
Non-verbal auditory stimuli were chosen from the Montreal Affective Voices set (Belin et al., 
2008) with five male and five female actors  (identity: 6, 42, 45, 46, 53, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61) producing 
emotional (50% angry and 50% happy expressions) and neutral non-verbal vocalisations. Again, for 
more details on stimuli see Chapter 1. Sound stimuli were cut after 800ms or continuously repeated 
and merged until they reached a length of 800ms. Sound stimuli were modified to fade in and out to 
avoid sudden onsets and loudness of each voice was normalised to a comparable level. 
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The current study consisted of two separate blocks split for either faces or voices and each 
block contained two sub-blocks where participants were told to either perform a gender or an emotion 
discrimination task in order to keep up attention levels. So all together, there were four experimental 
blocks but for subsequent analysis, ERPs were averaged across both gender and emotion tasks to 
increase number of trials. Each block was then repeated 3 times, resulting in 120 stimuli for each of 
the four presentation blocks. Each block was preceded by a short practise session. Order of blocks, 
tasks and stimuli within each block were manually randomized as well as counterbalanced amongst 
all participants.  Each of the four experimental blocks contained either 50% emotional (divided into 
25% angry and 25% happy stimuli) and 50% non-emotional stimuli, resulting in 40 stimuli in each 
block (20 neutral, 10 angry and 10 happy). Participants were told that emotional stimuli consisted of 
either angry or happy stimuli but were instructed to only discriminate between emotional and neutral 
stimuli. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2. Presentation blocks and subsequent conditions for analysis of stimuli. There were four experimental 
blocks with 2 modality x 2 task, resulting in 8 conditions.  Each block was repeated 3 times.  
 
Before each stimulus there was a fixation cross for 500ms. The stimulus then appeared for 
800ms, followed by an inter-stimulus interval of 2500ms in which the participants were asked to 
make a discrimination choice by pressing one out of two buttons.  
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This button-press happened only after the stimulus has disappeared in order to minimize interference 
with emotional processing during stimulus perception.  
 
5.2.3. Procedure 
Participants completed the task in a quiet, electrical shielded room with natural daylight. They 
sat on a comfortable chair, 80-85cm away viewing distance from the screen (refreshing rate 60Hz) 
inside a Faraday cage to minimise electrical noise. Before the start of the study, all participants signed 
the informed consent sheet, received detailed instructions and completed a practice session after 
which there was time for questions. Participants were informed about artefact problems and 
encouraged not to blink too often and sit as still as possible during stimulus presentation. Between 
each block, participants had a short break before continuing with the next condition. After completion 
of the experiment, there was time for questions and debriefing.  
 
5.2.4. ERP Acquisition, Analysis and Data Reduction  
The EEG (electroencephalogram) signals were recorded from 64 electrodes (FP1, FPz, FP2, 
AF3, AF4, F7, F5, F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, FT7, FC5, FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4, FC6, FT8, T7, 
C5, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T8, TP7, CP5, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, 
P2, P4, P6, P8, PO7, PO5, PO3, POz, PO4, PO6, PO8, CB1, O1, Oz, O2, CB2) which were arranged 
on the scalp according to the 10-20 system. Cz formed the average reference during ERP recording. 
To improve electrical conduction, a conductive gel was used (Compumedics Neuromedical Supplies, 
Quik Gel).   
To measure vertical eye movements (VEOG), two electrodes were placed just above and 
below the left eye (about 1 cm). To measure horizontal eye movements (HEOG), two electrodes were 
placed on the outer canthi of the right as well as the left eye. Electrical impedance was kept below 
10KΩ. To analyse the signal, Scan 4.4 acquisition and analysis software (Compumedics Neuroscan 
Ltd.) were used to amplify (x 1000) and band-pass filter (0.1 – 100Hz) the EEG waves. ‘Bad’ 
electrodes were identified by visually observing the EEG data. This only applied to one participant, 
where the electrode F8 had to be excluded as it was not recording correctly. 
Offline, the signal was band-pass filtered (0.1hz-30hz, 12 db/octave) and electrodes were re-
referenced to the average of both linked mastoids. A spatial filter paradigm (Scan 4.2.) was applied to 
remove eye blink artefacts by Principal Component analysis. The EEG signal was baseline corrected 
(entire sweep) and peaks exceeding ±150μV were automatically excluded in the subsequent analysis. 
Event-codes identified stimulus-locked responses which were then averaged across all sweeps.  
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Epochs were created from the cleaned data by including 100ms of pre-stimulus interval and 900ms of 
stimulus processing which was locked to stimulus onset at 0s. For each participant, ERPs were 
averaged across 8 conditions (i.e. angry/happy face or voice, emotional/neutral face or voice). 
Averaged ERPs for each individual and each condition were then baseline corrected to pre-stimulus 
interval of -100ms. For each average ERP per participant and condition, amplitudes and latencies 
were detected via a peak detection algorithm in Scan 4.3. This was conducted across all electrodes 
and for three specific time-windows: 70-130ms for early sensory processing, 130-200ms for specific 
face or voice processing, and 300-600ms for late effects during emotion-specific processing. 
For the present analysis of ERPs, separate ANOVAs were conducted for auditory and for facial 
stimuli due to their perceptual differences in basic perception. Further, separate ANOVAs were 
conducted for latency and amplitude measures. Although stimuli were presented in four blocks (2 
modality x 2 task), for analysis, the data was subsequently split into 8 conditions. For each of the two 
modalities, there were separate analyses for (1) emotional versus neutral stimuli derived from the 
explicit emotion-task and secondly for (2) angry versus happy stimuli which were collapsed across 
gender and emotion-tasks to increase the number of trials. This way, number of trials were kept 
constant across tasks (N = 60) as is illustrated in Figure 35. Running separate analyses for emotional 
versus neutral and happy versus angry stimuli allowed observing hierarchical processing stages within 
the human mind from more general to narrower emotion concepts. The current study did not analyse 
ERP responses in relation to gender discrimination nor did it specifically investigate the contrast of 
direct versus indirect emotion ratings because at this point, the present investigation is of preliminary 
nature only.  
Regions of interest (ROI): Regional averaging by clustering several electrodes in a smaller 
amount of regions reduces the levels of comparisons and degrees of freedom (Dien & Santuzzi, 2005). 
Visual inspection of topographical maps for all conditions and each time-window revealed ROIs for 
the subsequent analyses (see Table 5.1.). After initial screening for hemispheric lateralisation, no 
significant effects were found (p > .05). Therefore, lateralisation was not included as additional 
variable. Hence, in the present analysis, several electrodes were averaged together in order to observe 
activity in three main regions of the brain: Frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, F3, F1, F2, F4), Central 
(FC3, FC1, FC2, FC4, C3, C1, C2, C4, CP3, CP1, CP2, CP4) and Posterior (P3, P1, P2, P4, PO3, 
PO4, O1, O2) ROIs within the 10-20 system. There was one exception: for faces during the second 
time-window, four individual posterior electrodes P7, P8, PO7 and PO8 - rather than one averaged 
region - were selected. Those electrodes are commonly used to investigate the face-typical N170 
response in posterior regions (e.g. Batty & Taylor, 2003; Smith, 2012). This is illustrated in Figure 
5.3.  
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Table 5.1 
Identification of regions of interest (ROI) for each modality and time window  
 
Faces 
Voices 
70 –  
130 ms 
Frontal region: negativity 
Posterior region: positivity 
 
Frontal region: positivity 
Posterior region: negativity  
 
130 – 
200 ms 
P7, P8, PO7, PO8: 
negativity 
 
Frontal Region: positivity 
Posterior region: negativity 
 
300 – 
600 ms 
Posterior region: positivity Frontal Region: positivity 
Central Region: positivity 
 
Note. Topographic maps show difference waves between emotional and neutral stimuli. 
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300/325 ms 325/350 ms 350/375 ms 375/400 ms 400/425 ms 425/450 ms
450/475 ms 475/500 ms 500/525 ms 525/550 ms 550/575 ms 575/600 ms
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+2.3
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+1.5
+1.1
+0.8
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0
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-2.6
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Rate - 1000 Hz, HPF - 0 Hz, LPF - 200 Hz, Notch - off
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 178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Electrodes used to create average for frontal (blue), central (yellow) and posterior (red) regions of 
interest (ROI). Green electrodes used as individual electrodes for the second time-window in the face analysis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Posterior ROI Face-specific Electrodes 
Frontal ROI 
Central ROI 
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5.3. Results 
 
The present section will report findings from the ERP study on emotion-effects across two 
separate modalities across three individual time-windows. It will firstly summarise behavioural 
findings before moving on to describe ERP patterns which are split according to task: emotional 
versus neutral and angry versus happy. Within each subsection, data will be reported for all three 
time-windows and for both modalities. Mean amplitudes and latencies for each time-window and 
condition are presented in Table 5.2. 
5.3.1. Behavioural Analysis 
A modality (2) x emotionality (2) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the number of 
correct guesses of whether a stimulus was emotional (M = 26.86, SE = .83) or not (M = 28.14, SE = 
1.34) did not vary across different modalities (p > .05). Behavioural reaction times were not analysed 
as participants were instructed to wait with the button press until the stimulus has disappeared. 
However, due to a recording error, only behavioural data from seven participants was recorded which 
significantly limits the generalizability of results. Since the behavioural task was at a very basic level 
and was only included to ensure that participants made conscious categorizations, the behavioural 
results will not be further discussed.  
 
5.3.2. ERP Analysis 
 
Table 5.2 displays ERP latency and amplitude means and Standard Errors for all three time-
windows and across both modalities.  
5.3.2.1. Emotional versus Neutral 
 
a) Early effects: 
70 – 130ms: For each pre-defined ROIs and its polarity, dependent t-tests were conducted with task 
(emotional vs neutral) as within-subject variable. For faces, although visual inspection of topographic 
maps suggested posterior positivity, neither amplitude nor latency measures showed any significant 
differences between categorising emotional or neutral faces. This suggests that for faces, statistically, 
the earliest processing stage did not carry any emotion information. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 
(electrode P8). 
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Table 5.2 
Means and Standard Error for amplitude and latency measures for each time-window and conditions  
 Faces 
Emotion 
Voices 
Emotion 
Faces 
Neutral 
Voices 
Neutral 
Faces 
Happy 
Voices 
Happy 
Faces 
Angry 
Voices 
Angry 
70-130ms 
Amplitude 
1.48  
(0.69) 
-0.06  
(0.23) 
1.94 
 (0.65) 
0.57 
 (0.32) 
1.91 
 (0.70) 
0.62  
(0.31) 
1.86 
(0.62) 
0.10 
(0.24) 
70-130ms 
Latency 
98.53 
(4.63) 
101.65 
(2.53) 
99.14 
(4.68) 
97.04 
(4.71) 
101.03 
(4.85) 
101.34 
(2.42) 
97.90 
(3.99) 
96.45 
(4.15) 
130-200ms 
Amplitude 
-1.72 
(0.74) 
-2.23  
(0.44) 
-1.97 
(0.78) 
-2.03 
(0.53) 
-1.54 
(0.96) 
-1.43 
(0.34) 
-1.70 
(0.87) 
-1.16 
(0.35) 
130-200ms 
Latency 
146.78 
(4.53) 
143.14 
(2.57) 
151.96 
(5.99) 
151.39 
(5.64) 
147.28 
(5.06) 
150.21 
(4.06) 
146.02 
(4.47) 
146.71 
(2.92) 
300-600ms 
Amplitude 
8.03 
(1.41) 
3.30  
(1.54) 
7.03 
(1.47) 
1.78 
 (0.79) 
7.74 
(1.48) 
2.68 
 (0.49) 
7.46 
(1.19) 
3.51 
(0.48) 
300-600ms 
Latency 
462.84 
(22.89) 
442.02 
(15.15) 
416.29 
(26.68) 
414.42 
(12.72) 
470.01 
(16.19) 
457.29 
(18.80) 
463.15 
(21.50) 
418.96 
(17.23) 
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Figure 5.4. Faces: Emotional (red) versus neutral (blue) at posterior ROI (P8). Non-significant effects in mean 
amplitude and mean latencies at the first positive peak, second negative deflection and late stage. N.s.  
 
For voices on the other hand, in the frontal ROI, the mean amplitude differed at the first 
positive peak, t(10) = 4.4, p = .001. Emotional voices (M = .69, SD = 1.14) had a significantly higher 
mean deflection than neutral voices (M = -1.93, SD = 2.17). This early frontal positivity for emotional 
voices occurred at a mean latency of 98.93ms. For posterior ROI, mean amplitudes for the first 
negative deflection did not differ between emotional and neutral voices; however, there was a 
significant difference for mean latencies in the posterior regions, t(10) = -6, p < .001, and neutral 
voices (M = 74.4, SD = 11.65) were processed with an earlier mean latency than emotional voices (M 
= 108.39, SD = 19.93). This is illustrated in Figure 5.5 (electrode FP2). 
 182 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Voices: Emotional (red) versus neutral (blue) at frontal ROI (FP2). Significant effects in mean 
amplitude at the first positive peak and late stage for emotional versus neutral voices (p < .05) but not in the 
second stage.  * = p < .05 
 
130 - 200ms: A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with electrodes (P7, P8, PO7, PO8) x 
task (emotional versus neutral) as within-subject factors. For posterior negativity in faces, results 
revealed a significant main effect for electrode, F(3, 30) = 4.36, p < .05, pes = .3 with the electrode P8 
(M = -6.58, SE = 1.41) in the right posterior area showing greatest negativity at a latency of 169.92ms. 
However, after Sidak post-hoc comparisons, only the difference between P8 and PO7 remained close-
to-significant at p = .058. There was no significant main effect for task, p >.05. Latency for emotional 
and neutral faces did not differ at posterior sites at the given time-window.  
For voices, for each pre-defined ROIs and their polarities, dependent t-tests were conducted 
with task (emotional versus neutral) as within-subject variable. Neither amplitude nor latency 
measures at the posterior or the anterior ROI differed for emotional versus neutral stimuli (p > .05). 
This suggests that for voices, statistically, early posterior negativity as well as frontal positivity did 
not differ for emotional versus neutral voices between 130 and 200ms. This is illustrated in Figure 
5.5. 
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b) Late effects: 
300 – 600ms: At each pre-defined ROI, dependent t-tests were conducted with task (emotional vs 
neutral) as within-subject variable. Data from faces did not reveal any significant differences in mean 
amplitude or latency for processing emotional and neutral stimuli in posterior ROI (p > .05). This 
finding suggests that brainwaves for rating emotions in faces were not different to rating neutral faces 
during later stages of processing.  
For voices, two ROIs were identified that both showed positive deflections; hence, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted with area (2: frontal versus central) and task (2: emotional versus 
neutral) as within-subject factors. Results revealed a significant main effect for task, F(1, 10) = 5.23, p 
< .05, pes = .34. Emotional voices (M = 3.48, SE = .66) had significantly higher mean amplitudes than 
neutral voices (M = 1.67, SE = 1.09) across fronto-central sites. There was no main or interaction 
effect for amplitude differences in area (p > .05). For measures of latency, there was a significant 
main effect for area, F(1, 10) = 12.48, p < .05, pes = .56 and positive deflections in the frontal ROI (M 
= 387.76, SD = 12.81) occurred at significantly earlier latencies than in the central ROI (M = 436.11, 
SE = 13.11). There was no significant main effect for task latency (p > .05). 
In summary, faces did not show any significant differences in processing neutral versus 
emotional stimuli during any of the given time-windows apart from a subtle right hemisphere 
advantage. Voice ERPs on the other hand differed for emotional and neutral stimuli for the first time 
at around 100ms after stimulus onset as reflected in an increased early frontal positivity. For later 
stages of processing, voices showed increased fronto-central positivity for processing emotional 
compared to neutral voices which was earlier for frontal than for central ROIs (this is illustrated in 
Figure 5.5). 
600-900ms: Since none of the included time-windows showed any emotion-effects at all during the 
discrimination of emotional versus neutral face expression, it was necessary to ensure that no 
emotion effects occurred after the first 600ms. Hence, a fourth time-window was included (600 and 
900ms), specifically for faces, to observe the possibility of a very late positive component within the 
posterior region that would have otherwise been missed. Related t-tests showed that even for the very 
late time-window, the posterior positivity for discriminating emotional from neutral faces did not 
show any significant effects for either amplitude or latency (p > .05). 
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5.3.2.2. Emotion Differentiation (angry versus happy) 
a) Early effects: 
70 – 130ms: For each pre-defined ROI and its polarity, dependent t-tests were conducted with task 
(angry versus happy) as within-subject variable. For faces, neither positivity in posterior ROI nor 
negativity in frontal ROI showed significant differences in mean amplitude or latency measures for 
categorising happy or angry stimuli.  
Similarly, for voices, neither frontal positivity nor posterior negativity differed significantly in 
mean amplitude or latency measures for categorising happy or angry stimuli (p > .05).  
130 – 200ms: For the present time-window, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with 
electrodes (P7, P8, PO7, PO8) x task (angry versus happy) as within-subject factors. For faces, there 
was a significant main effect for electrode over posterior regions, F(3, 30) = 3.93, p < .05, pes = .28. 
Electrode P8 (M = -6.61, SE = 1.3) in the right hemisphere showed a greatest negativity at a latency of 
166.09ms. However, after applying post-hoc Sidak comparisons, none of the differences between 
pairs of electrodes remained significant. Further, there was no significant main effect for task. 
Equally, mean latency was not affected by condition (p > .05). This is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6. Faces: Angry (red) versus happy (blue) at posterior ROI (P8). No significant effects in mean 
amplitude and mean latencies at the first positive peak, second negative deflection and late stage. N.s. 
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For each of the pre-defined ROIs and their polarities in voices, dependent t-tests were 
conducted with task (angry versus happy) as within-subject variable. Posterior negativity did not 
differ in mean amplitude between happy and angry stimuli in the given time-window.  Latency 
showed a close-to-significant difference, t(1, 10) = 4.27, p = .066 with a relatively high effect size 
(pes = .3). Negative deflections over the posterior ROI for angry voices (M = 155.9, SD = 3.47) 
occurred earlier than for happy voices (M = 164, SD = 3.32). Anterior positivity did not differ for 
amplitude as well as latency measures for happy versus angry voices (p > .05). This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.7 (electrode FP2). 
 
Figure 5.7. Voices: Angry (red) versus happy (blue) at frontal ROI (FP2). No significant emotion effects in the 
first stage (n.s.), close-to-significant latency differences in the second stage (p = .06) and significant latency 
effects for the third stage (*p < .05). 
b) Late effects: 
300 – 600ms: For the pre-defined ROI, dependent t-tests were conducted with task (angry versus 
happy) as within-subject variable. For faces, there were no significant differences in waveforms over 
the posterior ROI for processing angry or happy stimuli within the given time-window (p > .05),.  
For voices within the given time-range, the current study has identified two ROIs that both 
showed positive deflections; hence, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with area (frontal 
versus central) and task (angry versus happy) as within-subject factors.  
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For amplitude measures in the given time-window, there were no significant main effects for either 
task or area (p > .05). For latency, there was a significant main effect for task, F(1, 10) = 9.03, p < 
.05, pes = .47 with angry voices (M = 394.13, SE = 13.52) showing significantly earlier latencies of 
positive deflections than happy voices (M = 433.67, SE = 17.71) over fronto-central sites. Further, 
there was a significant main effect for area, F(1, 10) = 6.23, p < .05, pes = .38 and frontal areas (M = 
396.4, SE = 13.93) showed significantly earlier positive peaks during the given time-window than 
central regions (M = 431.71, SE = 17.73). This is illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
In summary, during the first time-window, neither faces nor voices showed different 
waveforms for rating happy or angry stimuli - in fact, faces did not show any significant emotion-
differentiation effects within any given time-window. Between 130 and 200ms, angry voices showed 
an earlier deflection than happy voices over posterior sites although this was only marginally 
significant (p = .066). In the final processing stage of voices, this anger-superiority effect became 
significant over fronto-central sites.  
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5.4. Discussion 
The present ERP study investigated for the first time in a within-subject design whether faces 
as well as non-verbal vocalisations showed comparable neural patterns of activity during emotion 
processing. Further, it was of interest whether emotions were processed in distinct, hierarchical stages. 
This was predicted to start with a pre-emotional processing stage before moving on the broad emotion 
versus neutral discrimination and ending with narrow discrimination between angry and happy 
stimuli.  
Data from the present ERP study indicated that for faces, there were no early emotion effects 
visible across three distinct time-windows of processing. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, comparable 
emotion stages between voices and faces could not be consistently found. For voices, participants 
showed emotion effects within the first 100ms and - according to Hypothesis 2 - this processing 
seemed to occur in hierarchical manner. Broad discrimination between emotional and neutral voices 
happened before the enhanced processing of angry compared to happy voices in later stages.  Overall, 
present data identified specific emotion processing stages in the voice condition; however, those 
stages could not be replicated in the face condition.   
 
5.4.1. Sensory Processing Stage (70-130ms) 
5.4.1.1. Faces  
The first time-window was included in order to investigate whether early sensory processing 
of faces and voices can be modulated by emotion content. The results of the current study suggested 
that for faces, the first processing stage between 70 and 130ms was not significantly influenced by the 
emotional load of displayed faces. The waveforms for neutral and emotional as well as for angry and 
happy faces were comparable. Contrary to the present results, very early emotion effects during visual 
perception have previously been suggested. For example, Batty and Taylor (2003) suggested 
automatic processing of emotional versus neutral faces in posterior brain regions as early as 90ms 
after stimulus onset. Indeed, visual stimuli that have been associated with affective meaning following 
electric shocks yielded better results in a visual search task and also increased brain activity in the 
primary visual cortex V1 (Padmala & Pessoa, 2008). This association between affective meaning of 
faces and early visual perception could not be replicated in the present study.  
However, the current findings are in line with previous accounts of pre-emotional processing 
during sensory face perception. For example, Krolak-Salmon et al. (2001) found earliest 
discrimination between emotional versus neutral faces at 250 to 550ms after stimulus onset.  
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This effect was mainly visible in occipital brain areas. In agreement with this, emotional versus 
neutral faces also showed a larger occipital-temporal negativity as late as 200 to 400ms in a study by 
Marinkovic and Halgren (1998).   
The current ERP data on emotional face processing supports the first pre-emotional stage of 
the hierarchical three-stage processing model in voices by Schirmer and Kotz (2006). According to 
this model, early voice processing within the first 100ms based on perceptual features is independent 
of emotional content as reported by Engelien et al. (2000). Consequently, it is possible that the first 
stage of Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) voice model can be extended to emotion processing in faces, too.  
 
5.4.1.2. Voices  
Data from the present study found very early emotion modulation of the ERP signal during 
early sensory processing stages: Current results demonstrated enhanced broad discrimination for 
emotional versus neutral non-verbal affect vocalisations around 100ms after stimulus onset in frontal 
brain regions. Further, in line with Hypothesis 2 of a hierarchical emotion process model, there was 
no specific emotion-category discrimination such as between happy and angry vocalisations.  
In line with the first stage of Schirmer and Kotz’s model (2006) and ERP face data reported 
above, initial processing of sensory information happens irrespectively of emotional content within 
the first 100ms after stimulus onset. This statement, however, has been challenged by the current 
voice data as well as by Iredale et al. (2001) who reported emotion effects in prosody between 50 and 
100ms. In support, during an fMRI study, non-verbal affect vocalizations such as laughing did not 
only activate the amygdala but also directly enhanced auditory cortex activation (Sander & Scheich, 
2005). Since Schirmer and Kotz (2006) based their voice processing model on prosody rather than on 
non-verbal affect bursts, it is possible that the affect modulation on non-verbal vocalisation may be 
happening earlier due to prototypical presentation of emotion stimuli.  
The present brain activity pattern of frontal positivity and posterior negativity during voice 
perception can typically be found at around 160ms and previously been termed as ‘fronto-temporal 
positivity to voices’ (FTPV) by Charest et al. (2009). The current data suggests firstly that the FTPV 
response may already occur at around 100ms after stimulus onset in non-verbal affect vocalisations. 
Indeed, Rogier, Roux, Belin, Bonnet-Brilhault and Bruneau (2010) reported a typical FTPV response 
at fronto-temporal sited in children as early as 60ms after stimulus onset. Secondly, the current data 
further suggests that the FTPV may be modulated by emotional content of voices. In accordance with 
this, Kryklywy et al. (2013) conducted a functional neuroimaging study and concluded that the 
auditory ‘what’ pathway was also influenced by emotionality of voices. 
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Alternative accounts of the present frontal activation also exist: For example, it has been 
proposed that humans may exhibit a ‘prefrontal auditory domain’ that also shows activation during 
emotion processing (Fecteau, Armony, Joanette, & Belin, 2005). Following present results, it is 
possible that this prefrontal auditory region processes emotional significance of non-verbal 
vocalisations as early as 100ms after stimulus onset.  
Overall, the earliest time-window reported an early posterior negativity (EPN) and frontal 
positivity in voices, but not in faces. This EPN could possible reflect early voice-specific responses in 
the auditory ‘what’ pathway’ that are modulated by emotional significance as early as 100ms post 
stimulus onset.  
 
5.4.2. Modality-specific processing stage (130 – 200ms) 
5.4.2.1. Faces 
For the second time-window, topographic maps from the current ERP data indicated a frontal 
positivity and occipito-parietal negativity around 170ms after stimulus onset as commonly found 
during the face-specific N170 component. However, this pattern was not statistically different for 
processing emotional and neutral faces. Current ERP responses suggest that faces may be encoded 
independently of emotional significance at around 170ms. The current study is not the only one to 
suggest emotion-independent face processing responses at the N170 component: For example, Eimer 
and Holmes (2002) also reported N170 waveforms that were unaffected by the emotionality of faces. 
According to Bruce and Young’s face perception model (1986), it is possible that the extraction of 
facial features used to recognise face expressions may to some extend be functionally segregated from 
extracting facial features for general face perception.  
The current analysis also found a subtle right hemisphere advantage during emotional face 
processing at a latency of 170ms after stimulus onset. Although this findings was only close to being 
significant (p = .06), it is in line with the common assumption of emotion processing within the right 
hemisphere (e.g. Blonder, Bowers, & Heilman, 1991). Hemispheric differences after rating face 
expressions indicate that some emotion-typical processing may be happening within the right 
posterior region in the given time-window. This is likely to reflect enhanced activity in the right STS 
and FFA during processing of face expressions (Ganel et al., 2005).  
On a different note, it is, however, possible that emotion-effects reported for the N170 
component depend upon the commonly used reference electrode as noted by Rellecke, Sommer and 
Schacht (2013): When using an average reference, studies such as by Batty and Taylor (2003) or Blau 
et al. (2007) reported emotion effects for the N170 whilst for studies using the linked mastoid as 
average reference (e.g. Eimer & Holmes, 2002) often failed to find emotion effects in the N170.  
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Since the present study used a linked mastoid reference, it is possible that emotion effects at the 
temporal-occipital N170 component are not visible as effects seem to be smaller when reference and 
recording sites are close to each other (Rellecke et al., 2013).  
5.4.2.2. Voices  
Although the topographical ERP map suggested a frontal positivity and posterior negativity at 
around 170ms which may reflect the FTPV response, the present study did not find significant 
emotion effects during the discrimination of neutral and emotional affect vocalisations.  
This finding for the voice condition is in line with findings from the face condition: neither found 
significant effects of rating emotional versus neutral faces during the second time-window. However, 
for emotion-specific discrimination between happy and angry stimuli, activity in the second time-
window reveals close-to-significant effects (p = .066) with surprisingly early posterior negativity. 
This occurred earlier for angry compared to happy voices at around 155ms.  In line with Hypothesis 2, 
the current pattern demonstrates a hierarchical emotion mechanism as the early time-window 
demonstrated broad emotional versus neutral voice discrimination, followed by narrower anger versus 
happiness voice discrimination in the subsequent time-window.  
It is possible that this negativity for angry voices coincides with the FTPV response at round 
160ms after stimulus onset. Interestingly, the regions within the STS are also commonly associated 
with the specific processing of angry voices (Grandjean et al., 2005; Sander et al., 2005). Note, 
however, that the current study did not find significant frontal positivity effects in the given time-
window which is commonly thought to accompany the FTPV response.  
The current proposal that threatening emotions such as anger seemed to be processed earlier 
than happy voices has previously been supported by Sauter and Eimer (2009) who also found 
enhanced processing of fearful non-verbal vocalisations at around 150ms after stimulus onset. This 
negativity bias may have evolutionary reasons: Earlier latencies could reflect faster processing and in 
order to enhance survival and minimize threat, it is important to rapidly detect the angry person 
(Hansen & Hanson, 1988). 
Overall, neither faces nor voices showed discrimination effects between emotional and 
neutral stimuli during the second time-window. However, voice data indicated an anger-superiority 
effect at around 170ms in posterior regions which possibly suggests early STS activation for emotion-
specific vocalisations. For faces a small right hemisphere advantage was noted in the same time-
window and region, suggesting some degree of emotion processing within the right hemisphere. 
Although this did not survive statistical post-hoc comparisons, by including a larger sample in future 
studies, this effect from the present study may eventually become significant.  
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5.4.3. Late processing stage (300-600ms) 
5.4.3.1. Faces 
The present ERP data did not find any statistically significant differences in waveforms for 
emotional versus neutral faces during the third time-window.  
To ensure no late activity was missed, the time-window got extended to the first 900ms after stimulus 
onset, but again, no significant brain activity related to the specific processing of emotions was 
recorded over posterior regions. According to the majority of past ERP studies investigating emotion 
recognition in faces, emotion effects are consistently reported to occur within the first 200-300ms of 
processing (e.g. Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Sato et al., 2001).  
Commonly, within the first 400ms, a late posterior negativity or frontal positivity for emotional 
compared to neutral faces is found, which possibly reflects projections from the amygdala back to the 
visual cortex (Sato et al., 2001).  
One possible explanation for the lack of emotion effects in faces could be that the used 
stimuli were not salient enough to elicit a significant ERP signal. Especially the ERP signal around 
300 and 450ms seems to be higher for high-arousing compared to low-arousing faces (Rozenkrants & 
Polich, 2008). Similarly, between 400 and 800ms, the late positive potential (LPP) was found to be 
enhanced for images with a high compared to low degree of arousal (Leite, Carvalho, Galdo-Alvarez, 
Alves, Sampaio, & Goncalves, 2012). Hence, although not statistically tested, it is possible that 
differences in arousal levels between neutral and emotional stimuli in the present study are too subtle 
and did not get picked up in the ERP signal. 
Secondly, the current study did not find different waveforms for angry compared to happy 
faces during the final time-window. The lack of emotion-specific effects could, again, be attributed to 
the possibility of similar degrees of arousal in happy and angry faces. However, lack of emotion-
specific effects in the late time-window is not uncommon: for example Eimer and Homes (2007) 
reported global emotion effects that lasted up to 1 second but were unaffected by the specific emotion 
category. According to Eimer and Holmes (2007), this lack of emotion-specific effects could be 
evidence for one general emotion core network of face processing. For example, the amygdala has 
been associated with not only with fear processing (Morris et al., 1998) but also equally with 
happiness and anger processing (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006). However, it is 
to note that whilst Eimer and Holmes (2007) compared brain waves for six individual basic emotions, 
the current study only compared one positive with one negative emotion category and due to the 
current study design, these emotions were judged implicitly rather than explicitly.  
Further, it is possible that the current design of the study additionally limited emotion effects 
between angry and happy stimuli by balancing the number of angry and happy stimuli that expressed 
emotions with open mouths and teeth visible.  
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Previously, it has been proposed that happiness superiority effects in faces may be the confounding 
result of global visual features such as displaying white teeth (Schyns et al., 2009). Hence, it is 
possible that for the current study, visual features were comparable across both emotions which in 
turn results in comparable ERP waveforms.  
5.4.3.2. Voices 
During the later stage of emotion processing, a late positive component over fronto-central 
sites was found for the discrimination of emotional versus neutral as well as for angry versus happy 
vocalisations. The late stage of processing in frontal brain regions may reflect conscious evaluation of 
emotions (Eimer & Holmes).  It has for example been stated that the amygdala is functionally 
connected with the medial prefrontal cortex (Kim, Gee, Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2010) which may 
couple bottom-up emotion experience and top-down emotion appraisal (Whalen et al., 2013).  
Secondly, for voices within the third time-window, there were separate waveforms for angry 
and happy voices that differed in their mean latencies but not in mean amplitudes. This late positivity 
seemed to apply especially to frontal brain areas. According to Hypothesis 2, this hierarchical 
processing of emotions supports Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) stage model which suggests broad 
emotion discrimination before narrow emotion-specific processing in the third stage. The present 
findings are supported by Iredale et al. (2013) who suggested that at the third processing stage 
between 400 and 650ms, sentences spoken with angry or happy prosody elicited different brain waves 
at frontal sites. As for the second time-window, angry vocalisations had earlier mean latencies 
compared to happy vocalisations, but at the third stage, this comparison was statistically more 
significant. Again, brain activity for emotion-specific processed seemed to move from a posterior 
negativity in the second time-window to a frontal positivity in the third time-window.  
Interestingly, damage to frontal lobe regions has also been associated with impaired emotion 
recognition in faces as well as in affect vocalisations (Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996). Although not all 
participants were impaired across both modalities, Hornak et al.’s (1996) data supports the current 
findings that emotion recognition abilities may indeed be linked to pre-frontal activity. Alternatively, 
it is possible that the fronto-central activation seen in the current study reflects processes in deeper 
brain structures such as the amygdala which is commonly associated with emotion processing. For 
example, the amygdala is often activated when listening to non-verbal exclamations of laughter and 
crying (Sander & Scheich, 2005). 
Overall, faces did not show any emotion-effects for either emotional versus neutral nor for 
angry versus happy discrimination during late stages of emotion processing. For voices, emotional 
versus neutral as well as happy versus angry comparisons yielded significant differences in fronto-
central regions.  This suggests that angry vocalisations had earlier mean latencies than happy 
vocalisations at 300ms after stimulus onset.  
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It is possible that in the present within-subject design, participants perceived vocalisations are more 
arousing that static faces which results in the null-effect seen for the face condition. 
5.4.4. Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
Results from the present ERP study suggested that Schirmer and Kotz’s (2006) hierarchical 
model of prosody processing may also extend to emotional non-verbal vocalisations. However, the 
distinct emotion processing stages seem to be occurring earlier for vocalisations compared to prosody 
which may be due to prototypical representation of emotions in vocalisations. Further, the present 
study did not find pre-emotional stages of sensory processing, which suggest very rapid and automatic 
processing of emotional vocalisations.  
In order to increase statistical significance in the present ERP study, it is necessary to increase 
the number of participants. Further, the current data may have contained some low levels of noise as it 
was conducted during hot summer days and sweat may influence electrical skin conductance and 
consequently decrease statistical power (Kappenman & Luck, 2010). Additionally, it was not possible 
to relate brain activity to behavioural findings due to a technical error. Hence, it is not known whether 
the ERP signal corresponds to accuracy rates of emotion categorisation across modalities. Further, the 
current ERP study was conducted with male participants only; hence, the results can neither be 
generalised across gender now can it explore potential gender differences during emotion recognition 
in voices and faces. However, since the behavioural chapters in this thesis did not find any main 
effects of gender, this was not the main focus of this ERP study.  
Possible implications may arise from the current study: If applied to the real world, it is 
possible that voices communicate emotional intend earlier than face expressions. In an evolutionary 
context, it is possible that recognising emotional voices rather than emotional faces is important for 
threat avoidance in situations where vision is limited such as in darkness. This reflects verbal 
feedback from participants after the ERP study who found the voices as ‘more exciting’ than the faces 
which in turn possibly motivated attention and emotion processing.   
 
5.4.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present ERP study investigated in a within-subject design how similar 
emotion processes across two separate modalities are. Whilst the current data did not suggest 
significant emotion categorisation effects across any of the three time-windows for faces, voices 
showed distinct and hierarchical stages of processing with early discrimination of emotional versus 
neutral vocalisations and subsequent discrimination of angry versus happy vocalisations.  
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In terms of modality similarities, the current study could not confirm equal emotion-processing stages 
across faces and voices. However, there were also some similarities – at least to a degree - between 
emotion processing across faces and voices: for example, during the structural face and voice-
decoding response such as the N170 and FTPV at around 150-170ms, neither of the modalities 
showed waveforms that were influenced by the emotionality of stimuli.  
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6 
General Discussion & Conclusions 
How do we recognise emotions from individual modalities such as faces or voices? The aim 
of the present thesis was to investigate the above question in a multi-method manner and to 
investigate how this ability develops with age and how it varies depending on cultural factors. 
Implementing a within-subject design to rate emotions across modalities counteracts the many 
different measures and stimuli previously used in emotion recognition research which make 
comparisons of results difficult (Bayer & Schacht, 2014). For the present investigation, cognitive, 
developmental, longitudinal, cross-cultural and neuroimaging studies as well as an online-survey were 
conducted in order to investigate from several viewpoints whether emotion recognition was 
comparable across faces and voices.  
Chapter 2 suggested that emotions presented in one modality can be recognised in comparable 
manner with emotions presented in a second, separate modality. Consequently, there is a possibility 
that emotions are categorised more on the appraisal of the events itself (Scherer, 1984) rather than on 
perceptual features such as the typical smile in happy faces (Ekman & Friesen, 2003). It has been 
hypothesised that there may be one general emotion core network which acts independently of 
modality (Peelen et al., 2010) and the current behavioural data supports this statement.   
Chapter 3 suggested that this modality-independent emotion processing may be a feature of 
development because as age increased, recognition across modalities became more similar. Across 
both modalities, emotion recognition improved with age. Findings from the child Chapter 3 
additionally validated the newly developed child face database DDCF (Dalrymple, Gomez, & 
Duchaine, 2013) for the use in children which has not been tested before. The present longitudinal 
study indicated, however, that emotion processing development in faces may happen in stages which 
cover periods longer than 1.5 years before changes are visible. Overall, children’s facial emotion 
recognition was not influenced by in-group age effects.  
The originality of the current investigation into emotion recognition has further been 
demonstrated by comparing German and British individuals in their emotion recognition. Chapter 4, 
showed universal signs of basic emotion recognition which were coloured by subtle differences 
depending on culture, in line with the Dialect theory (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003). It is possible that 
underlying differences in display rules such as the German reservedness (e.g. Wouters, 2011) may be 
linked to dampened intensity perception in the German compared to the British sample.  
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Children on the other hand showed less vulnerability to culture effects during emotion recognition; 
hence, it is possible that whilst general developmental aspects drive emotion recognition during 
childhood, only in adulthood does culture drive emotion recognition.  
Lastly, the present ERP Chapter 5 aimed to investigate neurophysiological features of 
emotion processing across two separate modalities. Hierarchical emotion processing stages were 
found on the voice condition with emotion processing visible as early as 100ms after stimulus onset. 
However, no emotion effects were visible for the face condition. Overall, the results of the current 
ERP study remain preliminary and further testing needs to be conducted with a larger sample size. 
 
6.1. Role of Modality  
For humans, it is a necessity to be able to recognise emotions when we only have access to 
one modality such as in darkness or in noisy situations. Across all three behavioural chapters, the 
present thesis concludes that participants rated emotions from separate modalities with more 
similarities than dissimilarities. The similarity across modalities became especially evident during the 
analysis of confusion matrixes in Chapter 2 and 3. For each participant, rating patterns for each 
emotion were highly correlated across modalities and this correlation became stronger with age whilst 
younger children showed a face-preference. 
Similar pattern of emotion perception across modalities questions the reliance on perceptual 
features during emotion classification. Instead, the researcher proposes the idea that there may be 
similar underlying emotion mechanisms which are shared across modalities and guided by cognitive 
appraisal such as novelty and pleasantness (Scherer, 1984). This may be despite the great perceptual 
difference in sensory inputs from faces and voices. An emotion-general core network that acts 
independently of modality has previously been proposed by Peelen et al. (2010). In addition, neuronal 
structures such as the amygdala also seem to process emotions independently of their perceptual 
features (Adolphs, 2002; Phillips et al., 1998). The present findings suggest that not only person-
identity from voices and faces (Yovel & Belin, 2013), but also emotion recognition from voices and 
faces may share common underlying coding mechanisms. Additionally, there may also be a 
perceptual interdependence of physical features during emotion production. For example, muscular 
activation of the mouth and tongue, which reflect functionally adaptive behaviours such as vomiting, 
not only creates the typical face expression of disgust but also activates musculature in the upper 
vocal tract, creating typical vocal expressions of disgust (Scherer, 1994). This may explain the 
similarity of rating patterns of emotions across two separate and independent modalities. 
This modality-independent rating pattern may, however, be a feature of adult emotion 
recognition whilst children during years at primary school relied more on facial than on auditory 
emotion information. Further, cultural differences may affect the strength of modality similarities. The 
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similarity across modalities was weaker within the German adult sample as there was a face reliance 
in emotion recognition, especially for German men. Children on the other hand did not seem to differ 
in their degree of modality similarities across cultures and culture-independent early face reliance 
with later modality-independent processing was evident in both countries.  
What could be the benefit of modality similarities during emotion recognition? In real life, 
emotions in faces or voices may not always be expressed in isolation. In other words, it is very 
common that emotions are expressed multimodally and simultaneously across modalities.  In order to 
make sense of our environment and everyday life, we need to successfully integrate emotion cues 
from several independent modalities such as faces or voices. Multimodal emotion recognition is 
believed to be superior to unimodal emotion recognition from single modalities (Ethofer et al., 2006) 
and attending to one modality may change the perception of another modality in situation where 
visual and auditory inputs don’t match (Collignon et al., 2008).  
The benefit of a possible shared emotion mechanism across faces and voices could be the 
successful integration of modalities in shared brain regions such as the STS (Kreifelts, Ethofer, 
Shiozawa, Grodd, & Wildgruber, 2009). Indeed, research into congruent and incongruent emotion 
cues across modalities hints at a strong link between processing emotion signals from faces and voices 
that cannot simply be switched off – in line with the idea of a shared emotion mechanism. For 
example, De Gelder and Vroomen (2000) suggested that the recognition of emotions expressed in 
faces was influenced by the simultaneously presented emotion expressed in voices and vice versa. 
Purposely attempting to focus on one channel alone did not break this mandatory link between 
processing of emotions from faces and voices simultaneously. Similarly, Ethofer et al. (2006) 
suggested the bidirectional link between two separate modalities during congruent emotion 
perception. So called cross-modal effects were visible when fearful faces were presented with a 
simultaneous fearful voice, enhancing the emotion perception of fear by integrating congruent 
emotion signals from two separate modalities. This enhanced emotion perception of fear across two 
modalities was also reflected in an enhanced hemodynamic response in the emotion structure 
amygdala during an fMRI study.  
In terms of incongruent emotion perception, the recognition of ambiguous face or voice 
expressions was influenced by the simultaneous presentation of bodily expressions of emotions (van 
den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). Collignon et al. (2008) suggested that for incongruent 
emotion pairs, visual emotion signals commonly overrode auditory emotion signals – although this 
was less common if the visual signal was unreliable and noisy. This carry-over effect of incongruent 
emotions across modalities suggests a link between emotion signals from faces and voices that 
influence the bidirectional perception. This in turn is consistent with the idea of a shared emotion 
network, independent of modality.  
The superior temporal sulcus is believed to be involved in dynamic information from faces 
such as gaze and face expressions (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000). Interestingly, parts of 
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the STS are also believed to include temporal voice areas (Charest et al., 2009) which are active 
during processing of auditory voice information such as prosody. This shared use of neural structures 
during emotion recognition across modalities may enable the integration of information from several 
modalities. Indeed, the STS is commonly associated with multimodal emotion recognition: For 
example, Hagan, Woods, Johnson, Calder, Green and Young (2009) suggested increased activity in 
posterior regions of the STS during the combined processing of static faces and non-verbal emotion 
vocalizations. Kreifelts, Ethofer, Shiozawa, Grodd and Wildgruber (2009) reported a functional 
segregation of emotion processing in the STS with the trunk showing voice-selective activation whilst 
the ascending branch showed face sensitive activation. Grippingly, in the middle regions of the STS 
that spatially overlapped between face – and voice-selective regions, activity during audio-visual 
emotion recognition was recorded.  
Hence, it is possible that the similarities of emotion recognition across separate modalities - as 
demonstrated by the current behavioural results – smooth the way for the integration of emotions from 
several modalities in the STS. Alternatively, every-day exposure to multimodal emotion expressions 
may have strengthened the associations of emotion representations from individual modalities so that 
the recognition from one isolated modality is associated with the recognition from another isolated 
modality. This could also possibly explain how the degree of modality similarity developed 
throughout childhood (see Chapter 3) as the associations between emotions expressed in individual 
modalities become stronger with every-day experience of multimodal emotion expressions. 
 
6.2. Nature of Emotions 
One main finding of the current thesis was that, although emotion recognition may be 
anchored in our genetic make-up, this ability improved with age, in line with research by de 
Sonneville et al. (2002) and others. The present thesis attempted to shed some light on how much 
variance is accounted for by nature or nurture effects during emotion recognition by including 
developmental as well as cross-cultural data. As presented in the following paragraphs, the present 
thesis has delivered support for – at least to some degree – universal emotion recognition abilities 
across age and culture, but also specific emotion recognition abilities that varied according to age and 
culture. 
 
6.2.1. Early Emotion Recognition Mechanisms 
Do humans have an innate core system of emotion recognition? One perspective of emotion 
recognition is the view of emotions as a ‘natural kind’ (Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2007) which suggests 
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that emotions are of biological and categorical origin that is enrooted in every mammalian brain. 
Universal biological responses to arousing events can then be interpreted as emotions (James, 1884; 
Lange, 1885).  In support of this statement, the current thesis demonstrated firstly that children 
showed similar emotion recognition patterns to adults and secondly that British and German 
participants showed similarities in basic emotion recognition despite belonging to separate cultures.  
As suggested by Darwin (1872) and Izard (1994), humans may be born with an innate 
emotion expression as well as recognition capacity as part of evolution and successful threat 
avoidance mechanisms. This can also be seen in 5 month-olds’ ability to discriminate between 
different types of emotions expressed in faces (e.g. Bornstein &Arterberry, 2003). In the 
developmental Chapter 3, the similar rating patterns of emotions across two separate modalities were 
found for children and adults alike. Those patterns also seem to be largely independent of gender. 
Findings suggest that certain basic aspects of emotion recognition are independent of external effects 
and emotion recognition may exist from an early age onwards. However, it is important to note that 
the present thesis did not include children under the age of 5 and hence the researcher cannot draw 
conclusions about innate abilities of emotion recognition that are evident from birth. In addition, 
children’s responses were independent of the age of actors suggesting that children did not prefer to 
rate emotions from members of the same age-group as suggested by Bracovic et al. (2012).  Those 
arguments are in favour of the idea that we may have a general emotion system that recognises 
prototypical emotions in others, independently of external factors such as age of actors.   
Does culture contribute to the way we experience and recognise emotions in faces and 
voices? Previously, Izard (1980) stated that basic emotions are recognised universally across literate 
as well as illiterate cultures. Current results from the adult sample in Chapter 4 partly support the idea 
that there are indeed certain aspects of emotion recognition that may be universal. For example, 
Chapter 4 reported scores from a relatively large-scale questionnaire on self-reported emotional 
reactivity that were comparable between British and German participants (N = 215). Looking at 
emotion recognition scores, there were no main effects of culture for either the adult or the child 
sample. Further, the current results for adults suggested that happy stimuli were rated preferentially 
compared to angry stimuli and this was found to be true for both countries. For children, general 
emotion recognition performance improved across both countries and older children showed almost 
identical emotion recognition scores for all six emotions between Germany and Great Britain. This 
finding is interesting as it suggests that emotion recognition processes in older children may be guided 
by culture-independent developmental factors such as brain maturation or general school attendance. 
Hypothetically, it is possible that we humans have an innate emotion core-system that is universal but 
at the same time also universally programmed to develop in certain predetermined stages, independent 
of external factors such as culture and society.  
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6.2.2. Learnt Emotion Recognition Mechanisms 
On the other hand, it is possible that emotion recognition is additionally influenced by 
external factors and may change throughout a lifetime. For example, older adults often show a 
positivity bias in emotion recognition (Isaacowitz et al., 2006), which, according to learning theories, 
may be based on past experiences and learnt positive or negative reinforcements (Dollard & Miller, 
1941). Results from the present thesis support the idea of emotion recognition abilities that may be 
influenced by developmental as well as by cultural aspects. It is commonly believed that emotion 
recognition abilities mature with age throughout childhood (Herba & Phillips, 2004) and even until 
adulthood (Thomas, de Bellis, Graham, & LaBar; 2007). This has for example been related to the 
development of social brain structures such as the anterior temporal cortex throughout childhood 
(Mills et al., 2014). In line with appraisal theories (e.g. Scherer, 1984), it is possible that cognitive 
appraisal of events such as novelty and pleasantness changes with age. 
Current results from the developmental Chapter 3 support the idea of age-related effects on 
emotion processing. For example, modality ratings became more similar with age. This finding is 
intriguing as it poses the idea that younger children may base emotion recognition on perceptual 
differences across modalities whilst older children may recognise emotions independently of the 
modality and perceptual features. Up until adulthood, RTs as well as intensity ratings also increased 
with age; this was true for both modalities. Again, this is in support of appraisal theories (e.g. Frijda et 
al., 1989; Scherer, 1984) as this suggests that general cognitive evaluation of events takes place in 
adulthood which is independent of modality.  
In line with one assumption of the current thesis, which stated that emotion recognition may 
be based on inferring mental states of others, children’s Theory of Mind abilities also increased with 
age which in turn had a positive impact on speed for rating emotions in faces as well as in voices. 
Further, children rated child faces with higher intensity than adult faces when they expressed anger. 
Interestingly, the recognition of angry faces may be context-dependent: Children may be more 
programmed to recognise anger in others when the emotion is expressed by members of their own 
age-group. Lastly, in support of importance of age on emotion-recognition, results from the adult 
Chapter 2 implied that emotion intensity ratings as well as rating speed were negatively affected by 
increasing age. Overall, findings from the present thesis have outlined that external factors such as age 
may indeed influence the pathway of emotion development. The age-variable could be replaced with 
several other interacting factors such as cognitive development – such as Theory of Mind abilities. 
Although basic emotions are believed to be recognised universally (Izard, 1980), it is now 
commonly accepted that cultural norms and display rules (Buck, 1984) may influence emotion 
recognition. The present results of Chapter 4 are in line with the Dialect theory (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2003) which suggests that otherwise universal emotion recognition processes may be coloured by 
culture-specific factors. For example, results from Chapter 4 suggested that British children rated 
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emotions faster than German children whilst intensity ratings, did not differ between countries. Since 
the youngest children in Germany visited a nursery whereas the youngest children in Britain already 
visited primary schools, it is possible that external social factors such as school attendance influence 
emotion recognition processes. Further, although Chapter 4 did not find main effects for culture 
within the adult sample, British adults nonetheless rated 50% of emotion categories as more intense 
than German adults. The exception was for angry faces which were rated with higher intensity by the 
German than the British samples. Depending on cultural background, it is possible that subjective 
appraisal of events may have been altered which accounts for variation in emotion recognition across 
cultures (Scherer, 1984). However, it is possible that those social norms and display rules only take 
effect in adulthood because older children showed almost identical emotion intensity perception for 
all six emotion categories across both countries.   
 
6.3. Appropriateness of Design & Stimulus Choice 
A natural draw-back of past literature on emotion recognition across modalities is the vast 
amount of different measures, stimuli and samples used (Bayer & Schacht, 2014). Hence, the current 
within-subject design allowed for direct comparison of emotion recognition across faces and voices. 
Further, by rating each emotion on multiple emotion-scales, forced-choice answers were avoided 
which in turn reduced methodological artefacts, especially when comparing across cultures (Russell, 
1994). The choice of stimuli from the present thesis proved to be appropriate to investigate emotion 
recognition across children and adults from different cultures. For example, all actors as well as 
participants were White-Caucasian in order to reduce the possibility of out-group biasing during 
emotion recognition (Russell, 1994). The Montreal Affective Voices (Belin et al., 2008) are based on 
non-verbal features of the voice which facilitated emotion research across different cultures and 
children which may not be as verbally developed as adults.  
Although the Ekman POFA stimuli date back to 1975 and only contain black and white photographs, 
it is one of the most widely used and validated emotion face databases (Belin et al., 2008). 
The present developmental study included static face expressions as well as dynamic, non-
verbal affect bursts. Previous research suggested comparable task-difficulty for non-verbal affect 
vocalisations and face expressions (Hawk et al., 2009) whilst emotions recognised from speech 
prosody showed higher error rates (see also Sauter, Panattoni, & Happe, 2012). Present findings 
agreed with this and it seems possible that for static faces as well as for non-verbal affect bursts, 
emotions were portrayed in iconic and prototypical ways which are relatively easy to recognise across 
both modalities. This impression has been supported by Simon-Thomas et al. (2009) who reported 
higher recognition rates for prototypical compared to standard emotion expressions in vocal affect 
bursts. However, it is to note that whilst the current data supports the notion of participants’ 
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comparable emotion recognition abilities for vocal affect bursts and static face expressions, this may 
not apply to more general vocal emotion recognition paradigms such as prosody.   
Further, in order to investigate whether the current results could also be extended to dynamic 
face expressions, future studies could include dynamic 3D emotional face stimuli as developed by 
Girges, Spencer, & O’Brien (in print). So far, inferences from the present thesis are limited to 
judgements from categorical and static emotion expressions only. Stimuli used in the present thesis 
are also acted rather than spontaneous which allows a higher control in the experimental setting. 
However, acted emotion expressions may not be as realistic as spontaneously elicited emotions as 
their prototypical and stylistic representation of emotions may inflate recognition rates compared to 
prosody (Hawk et al., 2009; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986). Hence, the stimulus choice may have some 
influence on generalizability of results although Sauter (2014) suggested that affect bursts in general, 
whether acted or spontaneous, seem to be well recognised and appropriate for emotion research.  
The present study included six basic emotions as stated by Ekman and Friesen (1973). Whilst 
this covers a good range of emotion expression, it has been suggested that more than six emotions 
need to be studied in order to ensure that judgements aren’t simply based on discrimination processes 
(Banse & Scherer, 1996). This issue also applies to the happiness superiority effect consistently found 
in the present behavioural chapters. Because the present thesis compared one positive emotion 
(happiness) with several negative emotions, it is possible that the happiness superiority effect is an 
artefact of unbalanced valence of emotion included. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see 
Chapter 2 and 3. In line with this, the current ERP Chapter 5 only included one positive and one 
negative emotion and consequently could not find happiness superiority effects as reflected in 
neurological data. However, it is important to remember that the ERP Chapter 5 is a preliminary 
investigation only and further neurophysiological studies could extend the current findings.  
Lastly, in the current thesis, consistent findings of similarities between modalities for emotion 
recognition dominated; however, for some emotions such as happiness, emotion recognition in faces 
was faster than in voices. In a natural setting, humans usually integrate sensory information from 
multiple modalities. Although we tend to perceive inputs across modalities and often regard them as 
occurring simultaneously, the time course of processing visual and auditory signals in natural 
multimodal stimuli depends on the modality. For example – and in concordance with the current 
findings - light travels faster than sound waves (Fain, 2003) and hence, this may aid emotion 
recognition within the visual modality. This could be especially helpful in situations where auditory 
information is limited such as in noisy environments. However, the subsequent chemical transduction 
of sound into electrical signals within the human brain is faster than the transduction of light (King, 
2005), reducing the gap in processing time between visual and auditory stimuli. Indeed, in some 
realistic settings such as when talking to someone far away or in darkness, visual information is 
limited and auditory signals are the primary source of information. It has been stated that humans may 
integrate sensory information from different inputs by creating a temporal time-window in which the 
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synchronization of sensory information can occur. During this time-window, the time-delay between 
visual and auditory information can be eliminated and information is synchronized (Sugita & Suzuki, 
2003).  
Hence, it is important to notice that during multimodal integration of emotional stimuli from 
several modalities, the processing of sensory information may occur with a time-lag which in turn has 
to be processed by the brain accordingly. Signals from faces and voices –for example during audio-
visual speech – are often structured in a way so that the receiver perceives them simultaneously. For 
example, there seem to be a high correlation between perceived changes in mouth movements (visual 
input) and the auditory envelope (sound input) during the perception of audio-visual speech 
(Chandrasekaran, Trubanova, Stillittano, Caplier, & Ghazanfar, 2009). The current findings of high 
similarities in emotion recognition between faces and voices could possibly be a co-occurrence of 
successful integration of information during everyday life. Nonetheless, in the present thesis, 
similarities of emotion recognition from faces and voices were investigated within the laboratory 
setting where the information came from two separate sources: e.g. sound was delivered via 
headphones whilst vision was delivered via PC screens and signals were not presented 
simultaneously. Consequently, ecological validity may be somehow limited and future studies could 
address this issue. 
6.4. Future Directions 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous studies have investigated whether 
neural structures in children and adults are equally active during the processing of emotions in faces 
as well as in voices and whether those brain regions change over time. Since the present thesis has 
demonstrated that faces and voices show similarities in their behavioural rating profiles in adults, 
identifying the location of underlying brain activity in a within-subject design could help to answer 
the question about a modality-independent emotion core network. For example, is there a dissociation 
between regions that are active for emotion recognition in faces and regions that are active for 
emotion recognition in voices? Further, is there neurological evidence that the similarity of emotion 
recognition across modalities becomes stronger with age, as suggested by the data from the present 
thesis?  
In terms of processing abnormalities, another future direction of the current thesis could be to 
look at emotion processing abilities across modalities in individuals with autism spectrum disorders. 
Autism has been found to lead to impairment in emotion recognition from faces and also from voices 
(Philip et al., 2010) and in multimodal human stimuli (Mongillo, Irwin, Whalen, Klaiman, Carter, & 
Schultz, 2008). It is possible that important emotion brain structures such as the STS (Gervais et al., 
2004) or amygdala (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore, Wheelwright, Ashwin, & Williams, 2000) show 
reduced activation during emotion processing in autism. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
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there is no previous study that has investigated emotion recognition from non-verbal affect bursts – 
rather than prosody – and face processing in a within-subject design in individuals with autism. 
Extending the type of stimuli used in emotion research could help to identify whether individuals with 
abnormal processing have general emotion processing deficits or whether this may depend on the type 
of stimulus presentation.  
Further, assuming modality-independent emotion networks, it would be interesting to create 
interventions to increase emotion recognition abilities in individuals with emotion recognition deficits 
across a range of modalities. This has previously been proven effective for facial emotion recognition 
in children with high-functioning Autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009)  and it has previously been found 
that giving specific instructions to pay attention to emotions expressed in faces as well as in voices 
enhanced neural brain activity in prefrontal areas in individuals with autism. However, there is a 
striking lack of auditory interventions which limits the conclusions about modality-independent 
mechanisms one can draw from existing autism-intervention studies. 
In conclusion, behavioural results from the current thesis suggest a general core emotion 
network that may act independently of modality, as previously suggested (e.g. Peelen et al., 2010). 
This may be influenced by developmental or external factors such as culture. It seems that both faces 
and voices communicate emotion signals in parallel which allows us to recognise the other person’s 
emotional state. Hence, in light on the introductory Shakespeare’s quote from the Macbeth play 
(2010/1699), we may actually be able to find the mind’s construction – not only in the face, but also 
in the voice.  
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Appendix A – Adult Participants   
 
Chapter 2 & 4: INFORMED CONSENT SHEET 
Emotional Reactivity and typical emotional behaviour during emotional situations in adults across Germany and 
England 
 The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons who participate in 
psychology studies give their written consent to do so.  Please read the following and sign it if you agree with 
what it says.I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled “Emotional 
Reactions Across Different Countries” to be conducted with Lisa Kuhn and Prof. Taeko Wydell as supervisor or 
principal investigator. The broad goal of this research program is to explore how humans react to emotional 
situations across different countries. 
 Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to complete the following short questionnaire and give some 
basic information about my age, country of birth and so on. The session should take no longer than 10 minutes 
to complete. I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I also understand that if at any 
time during the session I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I am free to leave without negative consequences. 
That is, my participation in this study is completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this study at any time. 
My withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise. My name will not be linked with the 
research materials, as the researchers are interested in cross cultural performances in general - not in any 
particular individual's behaviour in particular. 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, and my questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I have been informed that if I have any general questions about this project, or 
ethical issues relating to the project, I should feel free to contact Lisa Kuhn at lisa.kuhn@brunel.ac.uk. If I have 
any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or has been conducted I may contact 
Professor Taeko Wydell, Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, at taeko.wydell@brunel.ac.uk. I 
have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. * My signature is not a waiver of 
any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for 
my records. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
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I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named has consented 
to participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
____________________                          ____________________________       ______________ 
Principal Investigator Signature              Please Print                           Date
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Chapter 2 & 4: DEBRIEFING FORM:  
Emotional Reactivity and typical emotional behaviour during emotional situations in adults across 
Germany and England 
 The aim of the study is to find out how human across different countries react to every day 
emotional situations. It is believed that humans across different countries show different emotional 
behaviour in emotional situations due to differences in display rules. More specifically, this study 
hopes to identify typical emotional reactions of participants depending on the country they are living 
in and to match those traits with the way we rate the emotional content of human voices and faces. 
Adults from Germany and England will participate in this study in order to compare the results cross-
culturally and investigate differences or similarities in emotional reactions and detecting emotions 
within the human voice and face.  
    
 In short, the predicted aims of this study are as follows: 
 
 Humans are able to detect basic emotions within non-human voice samples. 
 The detection of basic emotions within voice should be universal across different countries; 
participants from Germany and England will equally be able to detect emotions within the 
human voice. 
 Depending on the country of residency, humans could have different emotional reactions in 
certain situations which in turn could influence the way emotions are being perceived. 
 
If you want to learn more about the idea of this research, the following  
studies might be of interest to you: 
 
Affleck, G. , Tennen, H., Urrows, S., & Higgins, P. (1994). Person and contextual features of daily 
stress reactivity: Individual differences in relations of undesirable daily events with mood disturbance 
and chronic pain intensity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 329-340. 
 
Doherty, R. W. (1997). The emotional contagion scale: A measure of individual differences. Journal 
of nonverbal Behavior, 21(2), 131-154. 
 
Scherer, K. R., & Summerfield, A. B. (Eds.). (1986). Experiencing emotion: A cross-cultural study. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study. 
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ERS Online: INFORMED CONSENT SHEET  
Emotional Reactivity and typical emotional behaviour during emotional situations in adults across 
Germany and England 
 The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons who participate in 
psychology studies give their written consent to do so.  Please read the following and sign it if you agree with 
what it says. I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled “Emotional 
Reactions Across Different Countries” to be conducted with Lisa Kuhn and Prof. Taeko Wydell as supervisor or 
principal investigator. The broad goal of this research program is to explore how humans react to emotional 
situations across different countries. Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to complete the following 
short online questionnaire and give some basic information about my age, country of birth and so on. The 
session should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete.  
I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I also understand that if at any time during 
the session I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I am free to leave without negative consequences. That is, my 
participation in this study is completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this study at any time. My 
withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise. My name will not be linked with the 
research materials, as the researchers are interested in cross cultural performances in general - not in any 
particular individual's behaviour in particular. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the 
procedure, and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been informed that if I have any 
general questions about this project, or ethical issues relating to the project, I should feel free to contact Lisa 
Kuhn at lisa.kuhn@brunel.ac.uk. If I have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research 
is or has been conducted I may contact one of the Co-Chairs of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, Dr. 
Bridget Dibb at bridget.dibb@brunel.ac.uk or Dr. Achim Schuetzwohl at achim.schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk
 
* Required 
I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. * My signature is not a waiver of 
any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for 
my records. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named has consented to 
participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
____________________                          ____________________________       ______________ 
Principal Investigator Signature              Please Print                           Date 
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Chapter 4: ERS 
This questionnaire asks different questions about how you experience emotions on a regular basis (for 
example, each day). When you are asked about being “emotional,” this may refer to being angry, sad, 
excited, or some other emotion.  Please rate the following statements. 
 
 0 
Not at all 
like me 
1 
A little 
like me 
2 
Somewha
t like me 
3 
A lot  
like me 
4 
Completely 
like me 
 
1 When something happens that upsets me, it’s all I 
can think about it for a long time. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2 My feelings get hurt easily. 0 1 2 3 4 
3 When I experience emotions, I feel them very 
strongly/intensely. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4 When I’m emotionally upset, my whole body gets 
physically upset as well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 I tend to get very emotional very easily. 0 1 2 3 4 
6 I experience emotions very strongly. 0 1 2 3 4 
7 I often feel extremely anxious. 0 1 2 3 4 
8 When I feel emotional, it's hard for me to imagine 
feeling any other way. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 Even the littlest things make me emotional. 0 1 2 3 4 
10 If I have a disagreement with someone, it takes a 
long time for me to get over it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11 When I am angry/upset, it takes me much longer 
than most people to calm down. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12 I get angry at people very easily. 0 1 2 3 4 
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13 I am often bothered by things that other people don’t 
react to. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14 I am easily agitated. 0 1 2 3 4 
15 My emotions go from neutral to extreme in an 
instant. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16 When something bad happens, my mood changes 
very quickly. People tell me I have a very short fuse. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17 People tell me that my emotions are often too 
intense for the situation. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18 I am a very sensitive person. 0 1 2 3 4 
19 My moods are very strong and powerful. 0 1 2 3 4 
20 I often get so upset it’s hard for me to think straight. 0 1 2 3 4 
21 Other people tell me I'm overreacting. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Other relevant questions/comments: 
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Chapter 2 & 4: Some facts about you 
Now we would like to ask you for your time to tell us some facts about you. This will help us to get a 
better insight about some background information that may tell us more about your research 
results. Your information will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
Gender:   
____________________________ 
Date of Birth:   
____________________________ 
Ethnicity:   
____________________________ 
Educational Status:  
____________________________ 
Country of Birth:  
____________________________ 
First Language:   
____________________________ 
Second Language (if applicable):  
 ___________________________ 
Indicate the regions where you have lived for significant parts of time in your life: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
What culture do you feel a member of?  
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Translated words English-German 
 
Happy – glücklich Fearful – ängstlich 
Sad – traurig Surprised – überrascht 
Angry – wütend Disgusted – angeekelt 
 
 
German versions of emotional reactivity scale (ERS) and demographic details: 
ERS 
Die folgende Umfrage bezieht sich auf Ihr Emotionsempfinden auf regelmässiger Basis (zum Beispiel 
täglich). Mit dem Wort “emotional,” könnte zum Beispiel 'traurig, wütend, aufgewühlt sein' oder 
ähnliche Emotionen gemeint sein. 
 1 Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
2 Trifft 
nur 
bedingt zu 
3 Trifft 
etwas zu 
4 Trifft 
zu 
5 Trifft 
komplett 
zu 
1  Wenn etwas passiert, das mich aufregt, kann 
ich lange an nichts anderes denken. 
     
2. Ich bin schnell verletzt.      
3. Wenn ich Emotionen empfinde, spüre ich 
sie sehr stark und intensiv. 
     
4. Wenn ich aufgeregt bin, hat das physische 
Auswirkungen auf meinen ganzen Körper. 
     
5. Ich tendiere dazu, schnell emotional zu 
reagieren. 
     
6. Ich nehme Gefühle sehr stark wahr.      
7. Ich bin oft sehr ängstlich und beunruhigt.      
8. Wenn ich ein bestimmtes Gefühl empfinde, 
fällt es mir schwer mir vorzustellen, dass ich 
mich anders fühlen könnte. 
     
9. Sogar die kleinsten Dinge rufen Gefühle in 
mir hervor. 
     
10. Wenn ich mit jemandem eine 
Meinungsverschiedenheit habe, dauert es sehr 
lange, bis ich darüber hinweg bin. 
     
11. Wenn ich verärgert oder aufgeregt bin, 
benötige ich mehr Zeit als die meisten, um 
mich zu beruhigen. 
     
12. Ich regiere schnell verärgert auf andere 
Menschen. 
     
13. Ich störe mich oft an Dingen, welche 
andere nicht wahrnehmen. 
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Demographische Daten & ERS für Erwachsene, Jan/Feb 2013 
Folgende Daten werden uns helfen, ihre Ergebnisse besser zu interpretieren. Vielen Dank für Ihre 
Angaben, es wird natürlich alles streng vertraulich behandelt. 
 
Geschlecht: _________________                                                    Alter:   _______________                         
Geburtsjahr: ________________                                           Geburtsland: ____________________ 
Akademische Ausbildung: 
 * bitte das höchste wählen (entweder abgeschlossen oder momentan durchführend).  
Hauptschule/Mittlere Reife        Abitur         Bachelor         Master/Diplom/Doktor 
  Anderes: ___________________ 
Land/Länder in dem Sie länger als 5 Jahre am Stück gelebt haben (ausser Ihrem Geburtsland): 
 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Muttersprache: ___________________   Zweite Muttersprache (falls zutreffend): ______________ 
 
Welcher Kultur fühlen Sie sich zugehörig?  
* Normalerweise das Land in dem Sie geboren und aufgewachsen sind - außer in anderen 
Umständen. 
 
 ____________________________ 
14. Ich bin schnell durcheinander.      
15. Meine Gefühle springen innerhalb von 
wenigen Augenblicken von neutral zu extrem. 
     
16. Wenn etwas Schlechtes passiert, ändert 
sich meine Stimmung sehr schnell. Man sagt 
mir, dass ich schnell die Beherrschung 
verliere. 
     
17. Menschen sagen mir oft, dass meine 
Gefühle nicht der Situation entsprechend sind. 
     
19. Meine Launen sind sehr ausgeprägt und 
stark. 
     
20. Ich bin oft so aufgewühlt, dass ich 
nichtmehr klar denken kann. 
     
21. Andere sagen mir, ich würde 
überreagieren. 
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Appendix B – Child Participants 
 
    Chapter 3 & 4: Agreement 
 
I am pleased to confirm my agreement that the student Lisa Kuhn can conduct the PhD research as 
part of the international research project "Children's cross-cultural emotion detection in face and 
voice" here at the school/club _______________________________ (name) in 
_____________________ (place).  
The school/club agrees to provide Lisa Kuhn access to the institution/club named above and a 
selection of its pupils/members in order to conduct the research. Parental consent will be provided in 
advance. 
Contact person at the school/club for the duration of this study will be ______________________. 
 
 
 
 
Hiermit bestätige ich, dass die Studentin Lisa Kuhn einen Teil ihrer Doktorarbeit im Rahmen des 
internationalen Forschungsprojektes ‚Emotionen erkennen in der Stimme und im Gesicht – eine 
zwischenkulturelle Entwicklungsstudie` hier an der Schule/Verein 
____________________________________(Name) in __________________ (Ort) durchführen 
kann.  
Die Schule/der Verein gewährt Lisa Kuhn Zugang zu der oben genannten Institution/Verein und einer 
Selektion von Schülern/Mitgliedern um die Studie durchzuführen. Zustimmung der Eltern wird im 
Voraus bereitgestellt.  
Ansprechpartner an der Schule/Verein für den Zeitraum der Studie wird sein: __________________. 
  
 
_______________________       _____________________         ______________________ 
Unterschrift/Signature                  Position                                      Ort, Datum/Place, Time 
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Brunel University, 
Uxbridge, UB8 3PH.  
Tel: +44 (0)1895 274000 
Fax: +44 (0)1895 232806 
Lisa.Kuhn@Brunel.ac.uk 
11
th.
 October 2012 
Dear Parents, 
We (Brunel University) are conducting an international study funded by the Economics and Social 
Research council with primary school children in England as well as in Germany. We are interested in 
the way children across two different countries develop their emotion recognition abilities over age. 
After several co-operations in previous years, St. Andrew CofE Primary school has very kindly 
provided us with access to the school once again and we are very happy to be able to conduct the 
study at the school this autumn during normal school times. For this study, children aged 5-10 will 
have the chance to take part in a fun computer based emotion recognition task of emotional faces and 
voices and a problem solving task. 
If you are happy for your child to take part in this study and to help us collecting important research 
data, we would kindly ask you to sign and complete the two forms on the following pages (page 3 & 
4). All data will be kept strictly confidential and won’t be connected to any names. In case you have 
any questions please don’t hesitate contacting me at Lisa.Kuhn@brunel.ac.uk. 
Thank you very much for your help in advance! 
 
Lisa Kuhn 
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Chapter 3 & 4: DEBRIEFING FORM: Investigation of human interaction 
 The aim of the study is to find out how children develop the ability to recognise emotions and 
whether the reaction times of doing so changes with age. Furthermore, this study hopes to identify the 
young children can reliably detect emotions within voice and face and this ability develops with age, 
in line with their Theory of Mind development, which means to understand that other people may 
have other feelings and perspectives about the world. More specifically, we also want to find out 
whether children across England as well as Germany judge emotions in a similar way or whether 
there are any differences in the timing and onset of the development.    
In short, the predicted aims of this study are as follows: 
 Children across England and Germany aged 5-10 can detect basic emotions within the voice 
and face 
 We believe that this ability develops and improves with age, meaning that older children will 
be able to judge emotions faster and also assess perceived emotion intensity. 
 There could be small differences between English and German children in their emotion 
understanding due to certain cultural differences or differences in educational systems. 
 
 
If you want to learn more about the idea of this research, the following  
studies might be of interest to you: 
Charles, S. & Campos, B. (2011): Age-Related Changes in Emotion Recognition: How, Why, and 
How Much of a Problem? Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour, 35:287–295.  
 
Morton, J. and Trehub, S. (2001): Children’s Understanding of Emotion in Speech, Child 
Development, Volume 72, Number 3, Pages 834–843. 
 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study!! 
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Chapter 3 & 4: INFORMED CONSENT SHEET  
Parents of under aged participants:  Children’s emotion recognition         
 The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons/their legal guardians who 
participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so.   
 
Please read the following and sign it if you agree with what it says. My child freely and voluntarily consents to 
be a participant in the research project entitled “Children’s emotion recognition” to be conducted at ST. 
Andrews CofE school, with Lisa Kuhn and Prof. Taeko Wydell as supervisor or principal investigator.   
The broad goal of this research program is to explore how children recognise basic emotions within the face and 
voice and how this ability develops with age. 
 
Specifically, I have been told that my child will be asked to take part in a computer-based emotion recognition 
task of displayed faces and voices. Furthermore, my child will complete a short problem solving task and 
answer a few questions about people’s belief after listening to a story. The session should take no longer than 40 
minutes to complete. I have been told that my child’s responses will be kept strictly confidential.  I also 
understand that if at any time during the session he/she feels unable or unwilling to continue, he/she is free to 
leave without negative consequences.  That is, my child’s participation in this study is completely voluntary, and 
he/she may withdraw from this study at any time.  His/her withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic 
or otherwise.  
 
My child’s name will not be linked with the research materials, as the researchers are interested in social 
interactions in general - not in any particular individual's interaction/behaviour in particular.  I/my child have 
been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, and my questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction.   
 
I have been informed that if I have any general questions about this project, or ethical issues relating to the 
project, I should feel free to contact Lisa Kuhn at lisa.kuhn@brunel.ac.uk.  If I have any concerns or complaints 
regarding the way in which the research is or has been conducted I may contact Professor Taeko Wydell, Chair 
of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, at Taeko.Wydell@brunel.ac.uk. I have read and understand the 
above and consent to my child’s participation in this study.  My signature is not a waiver of any legal rights.  
Furthermore, I understand that I can make a copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
_______________________      _________________________               _______________ 
Participant’s Signature        Please Print                                                Date  
______________________ 
Child’s Name 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named has consented to 
participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
____________________                       ____________________________       ______________ 
Principal Investigator Signature              Please Print                                 Date 
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Chapter 3 & 4: To be filled out by Parents. 
We would like to ask you for your time to tell us some facts about you and your child. This will help us to get a 
better insight about some background information that may tell us more about the research results.  
Child’s Gender:  _________________________ 
Child’s Age:   _________________________ 
Number of Child’s Siblings (if applicable): _____________________________ 
Child’s Ethnicity: 
 
Asian   
 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Child’s Country of Birth:        _____________________________________ 
Child’s First Language:   _____________________________________ 
Mother’s Educational Status (if applicable):  
 
 
 
 
  _______________________________________ 
Father’s Educational Status (if applicable): 
 
 
Undergraduate Degree (BSc, BA, Diploma)  
 
   _________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for this information. All details will be kept strictly confidential and not 
be used in any connection with any names etc. 
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Chapter 3 & 4: INFORMED CONSENT SHEET – CHILD PARTICIPANTS: 
Emotion recognition (Children, 5-10 years old) 
What I will do today: 
- Listen to voices and watch face on the computer and say how sad, happy 
etc they sound/look.      
 
- Match some coloured patterns with missing ones, just like doing a puzzle. 
 
  
- Take part in two very short play tasks. 
 
- My reward will be stickers and other stationary.     
 
- I can stop if I want to at any time. 
 
- The session will take about 45 minutes 
 
- Lisa Kuhn has explained to me details about the study.     
   
- My parents and school teacher are happy for me to take part. 
 
I would like to participate (circle): 
 
YES                          NO 
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Chapter 3 & 4: Theory of Mind/Perspective Taking Task. 
 
As used in:  O’Brien et al. (2011): Longitudinal Associations between Children’s understanding of 
Emotions and Theory of Mind. Cognition and Emotion, Volume 25, Number 6, pp. 1074-1086. 
 
 Unexpected Contents (False Belief), developed by Astington & Gopnik, 1988 
Aim is to identify the child’s own and second person’s belief about the content of two items. 
 
Procedure: 
A cereal box containing pencils will be presented to the child. The child will be asked what 
he/she thinks is in the containers before the real content will be shown to them. 
Task question 1: Before we opened the container, what did you think was in here? 
Task question 2: What does this cuddle toy here think is in the container who hasn’t seen 
the content? 
 
Scoring: Do two trials, 1 point for each correct answer. 
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Risk assessment: Children’s cross cultural emotion detection in face and voice  
The research study is concerned with children’s (aged 5-10) emotional understanding of visual as well as 
auditory emotional stimuli. Children in Germany as well as England will be asked to take part in a computerized 
task, including the emotional intensity and reaction time judgement of face (Pictures of Facial Affect, Ekman) 
and voice (Montreal Affective Voices) samples.  Furthermore, they will be asked to complete a non-verbal IQ 
test (Coloured Progressive Matrices task) and two short Theory of Mind play tasks. 
Safety during conducting research: 
To the extent of my knowledge I am acting legally when planning and conducting my research. The experiment 
will be conducted at a local Primary school in London as well as Pforzheim (Ger) which is a neutral location 
where other people will be present. At no time will I be completely on my own with the participant. My family 
and my research supervisor will be informed when I am conducting the experiment. When children are taking 
part, teachers or parents/legal guardians will be asked to sit in the same room and there is a constant 
webmail/telephone contact to the research supervisor possible in case some advice is needed. 
Materials & Methods: 
 A fully charged laptop will be used in order to conduct the computer based emotion recognition study. The non 
verbal IQ test is a paper based version and the Theory of Mind tasks will include cereal boxes filled with pencils 
and a bubble jar filled with straws, additionally to some picture cards.  Material is safe as it has been previously 
tested (such as loudness, no electrical fault). The tests are non invasive and do not include any personal intrusive 
questions. Furthermore it is possible to withdraw any time. No special training for the participants will be 
required but there will be a short introduction on how complete the computer based task. 
Possible risks: 
All material used is non personal or intrusive. All tests are non offensive, written in basic terms so that it is 
easily understood by children. The tests used are widely accepted and validated. In case of young/less literate 
participants, questions  and task instructions will be read out aloud or filled in by legal guardians. The reduced 
risk for a participant is a priority to the researcher and is kept at a minimum. 
All in all, this study should not induce any form of distress in others and should take no longer than 40-50 
minutes to participate. 
I belief that the risk involved in this research is insignificant and unlikely to happen. All possible risks have 
been eliminated as much as possible. The possible risks involved should not exceed the distress of daily hassles 
of participants in any level.  
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Data protection & other requirements: 
Participant’s personal data about age, gender, country of birth, ethnicity, educational status will be stored in 
order to check for co-variation factors in research results.  
However, data protection issues are considered. Therefore, personal data will only be used for research aims. 
They are only accessible by the researcher and will not be forwarded to a third party. No names will be 
mentioned at any time and the research data will not come in contact with individual personal data as we are 
only concerned with average data across all participants.  
Since this study involves vulnerable participants such as children under the age of 16, a Criminal Record Bureau 
Check (enhanced disclosure) will be required for the researcher. Therefore, the researcher has been checked (13 
March 2009) and cleared with no records.  
This risk assessment will be shown to the University Research Ethics Committee, to the research supervisor, to 
parents of under aged participants or to participants themselves if they wish so. 
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Chapter 3: ToM Task questions for 5-6 year olds 
 
 
Story 1. BOBBY’S CHOCOLATE BARS 
 
Bobby loves chocolate. Bobby’s mum knows that chocolate is Bobby’s favourite thing in all the world. He 
keeps lots of chocolate bars in the cupboard in his bedroom. Bobby’s mum doesn’t like him eating 
chocolate. It might spoil his tea! One day when he has gone to his friend’s house, Bobby’s mum moves the 
chocolate bars and she puts them into her pink shopping bag. When Bobby comes home, where does he 
think his chocolate is? 
 
ToM Level 1: 
a) Bobby thinks his chocolate is in his mum’s shopping bag. 
b) Bobby thinks his chocolate is in his cupboard. 
Story 2. MUM’S BIRTHDAY 
 
Anna wanted to get her mum a birthday present. Her brother Ben was out riding his bike so Anna decided 
to look around his room to see if she could find what present he had got for mum. Anna went in and found 
a big bunch of beautiful flowers with a little card that said: ‘Happy Birthday Mum’. Anna thought to 
herself ‘mum must want flowers for her birthday!’ Anna didn’t want Ben to know that she had been 
snooping round his room, so she said to Ben: “Ben, have you got mum a birthday present?” Ben thought 
for a minute, he didn’t want Anna to copy him so he said: “Yes, Anna, I have got mum some perfume.  
 
ToM Level 1: 
a) Anna thinks Ben has bought mum some perfume. 
b) Anna knows Ben has bought mum some flowers. 
Story 4. THE SCHOOL FOOTBALL TEAM 
 
Best friends Johnny and Bob both want to play on the school football team. Johnny thinks that he is not as 
good at football as Bob is. He thinks that the football manager is more likely to choose Bob for the football 
team. But the football manager thinks that both Johnny and Bob are good football players. He wants them 
both to play in the school football team. But the manager knows that Johnny doesn’t think he will get on 
the team. 
 
ToM Level 2: 
a) Johnny doesn’t know that the manager wants both him and Bob on the team. 
b) Johnny thinks that the manager wants both him and Bob on the team. 
Story 5. THE TEST 
 
Class 4 were having a spelling test on Friday. Mrs Smith, the teacher, told all the children to work really 
hard. Kirsty wanted to do well. She learned all the words that she knew would be in the test. Kirsty told 
Mrs Smith that she had been learning the words all week. When the spelling test started, Mrs Smith turned 
to James first. James was a friend of Kirsty but sometimes he was rather lazy. “James,” said Mrs Smith.” 
How do you spell balloon?” James had not been learning his spellings. He did not know how to spell 
balloon. But James did remember that there was a poster in the classroom. He knew the word “balloon” 
was written on that poster. The poster was behind Mrs Smith. She could not see it. James cheated and spelt 
out that word “balloon” from the poster. Mrs Smith said: “Well done, James, that’s correct.” 
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ToM Level 2: 
a) Mrs Smith thought that Kirsty wanted to do well on the test. 
b) Mrs Smith didn’t know that Kirsty wanted to do well on the test. 
 
 
Chapter 3: ToM Task questions for 7-10 year olds 
 
 
Story 4. THE SCHOOL FOOTBALL TEAM 
 
Best friends Johnny and Bob both want to play on the school football team. Johnny thinks that he is not as 
good at football as Bob is. He thinks that the football manager is more likely to choose Bob for the football 
team. But the football manager thinks that both Johnny and Bob are good football players. He wants them 
both to play in the school football team. But the manager knows that Johnny doesn’t think he will get on 
the team. 
 
ToM Level 2: 
a) Johnny doesn’t know that the manager wants both him and Bob on the team. 
b) Johnny thinks that the manager wants both him and Bob on the team. 
ToM Level 3: 
a) The manager thinks that Johnny knows he wants him to be on the football team. 
b) The manager knows that Johnny doesn’t know that he wants him to be on the team. 
 
Story 5. THE TEST 
 
Class 4 were having a spelling test on Friday. Mrs Smith, the teacher, told all the children to work really 
hard. Kirsty wanted to do well. She learned all the words that she knew would be in the test. Kirsty told 
Mrs Smith that she had been learning the words all week. When the spelling test started, Mrs Smith turned 
to James first. James was a friend of Kirsty but sometimes he was rather lazy. “James,” said Mrs Smith.” 
How do you spell balloon?” James had not been learning his spellings. He did not know how to spell 
balloon. But James did remember that there was a poster in the classroom. He knew the word “balloon” 
was written on that poster. The poster was behind Mrs Smith. She could not see it. James cheated and spelt 
out that word “balloon” from the poster. Mrs Smith said: “Well done, James, that’s correct.” 
 
ToM Level 2: 
a) Mrs Smith thought that Kirsty wanted to do well on the test. 
b) Mrs Smith didn’t know that Kirsty wanted to do well on the test. 
ToM Level 3: 
a) James thinks that Mrs Smith believes that he knows how to spell ‘balloon’. 
b) James thinks that Mrs Smith knows that he doesn’t really know how to spell ‘balloon’. 
 
 
Taken from: Liddle, B. & Nettle, D. (2006): Higher-Order Theory Of Mind And Social Competence In School-
Age Children. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 4(2006)3–4, 231–24. 
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Chapter 3: INFORMED CONSENT SHEET  
(Parents of under aged participants): Children’s emotion recognition         
 The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons/their legal guardians who 
participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so.  Please read the following and sign it if 
you agree with what it says. My child freely and voluntarily consents to be a participant in the research project 
entitled “Children’s emotion recognition” to be conducted at ST. Andrews CofE school, with Lisa Kuhn and 
Prof. Taeko Wydell as supervisor or principal investigator.   
The broad goal of this study is to explore how children recognise basic emotions within the face and how this 
ability develops with age. This study is a follow up to the study your child completed in 2012 in order to track 
development over a period of time. Specifically, I have been told that my child will be asked to take part in a 
computer-based emotion recognition task to judge faces displayed by either child or adult actors according to 
the displayed emotion. The session should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. 
I have been told that my child’s responses will be kept strictly confidential.  I also understand that if at any 
time during the session he/she feels unable or unwilling to continue, he/she is free to leave without negative 
consequences.  That is, my child’s participation in this study is completely voluntary, and he/she may withdraw 
from this study at any time.  His/her withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise. My 
child’s name will not be linked with the research materials, as the researchers are interested in social 
interactions in general - not in any particular individual's interaction/behaviour in particular. 
 I/my child have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, and my questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction.  I have been informed that if I have any general questions about this 
project, or ethical issues relating to the project, I should feel free to contact Lisa Kuhn at 
lisa.kuhn@brunel.ac.uk.  If I have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or has 
been conducted I may contact Professor Taeko Wydell, Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, at 
Taeko.Wydell@brunel.ac.uk. 
I have read and understand the above and consent to my child’s participation in this study.  My signature is not 
a waiver of any legal rights.  Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to keep a copy of the informed 
consent form for my records. 
_______________________      _________________________                  _______________ 
Participant’s Signature        Please Print                                                   Date  
______________________ 
Child’s Name 
 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named has consented to 
participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
 
____________________                       ____________________________       ______________ 
Principal Investigator Signature              Please Print                                 Date 
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Dear Parents, 
We (Brunel University) are conducting an international study funded by the Economics and Social 
Research council with primary school children in England as well as in Germany. 
We are interested in the way children across two different countries develop their emotion 
recognition abilities over age. For this, we will return to St. Andrew CofE Primary school, which has 
very kindly provided us with access to the school once again. We are very pleased to conduct the 
study this March during normal school times. 
Your child has kindly participated in the first part of this study in 2012 which gave us fantastic 
results. Now we are conducting a follow-up study with the same children in order to track their 
development over time. This will give us a better idea of how to interpret findings from the first 
study. 
For this study, children aged 8-10 will have the chance to take part in a fun computer based emotion 
recognition task, rating emotional faces, such as: 
 
         or            
If you are happy for your child to take part in this second part of the study and to help us collecting 
important follow up data, we would kindly ask you to sign the form on the back of this page and to 
fill in additional information below. All data will be kept strictly confidential. In case you have any 
questions, please contact me at Lisa.Kuhn@brunel.ac.uk. 
Thank you very much for your help in advance! 
To be filled out by parents. 
Child’s Gender:  ______________________________ 
Child’s Age:  _______________________________ 
Child’s Date of Birth: ____________________________ 
Number of Child’s Siblings (if applicable): _____________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for this information. All details will be kept strictly confidential and not be 
used in any connection with any names etc. 
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Appendix C – EEG Chapter 
 
Research Participant Name:  
Research Participant signature: 
Date: 
Principal Investigator name:  
Principal Investigator signature: 
Date: 
 YES NO 
1. I have read the Research Participant Information Sheet. 
  
2. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study. 
  
3. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study: 
- at any time (Please note that you will unable to withdraw once your data                                 
has been included in any reports, publications etc)   
- without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
  
- without it affecting my future career 
  
4. I understand that this study measures my brain activity which is a completely 
harmless procedure   
5. I understand that I will not be referred to by name in any report/publications 
resulting from this study   
6. I agree that I will be viewing faces and hear voices which I will be rating during 
the task   
7. I agree to take part in this study 
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Instruction EEG study 
In this study, you will see either faces or hear short clips of voices. 
The faces or voices will either be emotional or just neutral (so that means they don’t express any 
emotions). 
There are two tasks for you: 
1) In the first task, you will see or hear briefly (under 1 second) a picture or sound. After it has 
disappeared, press ‘1’ if it was an emotional face/voice and ‘0’ if it was a neutral face/voice. 
So it is all about emotions! 
Be careful: Don’t press any buttons if it is a neutral face/voice! 
 
2) In the second task, you will see or hear exactly the same picture or sound. But this time, 
ignore the emotion they express and after it has disappeared, press ‘1’ if it was a female 
face/voice and ‘0’ if it was a male face/voice. So it is all about gender! 
Just before the picture/sound appears, you will see a purple cross in the middle of the screen to tell 
you that the next stimulus is coming up. Please keep looking at it whenever you see it! The cross will 
stay on for the duration of the sound. 
Most stimuli will be repeated several times. Can you find out how many times? 
No panic, we will always tell you which task is coming next and remind you of which buttons to 
press.  
Important: Please only click the button once the picture or sound has disappeared!  
We will start with a short practice run before each task (one for emotion task, one for gender task) so 
get you used to pressing the buttons after the stimulus. 
 
Any Questions? Thank you & Enjoy!! 
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DEBRIEFING FORM: 
Emotion Recognition in Human Voice and Face – An EEG Study 
 
 Results from our previous study indicated that participants rate happy emotions faster and with higher 
intensity than negative emotions such as anger or sadness. The aim of the present study is to 
investigate underlying brain mechanisms associated with rating either happy or angry emotions and to 
observe whether they correspond with our previous findings from behavioural studies.  
Furthermore, we aim to find out whether the brain reacts faster to emotions displayed in either faces 
or voices and whether the same pattern of emotion recognition (i.e. react faster to angry or happy 
emotions) is replicated across modalities. If you have any questions or complaints about the execution 
of the study, you can contact Dr. Bridget Dibbs (bridget.dibbs@brunel.ac.uk) or Dr. Achim 
Schuetzwohl (achim.schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk) as co-chairs of the Brunel Social Science Ethics 
committee.     
 More specifically, from our behavioural data, we predict that: 
1. Participants show enhanced brain activity to happy as compared to angry emotions 
2a. This pattern is expected to be visible across both modalities (voices and faces) 
2b. However, faces might show faster processing times than voices. 
The following studies might be of interest to you: 
 Becker et al., (2011): The Face in the Crowd Effect Unconfounded: Happy Faces, Not Angry 
Faces, Are More Efficiently Detected in Single- and Multiple-Target Visual Search Tasks. 
Journal of  Experimental Psychology. 140(4), 637–659. 
 
• Hansen, C. & Hansen, R. (1988): Finding the Face in the Crowd: An Anger Superiority 
Effect. Journal of Peraonality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 917-924. 
 
• Kiss, M. & Eimer, M. (2008): ERPs reveal subliminal processing of fearful faces. 
Psychophysiology, 45, 318–326. 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study. 
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Information Sheet: Recording the electroencephalogram (EEG) 
 
EEG is a recording of the electrical activity of the brain. It is a safe, non-invasive procedure. 
It involves wearing a cap that contains a number of electrodes (32 or 64) that are small ceramic discs 
with a silver coating. To make electrical contact with the scalp, these discs must be filled with saline 
gel (similar in consistency to hair gel). The gel is harmless to the hair and skin and is certified for this 
use. Once the electrodes have been filled, the cap is connected to the recording system to check 
whether the electrodes will record (impedance testing). There is usually some adjustment of the cap 
and re-filling of the electrodes to make sure that a good recording can be obtained. 
In the experiment itself, a stimulus such as a picture or a sound is presented repeatedly, and/or 
you will carry out a simple task. The tiny electrical signals are passed into a powerful amplifier, and a 
computer records the EEG signal from each electrode. After the experiment, we average the activity 
to each stimulus to obtain a 3D map (two spatial dimensions plus time) of the brain’s response to the 
stimulus, known as an event related potential (ERP).  
The experiment will involve observing blocks of stimuli, and/or making simple repeated 
responses, while keeping still and concentrating. Each block would typically last 8 min, and there 
would be breaks in between the blocks in which you can move around, stretch, talk, drink some water, 
etc. The experiment part would last about 60 min and the preparation and removal of the electrodes 
would last about 30 min making about 90 min for the whole procedure. 
With the gel method, it will be necessary to wash your hair soon after the experiment. There 
is a shower room nearby, with shampoo and a clean towel available, or if you prefer, you can remove 
most of the gel with a tissue and wash hair when you get home.  
It is also advisable to wash hair on the morning or night before the experiment for your own 
comfort and to obtain good recordings. We cannot record from people wearing a hijab or other head 
covering, with hair extensions, weave, thick plaited hair, or hair styled using wax, hair spray or 
similar products. 
Participants will be asked to read and sign a consent form. You will have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time – either before or during the experiment. No explanation is 
necessary and there are no adverse consequences (academic or otherwise) if you do not wish to 
continue.  
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Examples of visual stimuli for the ERP study on emotion recognition 
Female and male actors portrayed happiness, anger and neutral expressions. Expressions with open 
mouth/visible teeth (such as in happiness and anger expressions) were balanced.  
 
                       
                       
                          
                         
                    
 
 
 
